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Abstract
In the past decade a variety of fields has been explored by statistical physicists, lead-
ing to an increase of our quantitative understanding of various systems composed of
many interacting elements, such as social systems. However, an empirical quantifi-
cation of human behavior on a societal level has so far proved to be tremendously
diﬃcult due to problems in data availability, quality and ways of acquisition. In
this doctoral thesis we compile for the first time a large-scale data set consisting of
practically all actions and properties of 350,000 odd participants of an entire human
society interacting in a self-developed Massive Multiplayer Online Game, over a pe-
riod of five years. We describe this social system composed of strongly interacting
players in the game in three consecutive levels. In a first step, we examine the indi-
viduals and their behavioral properties over time. A scaling and fluctuation analysis
of action-reaction time-series reveals persistence of the possible actions and qualita-
tive diﬀerences between “good” and “bad” players. We then study and model the
diﬀusion process of human mobility occurring within the “game universe”. We find
subdiﬀusion and a power-law distributed preference to return to more recently visited
locations. Second, on a higher level, we use network theory to quantify the topo-
logical structure of interactions between the individuals. We focus on six network
types defined by direct interactions, three of them with a positive connotation (trade,
friendship, communication), three with a negative one (enmity, attack, punishment).
These networks exhibit non-trivial statistical properties, e.g. scale-free topology, and
evolve over time, allowing to test a series of long-standing social-dynamics hypothe-
ses. We find qualitative diﬀerences in evolution and topological structure between
positive and negative tie networks. Finally, on a yet higher level, we consider the
multiplex network of the player society, constituted by the coupling of the single
network layers. We quantify interactions between diﬀerent networks and detect the
non-trivial organizational principles which lead to the observed structure of the sys-
tem and which have been observed in real human societies as well. Our findings
with the multiplex framework provide evidence for the half-century old hypothesis
of structural balance, where certain frustrated states on a microscopic level tend to
be avoided. Within this setup we demonstrate the feasibility for generating novel
scientific insights on the nature of collective human behavior in large-scale social
systems.
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Kurzfassung
Die statistische Physik erforschte im letzten Jahrzehnt eine Fu¨lle von wissenschaftli-
chen Gebieten, was zu einem besseren quantitativen Versta¨ndnis von verschiedenen,
aus vielen Elementen bestehenden Systemen, z.B. von sozialen Systemen, gefu¨hrt
hat. Eine empirische Quantifizierung von menschlichem Verhalten auf gesellschaftli-
chem Niveau hat sich allerdings bisher als sehr schwierig erwiesen, wegen Problemen
bei der Gewinnung und Qualita¨t von Daten. In dieser Doktorarbeit erstellen wir
zum ersten mal einen umfangreichen u¨ber fu¨nf Jahre gesammelten Datensatz, der
praktisch alle Aktionen und Eigenschaften der 350.000 Teilnehmer einer gesamten
menschlichen Gesellschaft aus einem selbstentwickelten Massive Multiplayer Online
Game entha¨lt. Wir beschreiben dieses aus stark wechselwirkenden Spielern beste-
hende soziale System in drei Ebenen. In einem ersten Schritt analysieren wir die
Individuen und deren Verhalten im Verlauf der Zeit. Eine Skalen- und Fluktu-
ationsanalyse von Aktions-Reaktions-Zeitreihen enthu¨llt Persistenz der mo¨glichen
Aktionen und qualitative Unterschiede zwischen “guten” und “schlechten” Spielern.
Wir untersuchen danach den Diﬀusionsprozess der im Spieluniversum stattfindenden
Bewegungen der Individuen. Wir finden Subdiﬀusivita¨t und eine durch ein Poten-
zgesetz verteilte Pra¨ferenz zu ku¨rzlich besuchten Orten zuru¨ckzukehren. Zweitens,
auf der na¨chstho¨heren Ebene, verwenden wir Netzwerktheorie um die topologische
Struktur der Interaktionen zwischen Individuen zu quantifizieren. Wir konzentrieren
uns auf sechs durch direkte Interaktionen definierte Netzwerke, drei davon positiv
(Handel, Freundschaft, Kommunikation), drei negativ (Feindschaft, Attacke, Be-
strafung). Diese Netzwerke weisen nichttriviale statistische Eigenschaften auf, z.B.
skaleninvariante Topologie, und entwickeln sich in der Zeit, was uns erlaubt eine
Reihe von Hypothesen u¨ber sozialdynamische Pha¨nomene zu testen. Wir finden qual-
itative Unterschiede zwischen positiven und negativen Netzwerken in Evolution und
Struktur. Schließlich untersuchen wir dasMultiplex-Netzwerk der Spielergesellschaft,
das sich aus den einzelnen Netzwerk-Schichten zusammensetzt. Wir quantifizieren
Interaktionen zwischen verschiedenen Netzwerken und zeigen die nichttrivialen Or-
ganisationsprinzipien auf die auch in echten menschlichen Gesellschaften beobachtet
wurden. Unsere Erkenntnisse liefern Belege fu¨r die Hypothese der strukturellen
Balance, die eine Vermeidung von gewissen frustrierten Zusta¨nden auf mikroskopis-
chem Niveau postuliert. Mit diesem Aufbau demonstrieren wir die Mo¨glichkeit der
Gewinnung neuartiger wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse u¨ber die Natur von kollek-
tivem menschlichen Verhalten in großangelegten sozialen Systemen.
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Outline
This doctoral thesis is a compilation of Refs. [203–205, 208], work already published
or in review at the time of this writing, containing the research eﬀorts over my three
years stay at the Section for Science of Complex Systems, Medical University of
Vienna. These works were performed in collaboration with Stefan Thurner (Medi-
cal University of Vienna), Renaud Lambiotte and Giovanni Petri (Imperial College
London), Roberta Sinatra and Vito Latora (University of Catania).
The thesis is organized as follows. We start motivating the aims and goals of
this work in Chapter 1, elaborating the need for a data-driven social science. Chap-
ter 2 reviews the valuable contribution of statistical physics towards this issue, and
gives a literature review with focus on complex systems and network theory. Here
we also list the mathematical and statistical tools of network theory used subse-
quently. In Chapter 3 we expose the background and problems in the understanding
of large-scale human behavior, and motivate the goal of establishing a socio-economic
laboratory. Compiled primarily from Ref. [203], we present and describe in detail
the experimental setting, i.e. the environment of a self-developed Massive Multi-
player Online Game together with its users, a society of human players consisting of
over 350,000 individuals. Results are presented in subsequent Chapters, where we
first focus on the “building blocks” of the society, the individuals and their actions,
then on the network topology of their interactions, and finally on the interplay be-
tween the diﬀerent interaction networks. Beginning with the findings of Ref. [208]
in Chapter 4, we characterize the statistical nature of actions and reactions of in-
dividuals. Further, we give an analysis on the mobility of the individuals in their
network-shaped virtual universe in Chapter 5, based on Ref. [204], measuring and
modeling the subdiﬀusive nature of their movements. Chapter 6 contains results
assembled from Ref. [205], where three diﬀerent interaction and relation networks
between the subjects are analyzed in detail, with both static and dynamic aspects.
In Chapter 7 we present the final results, based on Ref. [203], where six diﬀerent
types of socio-economic networks are analyzed not only as single entities, but in
conjunction. There, we study network–network interactions and the multi-relational
organizational structure of the socio-economic system, with an application in social
balance theory. We conclude the thesis and give an outlook in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: The need for a
data-driven social science
Quantification of collective human behavior and social dynamics poses a unique, cen-
tury old challenge. It is remarkable to some extent that mankind knows more about
dynamics of subatomic particles than it knows about the dynamics of human groups.
The reason for this situation is that the establishment of a fully experimental and
quantifiable social science of group dynamics is tremendously complicated by two
factors: First, unlike many problems in the natural sciences, dynamics of societies
constitute a complex system, characterized by strong and long-range interactions,
which are in general not treatable by traditional mathematical methods and phys-
ical concepts, see Section 2.2. Second, data is of comparably poor availability and
quality [140, 216]. Evidently it is much harder to obtain data from social systems
than from repeatable experiments on (non-complex) physical systems. Despite these
severe problems, it is nevertheless paramount to arrive at a better understanding
of collective human behavior. Only recently it became evident in the context of
economics and finance, which costs are associated to misconceptions of human col-
lective behavior. The by far most devastating catastrophes in the history of mankind
are caused by social, man-made phenomena [111]: “Let us illustrate these risks by
some numbers: World War I caused more than 15,000,000 victims, and World War
II even 60,000,000 fatalities. The latter generated costs of 1,000 billion 1944 US$
and destroyed 1710 cities, 70,000 villages, 31,850 industrial establishments, 40,000
miles of railroad, 40,000 hospitals, and 84,000 schools. Moreover, the world has seen
many lossful wars ever since. The current financial and economic crises triggered
an estimated loss of 4-20 trillion US$. Climate change is expected to cause natural
disasters, conflicts for water, food, land, migration, social and political instability.
The related reduction of the world gross domestic product is expected to amount
to 0.6 trillion US$ per year or more.” Other collective social phenomena can have
similar devastating eﬀects on society, such as the amplification of epidemics spread-
ing through human mobility [55]. Considering these examples, one could in fact say
‘The major risks are social’. If the dynamics behind collective behavior are going
to remain as poorly understood as they are today, without the ability to generate
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statements with predictive value, any attempts of rationally managing crises related
to human groups in its various forms will remain illusionary.
A large social system is a complex system, featuring non-linear interactions be-
tween its constituents, the individuals making up the system, leading to emergent
macroscopic properties. Complex systems have the fundamental property of strong
interactions between its constituents, a feature which often allows the representation
of the system as a network, where nodes represent individuals, and links are the
one-to-one relations or interactions between them [44, 56, 83, 176]. These networks
typically have a time-varying topology, i.e. the network structure is dynamically
dependent on the particular configuration of node properties, or generalized “spins”
[27, 31]. As already noted by Ettore Majorana 70 years ago [148], social systems
(and social networks defined by the interactions and relations within these systems)
can be treated well statistically, and may be well approached with methods and tools
from statistical physics [16, 44]. In particular, the modern field of network science
can be built around the concept of the (statistical) ensemble, see Section 2.3. A
vast number of theoretical models have been introduced to explain large-scale social
phenomena, including the derivation of network Hamiltonians [27, 32]. At the same
time, 20th century sociology has produced a large number of observations and hy-
potheses, however usually only on a qualitative level and on small-scale groups of
individuals, due to the tremendous diﬃculties in acquisition of suﬃcient and reliable
data. Due to recent advances in information and communication technologies, the
increased capabilities to store and process large quantities of data from such systems
make it now possible to subject the proposed models and hypotheses to experimental
tests, and to quantify behavioral processes in human socio-economic systems with
extraordinary high statistical significance, increasing our understanding of collective
social phenomena.
The present doctoral thesis provides an experimental validation of a set of hy-
potheses following approaches motivated by statistical physics, based on data ex-
tracted from a set of more than 350, 000 human individuals living in a self-developed
online world, ‘Pardus’ [2], forming a closed social system. Complete information on
the properties and interactions of the participants of this online environment is avail-
able in the form of massive log-files and high frequency time-series. Individuals are
engaged in a multitude of social relations and are pursuing basic economic activities
to sustain a “living” in their virtual game-universe. This environment can be seen
as a large-scale “socio-economic laboratory”, a gigantic agent-based model in which
the agents are human beings [77, 94]. In particular the thesis follows the subsequent
paths of research:
1. Test experimentally to what extent mean-field assumptions in previously for-
mulated models [44] are justified. There is a growing number of indications that
in strongly interacting systems, such as social systems, heterogeneous patterns
of interactions seem to prevail [8, 44].
2. Calibration and quantification of microscopic interactions (couplings) of the
constituents on diﬀerent interaction networks. In particular, network analysis
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of the (evolving) structure of interactions [205].
3. Multiplex analysis of interactions between diﬀerent networks, quantification of
the organizational structure of the society [203].
4. Study and modeling of diﬀusion processes occurring in the system [204].
5. Scaling analysis of action–reaction time-series with fluctuation analysis and
anomalous diﬀusion techniques [208], as in Ref. [201].
For the first time the available detailed measurements of a large-scale social sys-
tem allow to test existing models with the precision of physical experiments, and
to improve these models if needed. For a historical placement of this new, un-
precedented way of analyzing social systems, Table 1.1 gives an overview of the
capabilities of social network data sets in the past and present. In this table, “Era
I” corresponds to the 20th century pre-information age, where data gathering of
social networks was conducted in an “analog” way only by e.g. interviews or ques-
tionnaires [162, 215]. “Era II” corresponds roughly to the first decade of the 21st
century, in which, additionally to previous methods, a number of specific large-scale
data sets have become available to the scientific community due to the capabilities of
data storage and collection, from means of digital communication technologies such
as the internet or mobile phones [140, 216]. “Era III” marks the time thereafter,
in which the development of virtual, large-scale “socio-economic laboratories” such
as Pardus becomes feasible, opening up a novel way for conducing social science
[13, 91, 188, 189, 203, 205]. Data sets from Era II typically do not feature multiple
relation types. By this we mean for example friendship or family ties, enmity, trade,
important for understanding the fundamentally multi-layered functioning of social
systems, see Chapter 7. While the number of subjects has reached the maximum
possible scale in Era II, i.e. planetary orders of magnitude [143], due to lack of rich
link data the full complexity of a society still cannot be studied there. Given that
the legal and ethical conditions are met, socio-economic laboratories also allow for
the possibility of experiments. If these conditions are too restrictive, at the very
least societies can be studied in multiple environments with diﬀerent sets of rules or
constraints. Online games often naturally feature this possibility when the game en-
vironment has to be split up into independent game-universes or so-called shards due
to technical or performance reasons [45]. This allows the straightforward implemen-
tation of parallel worlds, in which slightly diﬀerent sets of rules may exist, perfectly
controlled by the experimenter/game administrator. With such parallel universes,
multiple “histories” of human societies can be tracked and compared simultaneously,
allowing to fine-tune or test for robustness single parameters, for example in the
mechanisms of the financial system.
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Table 1.1: Sketch of a tabular history of the typically available capabilities of data sets in the
analysis of social systems, in particular in social network analysis. “Era I”, “Era II”, and “Era III”
mark the 20th century, the first decade of the 21st century, and the subsequent time, respectively,
in which data sets from social systems provide diﬀerent capabilities for researchers. “Rich node
data” stands for the availability of various data on the subjects, such as sex, age, ZIP code, etc.
“Rich link data” refers to the availability of multiple relation types, such as friendship or family
ties, enmity, etc., important for understanding the fundamentally multi-layered aspect of social
systems, see Chapter 7. “High frequency” concerns the availability of longitudinal data, usually
time-stamped to the second in information-age data sets. “Societal scope” stands for the possibility
to gather an all-encompassing view of a human society, requiring both rich node and link data, and
a large number of subjects.
Era I Era II Era III
Typical number of subjects N 101 – 102 103 – 109 103 – 109
Rich node data yes yes yes
Rich link data yes no yes
High frequency no yes yes
Societal scope no no yes
Avoidance of interviewer eﬀects no yes yes
Experiments yes no yes
Setup costs
(per individual)
very high practically zero,
but data has
to be available
low
12
Chapter 2
Statistical physics frameworks for
social systems
Statistical physics is the branch of physics which accounts for the understanding of
systems composed of many elements. At its base is the idea that a macroscopic sys-
tem made up of a large number of objects, e.g. atoms, is feasible to be understood
only from a statistical point of view. Analyzing the properties of each of its con-
stituents would practically not be possible. This approach allows to understand the
macroscopic properties that characterize the system and can be actually measured
in experiments. A classic example is gases: it is not possible to study the individual
motions of 1023 particles, but the state of one mole of gas can be fully characterized
by observing its pressure, temperature and the volume occupied, since the universal
law behind its behavior, i.e. the ideal gas law, is well-grounded and derivable from
statistical physics.
Given its very general framework and its applicability outside the realm of tra-
ditional physics, in the recent years researchers have successfully explored a variety
of fields with statistical physics methodology, such as in biology, computer science,
medicine, or in the social sciences. The main goal of a statistical physics approach
of social dynamics is to understand regularities on large scales as collective eﬀects
of the local interactions between single individuals, considered as relatively simple
entities [44].
In the following sections of this Chapter, we review a non-exhaustive compilation
of the statistical physics frameworks and paradigms used for describing social systems
and for modeling collective social phenomena. We introduce the concept of complex
systems in Section 2.2, and focus in particular on complex network theory, one of
the core themes of this thesis, in Section 2.3.
2.1 Human beings as particles?
In social systems, the constituents are not particles but humans. Human beings are
obviously more complex “entities” than atomic particles and feature complicated
13
2. Statistical physics frameworks for social systems
individual patterns of behavior, being the result of a multitude of physiological or
psychological processes1. The traditional approach in the social sciences has tended
to view the psychological complexities of human individuals as necessary to consider
when trying to understand human behavior in any form [16]. However, formulating a
deterministic scientific framework to exactly describe the processes behind individual
behavior or interactions amounts to a close to hopeless task – it is not possible to
model social agents without significant simplifications.
Despite these complications on the individual level, eﬀorts to model human soci-
ety using the methods of statistical physics by means of e.g. agent based models have
in the recent years provided ample reason to assume that a number of collective be-
havioral phenomena can be understood on the basis of strongly simplified interaction
rules [16].
2.1.1 From disorder to order
Many decisions of humans are the outcomes of simple imitation or learning processes,
in which individuals influence each other, and as a consequence come dynamically to
common agreements . If all my friends favor the same political faction, it is likely that
I will also have a tendency to favor it because I am influenced by the opinions of my
friends. Diﬀerent variations of opinion dynamics processes have been incorporated
by various models: i) the voter model [183], in which only two neighbors influence
each other in a time step, ii) the majority rule [89, 132, 135], where each member
of the group adopts the state of the majority of its neighbors, or iii) the Axelrod
model of cultural dynamics [12], in which each individual has a set of beliefs and can
become “more similar” to others through repeated interactions. The emergence of
agreements, or more generally of ordered social configurations, can result from subtle
eﬀects in the local influences between the individuals. In the famous Schelling model
of urban segregation [195], the slightest bias of individuals to prefer a neighborhood
where the majority of the immediate neighbors are of the same “race” can create
global patterns of racial segregation.
Considering that the transitions between disordered and ordered configurations
has traditionally been of high interest in statistical physics [118], it is not surprising
that quantitative physical models have been applied increasingly to social dynamics
phenomena. The Ising model is a paradigmatic example in which such transitions
occur. In a system of N spins (agents) si, having the values +1 or −1, each spin
is energetically pushed to align with the spins of its nearest neighbors. The total
energy is given by
H = −1
2
￿
(i,j)
sisj, (2.1)
with the sum running over the pairs of nearest neighbor spins [44]. The average
magnetization m = 1N
￿
i ￿si￿ starts taking a non-zero value as soon as the tem-
1For example, human behavior includes adaptive expectation, which has motivated the famous
Lucas critique on economic policies [147].
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perature T of the system decreases below a critical temperature Tc (angle brack-
ets denote averages over diﬀerent realizations). Besides its relevance for traditional
physical phenomena, such as for ferromagnets, the Ising model is well suited for mod-
eling phenomena in social dynamics and has been applied in this context in a large
number of studies [44]. Analogous phenomena of phase transitions can take place
in social systems, where ordered domains of small size grow through a coarsening
process, with their global statistical features remaining unchanged over time. The
Hamiltonian in equation (2.1) can be extended to incorporate nontrivial topologies,
for example network Hamiltonians [31], to account for more complex and realistic
interaction structures between elements. We study the related phenomenon of so-
cial balance in Chapter 7, in which particular configurations of local building blocks
(triads constituted by positive or negative relations) are expected and found to be
underrepresented in the social system due to reasons which are analogous to energy
minimization processes.
Adding to the theoretical work, empirical evidence has revealed the existence of
astonishing global regularities in social systems [40] becoming visible when studied
statistically, on a large scale. Although human individuals typically feature strong in-
teractions with only a limited number of “interaction partners” (and no interactions
with the vast majority of all the others), system-wide transitions between disorder
and order have been observed, such as the emergence of consensus about a specific
issue [44], urban segregation [195], or transitions in traﬃc or crowd dynamics [112].
Statistical physics makes it possible to understand the properties of these collective
social phenomena because in most situations they do not depend on the exact mi-
croscopic details of the processes involved [16, 44]. Rather, for many questions it is
enough to consider only the most important features of single individuals in mod-
els, and sometimes only higher level features such as symmetries, dimensionality, or
conservation laws play a relevant role for the global behavior. However, to generate
quantitative statements, and to relate the statistical laws to the microscopic proper-
ties of the system, these models need to be calibrated with empirical data measured
from real social systems, which is usually a very diﬃcult task, see Section 3.1, and
constitutes one of the aims of this thesis.
2.1.2 Mean-field approximation and the role of topology
The most basic assumption on the microscopic interactions between the entities of
a system is to suppose that all of them exert an influence on all others. This is true
in many physical systems, such as electromagnetic or gravitational systems. Such
a simple approximation can also be applied to a human society, where in a well-
mixed population each individual has the same likelihood of interacting with any
other individual. This assumption is common in areas such as evolutionary game
theory which deals with competing strategies in a population, and which allows to
significantly simplify adaptation and selection processes to a system of first order
diﬀerential equations. In this approach, the state of a population is given by the
vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) on the n-simplex Sn, where xi is the relative frequency
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of strategy i, i.e.
￿
i xi = 1 and 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 for all i. Every strategy has a fitness
value, contained in a payoﬀ matrix A, which determines its success against other
strategies. The evolution of the strategies in the system is then tractable in a special
input-output equation, the replicator equation
x˙i = xi [(Ax)i − x · Ax] , (2.2)
where a strategy i gains (Ax)i but loses the average payoﬀ in the population of
x · Ax =￿i xi(Ax)i [197]. The replicator equation is a special case of a master
equation, a concept which has also been used in the so-called sociodynamics approach
to model social systems [110]. In all these models, the results are independent of the
spatial configuration, as the “mean-field approximation” assumes that the dynamics
can be determined by studying interactions between “typical” interaction partners, a
notion which is equivalent to the concept of representative agent in economics [113].
Although the bulk of the literature on game-theoretic models focuses on well-mixed
populations, there is an increasing number of works studying these interactions on
complex topologies [202]. However, contrary to established opinions in the field,
systematic simulations have shown that the underlying spatial structure and the
particular update rules used can have a strong influence on the outcome of these
games [186].
Trading oﬀ for a certain amount of mathematical simplicity, a more realistic
approach to handle social systems is given by the assumption that individuals are
not connected to all others, but only to a finite and constant fraction of the whole
population. In practice this assumption implies a regular topology such as a lattice,
where each individual locally interacts with a fixed number of neighbors. Regular
lattices are the basis for the Ising model, for many agent-based models, and for most
statistical physics models of opinion dynamics. Also in these models there is a recent
tendency for considering more realistic topologies [44].
The recent shift of focus from the study of dynamics in well-mixed populations
or on regular topologies to irregular topologies, is caused by more and more empiri-
cal evidence that the structure of social and economic relations between humans is
typically of a heterogeneous form [44, 140]. This fact allows to represent the struc-
ture of human interactions as a complex network, see Section 2.3. Moreover, human
beings do not stay their entire life in the same position but can be highly mobile, see
Chapter 5. Also, their social and economic surroundings can change over time, so
that the underlying interaction networks change dynamically, see Section 2.3. These
additional, dynamic degrees of freedom often lead to the dynamic emergence of mea-
surable macroscopic phenomena which are the focus of study in the framework of
complex systems.
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2.2 Complex Systems
The exploding number of publications in the past decade on diverse natural phenom-
ena using a statistical physics approach has increased our understanding of systems
of diﬀerent nature, such as of complex social systems [16, 44]. Complex systems are
commonly understood as systems composed of a large number of elementary units
which as a whole exhibit properties not obvious from the properties of the individual
parts. The microscopic interactions in the system lead to the emergence of macro-
scopic properties. Typically strong interactions between the elementary units of a
complex system allow to represent them as networks, a core theme of this thesis
which we cover in Section 2.3.
Complex systems are abundant in nature, including human and animal societies.
Typical examples include [34]: ant or termite colonies, in which tasks are allocated
without central control, flocks of birds or fish swarms moving in coordination without
a leader, vehicle traﬃc on highways or in cities, pedestrian crowds, stock markets,
and in general any complete social or economic systems constituted by humans.
The following subsections contain some common properties related to complex
systems which are related to the core of the work.
2.2.1 Self-organization and power laws
The concept of self-organization and of self-organized criticality (SOC) was first de-
scribed in the so-called sandpile model [14]. In this classic model, the dynamical
response of an idealized pile of sand to small random perturbation is studied. The
perturbations lead to avalanches with scale-free distributions in space and time (“1/f
noise”). This phenomenon is not an exceptional case but may be the underlying con-
cept for scaling in a wide class of systems with extended degrees of freedom. Power
law distributions, P (k) ∼ k−γ, have in the recent years been found to be abundant
in a wide range of complex systems, including social, economic, or ecological sys-
tems [168]. In some social systems, this phenomenon is called Zipf’s law after the
linguist George Kingsley Zipf, who found scale-free distributions in word frequen-
cies of natural languages [226]. We report similar findings in Chapter 4, where we
study “words” in the action sequences of individuals. The distribution of city sizes
is another classical example termed after Zipf. In economic systems, power laws in
income or wealth distributions are known as Pareto distributions after the economist
Vilfredo Pareto, who observed this phenomenon over a century ago [175]. Power
law distributions also imply that extreme events such as stock market crashes occur
much more frequently than expected from normal distributions [109]. Throughout
this thesis we find several examples for power laws in the social system studied.
Reference [53] gives a good overview of the statistical methods for making accurate
parameter estimates for power-law data, based on maximum likelihood methods and
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. More important than exactly characterizing the
empirical distributions in social systems is however the development of new methods
for validating the models that have been proposed to explain those power laws.
17
2. Statistical physics frameworks for social systems
2.2.2 Breakdown of classical entropy
Non-interacting and weakly interacting statistical systems in which the number of
particles is large can be perfectly described by thermodynamics. Complex systems
on the other hand are typically characterized by strong and long-range interactions,
which can fundamentally change their macroscopic properties as a function of sys-
tem size or its degrees of freedom [102]. Here, a classical thermodynamic description
is usually not possible and traditional concepts of entropy, i.e. Boltzmann-Gibbs-
Shannon entropy, cannot be applied. Because of this, there is presently ongoing re-
search on non-extensive entropies suited for adequately characterizing such strongly
interacting statistical systems. For example, when the axiom of extensivity was
dropped in a recent, axiomatic approach [102, 103], a multitude of entropies, poten-
tially suited for long-range (non-ergodic) systems, could be brought into a general
framework, with some of them representing possible candidates for application to
complex systems. Measuring the Shannon n-tuple redundancy in behavioral se-
quences in Chapter 4, we find evidence indicating that Boltzmann-Gibbs-Shannon
entropy might not be an extensive quantity in this case, indicating strong structure
in behavioral time series.
2.2.3 Anomalous diﬀusion
Diﬀusion processes in complex systems often do not follow Gaussian statistics [155].
Physical systems in which non-trivial transport phenomena play a role include tur-
bulent flows, phase-space motion in chaotic dynamics, or transport in highly hetero-
geneous media such as porous materials or gels. Usually these anomalies are related
to the presence of non-homogeneous topological features such as a fractal structure
[225]. In complex systems, instead of Brownian motion, i.e. a linear time dependence
of the mean square displacement, σ2(t) ∼ t, often anomalous diﬀusion is found, which
typically features a non-linear, power law growth of the mean square displacement,
σ2(t) ∼ tν , ν ￿= 1. (2.3)
This functional form is strongly connected to the breakdown of the classical central
limit theorem due to heavy-tail distributions or long-range correlations. In this case
the systems often feature non-Markovian time evolution, as a typical manifestation of
non-local temporal phenomena [155]. In social systems, anomalous diﬀusion has been
observed for example in human mobility [192, 199, 214, 218], which can be caused
by the use of diﬀerent means of transportation [15, 101] or by heterogeneous human
activity patterns, leading to broad spatial jump or waiting time distributions. We
report a similar result on the mobility of human-controlled avatars in an online game
in Chapter 5, where we measure long-range temporal correlations in the movement
patterns of players in the game. We show that taking into account such correlation
phenomena is essential for modeling the observed statistical features of movement.
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2.3 Network theory
“Networks are all around us, and we are ourselves, as individuals, the units of a net-
work of social relationships of diﬀerent kinds and, as biological systems, the delicate
result of a network of biochemical reactions. Networks can be tangible objects in
the Euclidean space, such as electric power grids, the Internet, highways or subway
systems, and neural networks. Or they can be entities defined in an abstract space,
such as networks of acquaintances or collaborations between individuals.” [33]
Accompanying the recent availability of massive data sets on human activities in
social systems, methodologies to handle these data are being improved continuously,
with the field of network science leading the way. A network viewpoint emphasizes
that the behavior of a complex system is shaped by the strong interactions among
its constituents and oﬀers the possibility to analyze systems of very diﬀerent nature
within a unified, mathematically well-tractable framework. Social network analysis,
the field of network analysis which focuses on relationships among social entities and
which started to develop in the early 1920’s [215], has experienced a revival with
several new concepts being introduced or refined, such as scale-free networks [18].
Methods and algorithms are being constantly advanced to allow dealing with further
challenges, e.g. the dynamical, longitudinal (time-varying) facet of the torrent of
data we are now confronted with [33].
Network theory has its origins in graph theory, going back to Euler and the
famous “Seven bridges of Ko¨nigsberg” problem which he resolved in 1735. In its
modern form graph theory has been developed by mathematicians since the 1950’s,
most famously as one of the first by the Hungarian mathematicians Erdo˝s and Re´nyi.
Graph theory concerns the combinatorial or probabilistic study of the abstract math-
ematical objects of graphs (for a formal definition see Section 2.3.5), often as single
entities. Modern network theory however is based on the study of graphs as real-
izations of a very large number of graphs sharing the same macroscopic properties,
i.e. a network ensemble. One of the most important macroscopic properties in this
context is the degree distribution, or the exponent of the underlying power law,
see the following subsections. We make use of this paradigm for example in Chap-
ter 6, where we approach the empirically measured networks as realizations of the
ensembles of equally sized networks with the same degree distributions to calculate
triad significance profiles, or in Chapter 7 where the network ensemble is made up
of networks with identical topology but randomly reshuﬄed signs. Network theory
in today’s form was introduced primarily by statistical physicists at the end of the
1990’s [19, 20, 217] and has since then significantly contributed to the views in which
researchers approach and think about complex systems [18, 216].
2.3.1 Random networks
Graph theory in its modern form started with Erdo˝s and Re´nyi studying proba-
bilistically the properties of graphs as a function of the number of their random
connections [33]. They proposed a model in which graphs with N nodes and L links
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are generated randomly [78], known as Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) graphs or ER-networks.
In this model, (undirected) links are added randomly to a set of isolated N nodes,
until the network has reached L links (multiple and self-links are prohibited). One
ER-network is the result of a (usually huge) number of realizations, all of which form
an ensemble of ER-networks with the same macroscopic properties. This model has a
strong analogy to the canonical ensemble [33]. In another classic model, ER-netwoks
are created by adding links to all pairs of nodes with a probability 0 < p < 1. This
process defines again an ensemble of ER-networks, in which however the probabil-
ity to find a network with exactly L links is not 1, but pL(1 − p)N(N−1)/2−L [36].
This second model has a strong analogy to the grand-canonical ensemble, and in the
limit N → ∞, where the average degree k¯ is fixed, both models coincide [33]. It is
noteworthy that within the network framework, phase transitions occur at certain
critical values. For example, a second order phase transition occurs at a critical
probability pc = 1/N , corresponding to the critical average degree k¯c = 1. If p lies
below pc, the network will exhibit no giant component (for N →∞), and for p > pc
the giant component emerges with probability 1 (for a definition of giant component
see Section 2.3.5).
The distribution of the degrees of all nodes in a network, P (k), is a fundamental
property which has been under particular study since it makes it possible to identify
underlying and universal principles common in a variety of diﬀerent networks. In a
random network, the degree distribution is a Poissonian for large N and fixed k¯,
P (k) ∼ e−k¯ k¯
k
k!
. (2.4)
Note that this distribution is very narrowly focused around the average degree k¯
– almost all nodes in the network have a degree of k¯ or a value very close to k¯.
Due to lack of data, for a very long time it was assumed that most real networks
display this highly homogeneous degree distribution. However, when more and more
measurements on large networks became available in the late 1990’s, it turned out
that most real networks have fat-tailed degree distributions, many of them showing
approximate scale-free degree distributions.
2.3.2 Scale-free networks
In contrast to previous expectations, most networks found in the real world do not
display Poissonian degree distributions such as ER-networks, but heavy-tailed, often
scale-free distributions characterized by power laws:
P (k) ∼ k−γ, (2.5)
where the exponent γ often varies between 2 and 3. Networks with this degree
distribution have a diverging second moment σ2 = k2 − k¯2 and are therefore not
straightforward to treat with traditional analytical methods. These networks are
called scale-free because power laws have the same functional form at all scales [168].
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A heavy-tailed degree distribution emphasizes that interactions between the com-
ponent of a system are far from homogeneous as in regular lattices or ER-networks,
and that nodes are topologically not equivalent. The presence of hubs, i.e. of nodes
with a very high number of connections, is typical here. Besides the degree dis-
tribution, further evidence for this heterogeneity and for the nontrivial connection
patterns can be found when considering the average nearest neighbour degree knn
or the clustering coeﬃcient C as a function of degree k (for formal definitions see
Section 2.3.5). In the presence of homogeneous, therefore uncorrelated interaction
patterns, both these functions knn(k) and C(k) are constant. However, as has been
shown in many real networks, and as we also present evidence in the case of social
networks in Chapter 6, these functions are usually not constant. An increasing (de-
creasing) function knn(k) implies a tendency for high-degree nodes to be connected to
other high-degree nodes (assortativity) or to be not connected to high-degree nodes
(disassortativity) [165]. Networks with non-trivial topological features as described
above are called complex networks.
In the past decade a large number of real networks has been uncovered to exhibit
scale-free degree distributions and heterogeneous connection patterns, ranging from
the autonomous system spanning the internet and the world wide web to networks
defined by scientific citations [53], or biological, metabolic networks or networks of
actors who have played in the same films [33]. Some networks from a variety of fields
have in common similar power law exponents or growth processes, giving hope to
find universalities, i.e. common features underlying a multitude of diﬀerent network
types in systems of diﬀerent nature.
2.3.3 Models of growing networks
With the discovery that most networks are heterogeneous and have fat-tailed, often
scale-free, degree distributions, the need arose to find models explaining the growth
of the networks which develop these properties. One of the first was the Baraba´si-
Albert (BA) model, which as an essential ingredient incorporates the mechanism of
preferential attachment [19]. The idea behind preferential attachment is that nodes
with higher degrees – the more “popular” nodes – tend to attract new links with
a higher rate than “unpopular”, low-degree nodes. In particular, a BA network is
constructed by beginning with a small number m0 of isolated nodes, and then adding
nodes one by one havingm(≤ m0) links that connect them tom nodes already present
in the system. The probability Π that a new node is connected to an existing node
i depends linearly on the degree of that node, ki, namely Π(ki) = ki/
￿
j kj. As can
be shown analytically, a BA network constructed as above reaches a scale-invariant
state, with a degree distribution following a power law with exponent 3. It is further
possible to modify the model to produce networks with diﬀerent exponents [69].
Other network evolution models producing fat-tailed degree distributions include,
for example, an attachment mechanism with local walks [213], or a number of gen-
eralizations of the original BA model [33]. Most of these models have in common
growth only, i.e. the sole addition of links, but no deletions. As we however show
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in Chapter 7, there can exist a high churn of links in real networks, defined as the
number of removed links divided by the number of newly added links, necessitating
the implementation of new models accounting for this observation.
2.3.4 Rewiring and models of non-growing networks
Network evolution models in which the number of links remains constant are called
rewiring models, which in some cases can be solved exactly [79]. One classic ex-
ample of a rewiring model is the ‘small-world’ network model [217]. In this model,
a parameter ε regulates the ‘randomness’ of the network: If ε = 0, the network is
regular, if ε = 1, the network is an ER-network. For special intermediate values of ε,
the model is able to produce networks with low average path length g¯ (the so-called
small-world phenomenon [156]) and with relatively high clustering coeﬃcient C (for
definitions see Section 2.3.5). These two properties are typical for many empirical
networks, such as networks of film actors or biological networks [217].
More recent non-growing network models include a “gas-like” mechanism [209].
In this constant-size network process, “inelastic” interactions occur between pairs of
nodes, realized by mergers of pairs of nodes into new single nodes. Merged nodes then
obtain the union of all links of the previously separate nodes. With each merger, a
chemostat condition leads to a newly created node, randomly linked to the network.
This network model can be shown to be a generalization of the model developed by
[131], which introduced merging and regeneration processes of nodes earlier. Another
model of this type generalizes network dynamics to include both rewiring and growth
modes, which depend on the internal topology as well as on a metric imposed by the
space they are embedded in [207]. This model associates a fixed energy cost to every
link and leads to a degree distribution which can be seen as an energy distribution
of the type emerging within non-extensive statistical mechanics.
2.3.5 Notation and statistical tools
Graph
In mathematical terms, networks are described as graphs [68, 215]. An undirected
graph G = (N ,L) is defined as a pair of sets, the node set N containing all nodes i
and the link set L containing unordered pairs lij := {i, j} denoting those nodes which
are connected by an undirected link (edge). A directed graph (digraph) has a link
set L which contains ordered pairs lij := (i, j) marking nodes which are connected
by a directed link (arc) going from i to j. The expressions N , L denote cardinalities
of the respective sets. A graph is called complete if connections between all pairs of
nodes exist.
Symmetrization
The symmetrization or reflexive closure of a digraph G = (N ,L) is constructed as
follows: Start with G∗ = (N ,L∗), where L∗ is an empty link set, and for all pairs
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of nodes i and j add the undirected link lij to L∗ if the directed link lij ∈ L or if
lji ∈ L.
Weighted graph
In unweighted graphs all links are treated equally. A weighted graph is a generaliza-
tion in which the weight wij of a link lij may take any non-zero real value, usually
∈ R.
Dyad
A dyad is a (sub)graph consisting of two nodes. A directed dyad can be a null dyad
(no links), asymmetric (one link, going in one direction), or mutual (two links, one
going in one direction and the other going in the opposite one).
Signed graph
A signed digraph is a pair (G, σ), where G = (N ,L) is a digraph and σ:L→ {−1,+1}
is a sign function assigning each directed link a binary value, e.g. in the context of
social networks denoting positive or negative relationship [65]. We write sij short for
σ(lij), and set sij := 0 when lij does not exist.
Every signed digraph has a valency matrix V with entries vij defined as [105]:
vij = o if sij = sji = 0
vij = p if sij + sji > 0
vij = n if sij + sji < 0
vij = a otherwise. (2.6)
These entries correspond to null (o) dyads, to dyads with only positive ties (p) , to
dyads with only negative ties (n), and to dyads with one positive and one negative
tie (a for ambivalent relationship), respectively.
Degree
In an undirected graph the degree ki of a node i is the number of links connecting to
it. All ki nodes which are directly linked to i are called (nearest) neighbors of i. A
node with degree 0 has no neighbors and is called isolated. We denote the average
degree of all nodes in a network by k¯. In a directed graph the in-degree kini of a node
i is the number of its incoming links, the out-degree kouti the number of its outgoing
links. We denote the average degree of all nearest neighbors of a node i by knni . We
denote the average degree of all nearest neighbors of all nodes as a function of degree
k by knn(k).
The measure ρ(kin, kout), where ρ is the Pearson correlation coeﬃcient, eval-
uates the correlations between in-degree and out-degree around the same node,
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giving a measure of the deviation of a directed network from a Eulerian network,
i.e. ρ(kin, kout) = 1 only for a Eulerian graph, namely kini = k
out
i for each node i.
Geodesic and diameter
In an undirected graph, the geodesic or shortest path gij of two nodes i and j is the
smallest number of links one needs to get from i to j. If a graph is disconnected,
i.e. there exist at least two non-empty sets of non-connected nodes (called compo-
nents), geodesics between all nodes of diﬀerent components are set to∞. We denote
the average geodesic, or characteristic path length, of a graph by g¯. The average
geodesic of a random graph is g¯r ≈ lnN/ ln k¯ [68]. The diameter gmax of a network
is its largest geodesic.
Clustering coeﬃcient
The clustering coeﬃcient Ci of node i in an undirected graph is the ratio between
the number yi of links between its ki neighbors and the number of all possible links
ki(ki − 1)/2 between them,
Ci :=
2yi
ki(ki − 1) . (2.7)
The network’s clustering coeﬃcient C is the average over all clustering coeﬃcients,
C = (1/N)
￿
iCi. A random graph’s clustering coeﬃcient Cr is given by Cr = k¯/N
[68].
Eﬃciency
Global eﬃciency of an unweighted network G with N nodes is defined as
Eglob(G) := 2
N(N − 1)
￿
i ￿=j∈{1,...,N}
g−1ij . (2.8)
Global eﬃciency Eglob can be thought of as a measure how eﬃciently information
is exchanged over a network, given that all nodes are communicating with all other
nodes concurrently. Local eﬃciency Eloc, as a measure of a system’s fault tolerance
is defined as
Eloc(G) := 1
N
￿
i∈{1,...,N}
Eglob(Gi), (2.9)
where Gi is the graph of all neighbors of node i (not containing i). Both values
Eglob and Eloc are in the interval [0, 1]. Note that global eﬃciency is a reasonable
approximation for the inverse geodesic in unweighted graphs; local eﬃciency is a
good approximation for the clustering coeﬃcient when most local networks Gi are
not sparse [139].
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Reciprocity
Reciprocity measures the tendency of individuals to reciprocate connections, i.e. the
creation of mutual instead of asymmetric dyads [215]. Following [116], a naive reci-
procity index can be defined by
R :=
L
L∗
− 1, (2.10)
where L∗ is the number of undirected links in the reflexive closure of the digraph2.
Values of R = 0 and R = 1 stand for no mutual dyads and mutual dyads only,
respectively. Reciprocity may also be quantified by defining the fraction
r∗ :=
L↔
L
, (2.11)
where L↔ ≡ 2(L−L∗) counts the number of directed links in all mutual dyads of the
digraph. Due to conceptual problems with r∗, [90] we use the following reciprocity
index
ρ :=
r∗ − a¯
1− a¯ ∈ [ρmin, 1], (2.12)
with a¯ := LN(N−1) measuring the ratio of observed to possible directed links, and
ρmin := − a¯1−a¯ ∈ [−1, 0] for a¯ ≤ 1/2 (the expression ρmin makes sense for a¯ ≤ 1/2.
Otherwise it is not possible to have L↔ = 0). The index ρ allows to distinguish
between reciprocal (ρ > 0), areciprocal (ρ = 0) and antireciprocal (ρ < 0) networks.
Further, ρ enables a clear ordering of networks independent of link density which is
not possible with r∗ [90].
Assortativity
Assortative mixing coeﬃcients are the Pearson correlation coeﬃcients of the degrees
at either ends of a link [165]:
r =
ktokfrom − ktokfrom￿
k2to − kto2
￿
k2from − kfrom
2
∈ [−1, 1]. (2.13)
Bars denote averages, kto and kfrom index the (in-, out- or undirected) degrees of
nodes at the beginning and end of links, respectively. Following [116] we measure
assortativity rundir in the reflexive closures as well as coeﬃcients for all four combi-
nations of in- and out degrees in the directed networks: rinin, rinout, routin, routout. A
positive degree–degree correlation coeﬃcient indicates assortativity, i.e. the tendency
of nodes with high (low) degrees connecting to nodes with high (low) degrees, a neg-
ative correlation means disassortativity, i.e. the tendency of nodes with high (low)
2The factor 2 of equation (1) in [116] is dropped since we identify pairs of directed links of
mutual dyads with single undirected links in the construction of the reflexive closure.
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degrees connecting to nodes with low (high) degrees. Assortativity (disassortativity)
implies an increasing (decreasing) function knn(k).
Bridge
A bridge is a link which, when removed, increases the amount of disconnected com-
ponents in the graph by one [215]. A link is a local bridge of degree a if its removal
causes its endpoints i and j to have geodesic gij = a [97].
Overlap (of neighboring nodes)
The overlap of two neighboring nodes measures the number of neighbors common to
both of them. We adopt the definition used in [172],
Oij :=
mij
(ki − 1) + (kj − 1)−mij ∈ [0, 1], (2.14)
where mij is the number of neighbors common to both nodes i and j. A value of
Oij = 0 (1) corresponds to an empty (identical) common neighborhood of nodes i
and j. The Overlap Oij is not to be confused with measures of network–network
overlaps as defined later.
Betweenness
Link betweenness centrality, short link betweenness or load, is defined for an undi-
rected link lij by
bij :=
￿
ne∈V
￿
nf∈V \{ne}
θef (lij)
θef
, (2.15)
where θef (lij) is the number of geodesics between ne and nf that contain lij, and
θef is the total amount of geodesics between ne and nf [172]. Betweenness can be
viewed as a measure of “traﬃc” if e.g. all pairs of nodes exchange information at the
same rate [68].
Giant component and largest connected component
In graphs with infinitely many nodes one observes the emergence of a giant component
when crossing a percolation threshold [68]. The emerging giant component is the only
component holding infinitely many nodes. In finite graphs, we call the component
having the highest number of nodes largest connected component. We denote the
fraction of nodes being in the largest connected component by Γ.
Triad
A triad is a (sub)graph consisting of three nodes. In a digraph there exist 16 isomor-
phism classes of triads [105]. We adopt the notation of [159] for the 13 connected
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Figure 2.1: The 16 isomorphism classes of triads and their ids.
classes and label the unconnected ones by a, b and c, see Fig. 2.1. Within the group
of connected triad classes, seven are complete3.
Triad significance profile
The triad significance profile (TSP) is the vector of statistical significances of each
connected triad class compared to random networks drawn from the U(X∗+, X+∗,M∗)
distribution, i.e. of random networks having identical in/out degrees and equally
likely numbers of mutual dyads for each node [159, 185]. Statistical significance of a
triad class i is measured by the Z score
Zi =
(N reali − N¯ randi )
std(N randi )
, (2.16)
where N reali is the frequency of occurence of the triad class in the considered network,
and N¯ randi and std(N
rand
i ) are the average frequency of occurence and the standard
deviation in an ensemble of random networks drawn from U(X∗+, X+∗,M∗). The
TSP is the normalized vector of all 13 Z scores,
TSPi =
Zi￿￿13
i=1 Z
2
i
￿1/2 . (2.17)
Note that the TSP emphasizes the relative significances of triad classes, constituting
an appropriate comparison parameter for networks of arbitrary sizes [159].
3We write connected short for weakly connected, i.e. every two nodes are joined by a semipath
[105]. We write completeness short for completeness of the reflexive closure, i.e. a directed triad is
complete if it contains no null dyads, it is incomplete otherwise.
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Clustering similarity
To quantify the relative goodness of the partitions obtained from community detec-
tion applied to various network-related matrices in Chapter 5, we make use of three
measures of clustering similarity: the Fowlkes and Mallows index F [85], the Rand’s
criterion R [179] and the normalized information variation (NVI) [58], as defined
below.
Consider a set of nodes T of cardinality n and two partitions C and C ￿ of T , then
the set of all un-ordered pairs of elements of T is the union of the sets [38, 153]:
t11 is the set of pairs the same community under C and C ￿;
t01 is the set of pairs not in the same community under C but under the same
community in C ￿;
t10 is the set of pairs in the same community under C but not under the same
community in C ￿;
t00 is the set of pairs not in the same community under C and C ￿;
and n11, n01, n10, n00 are their respective cardinalities (and n11 + n01 + n10 + n00 =
n(n− 1)/2). The F and R indices are then given by:
F = n11￿
(n11 + n10)(n11 + n01)
, R = 2(n11 + n00)
n(n− 1) , (2.18)
which are essentially two ways of quantifying how well the partitions match pairs of
nodes. Therefore a perfect match between two partitions will have F ,R = 1. The
Variation of Information (VI) is a measure based on information theoretical concepts
and represents the informational distance between two partitions. Therefore, if the
VI is large, the two partitions are very dissimilar. The VI of a partition is bounded
by log2 n, hence it is possible to normalize it, obtaining the Normalized Variation of
Information (NVI ∈ (0, 1)):
NVI(C, C ￿) = VI(C, C
￿)
log2 n
, (2.19)
where
VI(C, C ￿) = H(C) +H(C ￿)− 2I(C, C ￿). (2.20)
The terms in equation (2.20) are the entropy H(C) of partition C and the mutual
information between two partitions C and C ￿ [38]:
H(C) = −
k￿
i=1
P (i) log2 P (i), I(C, C ￿) =
k￿
i=1
l￿
j=1
P (i, j) log2
P (i, j)
P (i)P (j)
, (2.21)
where P (i) = |Ci|n is the probability that an element of T chosen at random belongs
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to community Ci ∈ C, and P (i, j) = |Ci
￿
C￿j |
n the probability that an element belongs
to Ci ∈ C and to C ￿j ∈ C ￿.
Rank distribution
Constructing the rank of elements in a data set is the transformation in which nu-
merical values are replaced by their rank when the data are sorted. In a network,
nodes can be ranked for example by their degree, where the node with largest degree
has rank 1, the second largest has rank 2, etc. Nodes with the same degree have
the same rank; the diﬀerence to the subsequent rank is the number of nodes which
shared the previous rank. For example if there are three nodes with degree 45 and
rank 10, nodes with degree 44 have rank 13. We denote the rank of a quantity a by
rk(a). The rank distribution is then the probability distribution of ranks, ordered
by rank.
Multiplex network
A multiplex network is a set of networks, each spanned by a diﬀerent relation, all
defined on the same set of nodes. This superposition of networks is also called multi-
relational, multi-modal or multivariate network in the literature [215]. We denote
diﬀerent network types and their measures with Greek indices. The standard way to
represent a network is through its adjacency matrix Aij which, for an unweighted,
undirected network, is a symmetric matrix whose elements Aij are equal to one if
there is a link between i and j, and zero otherwise. To incorporate the existence
of multiple relations (multiplex networks), it is common to define the tensor Aij;α,
sometimes called super-sociomatrix [215]. This tensor has dimension N × N × R,
where N is the total number of nodes and R is the number of diﬀerent link types
between the same set of agents. For a fixed value of α, Aij;α is the adjacency matrix of
the network defined by link type α. By construction, the properties of each network
can be obtained from its adjacency matrix Aij;α. For instance, the degree ki;α of a
node i is given by
￿
j Aij;α, the total number of links in network α is Lα =
￿
i ki,α/2.
The number of paths of length n between nodes i and j is given by (Anα)ij. A whole
new layer of complexity opens once the interplay between diﬀerent sorts of networks
is considered. From a mathematical point of view, multiplexity can be revealed by
coupling diﬀerent adjacency matrices.
For a combined analysis of a whole multiplex network we define an envelope
network which is composed of the set of all links of all interaction types. In the
envelope network, a link from i to j exists if it exists in at least one of the relational
networks.
Measures for multiplex networks
The statistical properties of diﬀerent network types can been studied as separate
entities using the following notations and generalized measures. Nα is the number
of nodes in the network type α, and Ldir(undir)α is the number of (un)directed links.
29
2. Statistical physics frameworks for social systems
Reciprocity is labeled by rα, and ρ(kinα , k
out
α ) is the correlation of in- and out-degrees
within the α network. Average degree, clustering coeﬃcient, and clustering coeﬃ-
cient with respect to the corresponding random graph are marked by k¯α, Cα and
Cα/Crandα , respectively.
Network–network overlap
The (link) overlap Oαβ =
1
2
￿
ij Aij;αAij;β between the graphs α and β counts the
number of links they have in common. This overlap measures between diﬀerent
types of networks is not to be confused with the overlap Oij between neighbours as
defined earlier. Similarly, the multiplicity mij =
￿
αAij;α of a link between i and
j counts the number of diﬀerent links between these nodes. The Jaccard coeﬃcient
Jαβ between two diﬀerent sets of links α and β quantifies the interaction between
the two networks by measuring the tendency that links simultaneously are present in
both networks. Jαβ is a similarity score between two sets of elements and is defined
as the size of the intersection of the sets divided by the size of their union [212],
Jαβ ≡ |α ∩ β|/|α ∪ β|. (2.22)
Related similarity measures, such as the cosine similarity measure can be designed.
Network–network correlators
For two random variables X and Y with mean values X¯ and Y¯ , and standard devi-
ations σX and σY , the correlation coeﬃcient ρ(X, Y ) is defined as
ρ(X, Y ) =
E
￿
(X − X¯)(Y − Y¯ )￿
σXσY
∈ [−1, 1]. (2.23)
For example, the reciprocity coeﬃcient r, as defined earlier, is the correlation coef-
ficient between the transposed entries of the adjacency matrix of a directed graph,
X ≡ Aij, Y ≡ Aji [90]. We introduce two related coeﬃcients to compare diﬀerent
network types α and β. First, we consider ρ(kα, kβ), to evaluate the correlations
between the degrees of a node in the two diﬀerent graphs α and β, and second,
ρ(rk(kα), rk(kβ)), which is calculated the same way as ρ(kα, kβ), with the diﬀerence
that not degrees but ranks of degrees are used.
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Chapter 3
Quantification of socio-economic
behavior using an online society
3.1 Establishing a socio-economic laboratory
3.1.1 Problems with data
Usually the bottleneck in quantitative approaches to the analysis of social systems
is the availability and quality of data. An increasing number of massive data sets
– tracking behavioral “fingerprints” humans leave throughout their lives via mobile
phones, online applications, etc. – has become available in the past decade, signifi-
cantly advancing our scientific understanding of human behavior [140]. While in the
20th century measuring social relations was possible basically only via questionnaire-
based methods, involving rather small numbers of individuals, in the order of 10–100,
recent studies incorporate data sets of human social systems on up to planetary scales
[143]. These large data volumes allow to treat socio-economic behavior of humans by
means of statistical physics [44]. A major goal of this data-driven approach to social
sciences is to understand the underlying mechanisms of the microscopic interactions
between large numbers of humans and their connections in order to understand
emerging macroscopic features. An aim is to eventually predict extreme events, and
to uncover universal patterns which may emerge in systems of diﬀerent nature.
While this new data-driven approach to the social sciences has improved our un-
derstanding of a number of specific aspects of societal phenomena, such as spread of
epidemics [176], an all-embracing picture of social systems is far from being available.
Especially since human society is a complex system, see Section 2.2, full information
of its surroundings, contexts or boundaries, together with the interactions between
these boundaries and the system itself is needed to understand the system properly
[216].
Despite these extreme diﬃculties in data requirements, the analysis of small-scale
social systems has a tradition in the social sciences [76, 152, 174, 215]. Concerning
large-scale studies, recently there have been significant achievements in understand-
ing a number of massive social networks on a quantitative basis, such as the cell
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phone communication network [138, 172, 172], features of the world-trade network
[115], email networks [169], the network of financial debt [37] and the network of
financial flows [136]. The integration of various dynamical networks of an entire so-
ciety has so-far been beyond the scope of any realistic data source. However, with the
increasing availability of vast amounts of electronic fingerprints people leave through-
out their lifes, this situation is about to change. Online sources are capturing more
and more aspects of life, boosting our understanding of collective human behavior
[140, 145]. Regarding data acquisition it is essential not only to record decisions of
individual humans but also the simultaneous state of their surroundings. Further, in
any data-driven science the observed system should not be significantly perturbed
through the act of measurement. In social science experiments subjects usually are
fully aware of being observed – a fact that might strongly influence their behavior.
Finally, data acquisition in the social sciences becomes especially tiresome on group
levels, see e.g. the tremendous eﬀorts which have been undertaken in a classic ex-
periment by Newcomb et al. [162], in which a group of 17 students was congregated,
observed, and questioned over several weeks. Traditional methods of social science
such as interviews and questionnaires do not only require a large amount of time
and resources to deliver statistically meaningful assertions, but may introduce well-
known biases [41]. To many it might seem clear that social sciences can not overcome
these problems, and that therefore social sciences would always remain on a lower
quantitative and predictive level than the natural sciences.
3.1.2 The research potential of Massive Multiplayer Online Games
The issue of taking simultaneous, unobtrusive measurements on a large number
of subjects together with their complete surroundings, might appear in a radically
more positive light when considering Massive Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs)
[13, 45]. These online platforms provide a fascinating way of simultaneously observ-
ing thousands of individuals engaged in a multitude of social and economic activities,
they allow to conduct complete measurements of socially interacting humans, and
provide data at rates comparable to physical experiments. Remarkably, one of the
largest collective human activities on the planet is the playing of online games. Cur-
rently more than a hundred million people worldwide play MMOGs – the well-known
game World of Warcraft alone has more than ten million subscribers as of today [6].
MMOGs exhibit such an enormous success due to oﬀering their players possibilities
to experience alternative or second lifes, not only providing (virtual) economic oppor-
tunities, but also a huge variety of possible social interactions among players. Many
MMOGs provide rich virtual environments facilitating socialization and interactions
on group levels [45, 223, 224]. Motivation of players to participate in MMOGs are
highly heterogeneous, ranging from establishing friendships, gain of respect and sta-
tus within the virtual society, to the fun of destroying the hard work of other players.
Besides economical and social interactions, modern MMOGs also oﬀer a component
of exploration, e.g. players can explore their ‘physical’ environment, such as specific
features of their universe, ‘biological’ details of virtual monsters, etc., and share their
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findings within ‘specialist’ communities.
From a scientific point of view online games provide a tool for understanding
collective human phenomena and social dynamics on an entirely diﬀerent scale [13,
46]. In these games all information about all actions taken by all players can be easily
recorded and stored in log-files at practically no cost. This quantity of data has been
unthinkable in the traditional social sciences where sample sizes often do not exceed
several dozens of questionnaires, school classes or students in behavioral experiments.
In MMOGs on the other hand, the number of subjects can reach several hundred
thousands, with millions of recorded actions1. These actions of individual players are
known in conjunction with their surroundings, i.e. the circumstances under which
particular actions or decisions were taken. This oﬀers the unique opportunity to
study a complex social system: conditions under which individuals take decisions can
in principle be controlled, the specific outcomes of decisions can be measured. In this
respect social science is on the verge of becoming a fully experimental science [140]
which should increasingly become capable of making a great number of repeatable
and eventually falsifiable statements about collective human behavior, both in a
social and economical context.
Another advantage over traditional ways of data acquisition in the social sciences
is that players of MMOGs do not consciously notice the measurement process2. These
‘social experiments’ practically do not perturb or influence the sample. Moreover
MMOGs not only open ways to explore sociological questions, but – if economic
aspects are part of the game (as it is in many MMOGs) – also to study economical
behavior of groups. Here again economical actions and decisions can be monitored for
a huge number of individual players within their social and economical contexts. This
means that MMOGs oﬀer a natural environment to conduct behavioral economics
experiments, which have been of great interest in numerous small-scale surveys, see
e.g. [88, 114]. It becomes possible to study the socio-economic unit of large online
game societies.
3.1.3 Previous data-driven work on online worlds
Since widespread usage of the internet is a necessity for individuals to devote them-
selves to MMOGs or other online social platforms, scientific research on these envi-
ronments did not start much earlier than a decade ago. This was roughly the time
when internet usage started to become mainstream in large parts of the world and
the increased capabilities of data transmission allowed the establishment of well-
frequented online worlds [22, 91]. Accordingly, the literature on social research in
MMOGs is relatively few and far between, although in the past very few years a boom
1The concept of sample has to be reconsidered here, since within the system all data of all
individuals is available and a “sample” can by default span the whole system. The question of
which individuals from the total world population join the system in the first place may become
important.
2Players are informed that data is logged for scientific purposes and give their consent, prior to
their participation in the game.
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of scientific articles on the issue could be noticed [13, 154]. Because the researchers
who study these platforms almost never have access to the raw game data bases
of the companies which own the game servers, usually only data can be accessed
which is publicly available to players of the game. Researchers who want to study
such social systems online, therefore need to create accounts just as any other player
to conduct interviews or experiments, or they need to generate scripts or plug-ins
to the game to harvest the publicly available data [13]. Because of this, especially
data-driven studies on MMOGs are rare. Also, in relation to the total amount of
data stored on the game servers, data gained this way is relatively poor and incom-
plete, and may suﬀer from the same methodological issues involved in the collection
of data in classical social studies [221]. However, even with such fragmentary and
possibly biased data, a few researchers have been able to conduct expressive social or
economic studies. One of these studies was conducted by Castranova on testing an
economic law of elasticity in a virtual world [47]. Others, such as Yee and collabora-
tors, have conducted a census of online players [223], studied groups and their social
dynamics in online games [71, 72, 126, 219], or analyzed the motivations of players
from a psychological point of view [224]. It was further shown by Chesney et al. [50]
that small-scale social laboratory settings can be recreated in Second Life, where
individuals play the Ultimatum Game or conduct other game-theoretic experiments
well-known in behavioral finance. While all of these studies typically describe specific
aspects of certain online games or have the potential to make classical behavioral
studies simpler or less costly, the lack of large-scale data sets does not allow for a
quantitative, statistically significant treatment of social systems on a societal level,
in which the power of the statistical physics approach could reasonably come into
play to uncover potentially “universal” features of human behavior.
Due to a multitude of legal issues and the large amount of work involved in data
extraction, it is usually extremely diﬃcult to receive raw data on player activities
from game companies. To our knowledge, this case has happened only once, with the
online game EVE online [43], leading to a study on social norms [210]. Other works
in this spirit were done by Grabowski et al. [96], who conducted a series of social
network studies using data from the private server of a Lineage II shard. On the
other hand, a research group around Castranova and Ross has recently developed the
browser-based online game “Greenlandgame”, for the purpose of conducting socio-
economic experiments in virtual worlds with focus on resource management and
territorial conflicts [188, 189].
3.1.4 Employing the self-developed online world Pardus
The only other example we are aware of, in which the developers of an online game
coincide with the researchers who conduct the studies on the game’s population, is
the case of this thesis and the articles compiled within [203–205, 208]. In the past
years we have recorded practically all actions of all players taken in the self-developed,
proprietary MMOG Pardus [2] which is online since 2004. Pardus is an open-ended
game with a worldwide player base of almost 400,000 individuals. Players reside
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Figure 3.1: One example illustrating the rich exploratory life of players in the Pardus society. This
forum entry, posted on November 27th 2010 in the Pardus forums, shows a “scientific method”
proposed by one of the players, who encourages his fellow players to gather data and to peer-review
his work on a particular market mechanism in the game (“I’d prefer it if someone would peer-review
one item in my work.”).
and act within a virtual, persistent futuristic universe and make up their own goals.
Most players invent and develop their virtual social lifes without constraints by the
game setup. The game’s environmental topology is given but can be manipulated
by the players to some extent. Players self-organize within groups and subgroups,
claim territories, decide to go to war, etc., completely on their own accounts. Players
typically participate in the game for several weeks to several years, see Section 3.5.
One illustrative example for the richness and complexity of the Pardus society is
given by the continuous attempts of players to explore and understand the laws
governing their universe. Figure 3.1 shows a “scientific method” proposed by one of
the individuals in the game forum, who encourages his fellow players to gather data
and to peer-review his work on a particular market mechanism in the game.
Players of Pardus characteristically engage in various economic activities to in-
crease their wealth (non-convertible game money): There are numerous possibilities
for jobs, such as mining and processing basic resources from the environment, trade,
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production, assembly and consumption of commodities, etc. Economic life is em-
bedded in a production tree which provides a basic framework for player-created in-
dustries. Trade occurs following simple ‘rules’ within dynamic and demand-oriented
virtual markets constituted by groups of players, see Section 3.6.2. Social life within
Pardus is based on means of communication with fellow players in various forms,
such as chat, forum, private messages, which allow the establishment of e.g. friend-
ships or hostile relations, see Section 3.6.1. There are a number of ways to publicly
display one’s ‘status’ within the virtual society: Purchase of expensive status sym-
bols, such as space ships, earning of medals of honor for war eﬀorts or for defeating
outlaws, etc. These possibilities are not only well used, but constitute an important
psychological driving force for many players.
Given the complete data set from the Pardus game, one can identify four major
directions of possible research.
1. Network analysis. It is possible to directly access the dynamics of several
types of social networks such as dynamics of friend networks, networks of enemies, or
communication networks. Especially the latter oﬀer a way to directly relate findings
in the game with real-world communication networks, such as a data set of cell phone
calls which has been recently analyzed from a network perspective [138, 172]. While
there exists some insight into real-world friend networks in the literature, e.g. of
the Facebook community [93], there is practically no knowledge of topology and
dynamics of enemy networks [137]. Since the time resolution of our data is accurate
to one second, it becomes possible to study time courses of global network properties.
Using such longitudinal network data it can be understood if and how communities
show aging eﬀects, such as densification, i.e. shrinking diameters and growing average
degrees. This phenomenon has been observed in societies and online communities
[142, 144], as well as in the evolution of scientific fields and cities [28, 29]. The
vast majority of social network studies analyze single or at best small numbers of
network snapshots. Important exceptions include time resolved studies of an internet
dating community [116], the analysis of a university email network [134], of the web
of scientific coauthorships [164, 167, 182], as well as several large-scale networks of
various types [144].
Network growth and re-linking processes can be directly studied and compared
to well-known models, such as e.g. the preferential attachment model [19] or static
relinking models [207]. Preferential attachment dynamics of real-world networks
have been verified in a few recent studies [60, 123, 142].
2. Testing traditional social-dynamics hypotheses. The Pardus data al-
lows for direct empirical testing of long-standing hypotheses on social network dy-
namics, such as the Hypothesis of triadic closure [97, 180], the Weak ties hypothesis
[97], or the Hypothesis of social balance [65, 104].
For quantification purposes we employ network measures such as betweenness
centrality [86] and overlap which measures how often a given pair of nodes has links
to other common nodes [172]. To our knowledge, no longitudinal measurements of
large-scale signed networks exist as of today. One well-known social network study
on monks in a monastery can be found in the classic literature [191], as well as
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a modern long-time survey of social dynamics in classrooms [127]. These are first
attempts of systematic social balance experiments, however being far from conclusive
due to limited data and small scales (10 to 100 nodes), and a low number of samples
(about ≈ 10 observations). Further, the extent of reciprocity and Triad significance
profiles [157] together with their dynamics can be directly accessed from the game
data. To understand microscopic changes in social network dynamics, transition
rates between dyadic and triadic structures can be measured – yielding parameters
needed e.g. for calibrating agent-based models of social network dynamics, as e.g. in
[10]. So far these transition rates could only be assumed by model builders and have
never been measured in actual societies.
3. Economic analysis. The fact that all players are engaged in economic
activities allows for statistically significant measurements of wealth and income dis-
tributions which can be compared to real economies [49, 70, 222]. The process of
price formation – and more generally preference relations – for all goods and services
in the game can be observed within the social and economical context of players.
All prices of all goods in the game are recorded with a time resolution of one second
and can be analyzed with respect to ‘stylized’ facts in real prices, in a straightfor-
ward fashion. These ‘stylized’ facts, such as volatility clustering, fat-tailed return
distributions, squared auto-correlation decays, etc., are known for traded goods in
the real world [57]. Further, co-evolution dynamics, i.e. the evolution of economic
properties of players (e.g. wealth) as a function of their local social networks, and
vice versa, their social evolution as a function of their economic network, can be
extracted from the data. The theoretical literature on co-evolving networks is rela-
tively sparse [30, 31]; to our knowledge there exist practically no measurements on
this issue so far.
4. Group formation and dynamics – gender and country aspects. Play-
ers have the possibility to create and join ‘alliances’ (communities) in the game,
which allow them to streamline ideas, join forces for common projects, or coordinate
aims and believes. The dynamics, formation, interaction, and disappearance of these
cohesive communities can be investigated readily in the data. Players choose to have
a male or female character allowing all data to be partitioned into female and male
networks. This oﬀers the possibility to search for behavioral diﬀerences in ‘network-
ing’ patterns between female and male players. Further, economic productivity and
communication patterns can be analyzed gender-specifically. The same holds for
country specifics of players.
In this work we focus on the first two of the above directions: analysis of complex
network structures/dynamics and testing sociological hypotheses. Along these lines
we establish further evidence that online game communities may serve as a model
for real world communities. It is not obvious a priori that a population of online
players is a representative sample of real-world societies [220]. However, several
recent studies are providing evidence that human behavior on a collective level is
remarkably robust, meaning that statistical diﬀerences of real-world communities
and game-societies are often marginal [124, 126].
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3.2 Overview and history of Pardus
Pardus [2] is a browser-based MMOG in a science-fiction setting, open to the public
and played since September 2004. A browser-based MMOG is characterized by a sub-
stantial number of users playing together in the same virtual environment connected
by an internet browser. The game’s manual states [4]: “Pardus can be categorized
as a Massive Multiplayer Online Browser Game (MMOBG), a subcategory of a Mas-
sive Multiplayer Online Game (MMOG). This means that thousands of people from
all over the world are playing together in the same fictional universe at the same
time over the internet. Because Pardus is also about roleplaying, it is a subcate-
gory of a Massive Multiplayer Online Roleplaying Game (MMORPG) too. Since
‘MMOBRPG’ would be a bit too complicated, we left the ‘RP’ out.” For a detailed
categorization of online games see [22, 45, 154].
In Pardus every player onws an account with one character per game universe;
players are forbidden to operate multiple accounts. A character is a pilot owning a
spacecraft with a certain cargo capacity, roaming the virtual universe trading com-
modities, socializing, and much more, “to gain wealth and fame in space” [5]. The
main component of Pardus consists of trade simulation with a society of players
heavily driven by social factors such as friendship, cooperation or competition. Con-
flictual relations may result in aggressive acts such as attacks, fights, revenge, even
destruction of another player’s means of production or transportation. Under certain
conditions, hostile acts may degenerate into large-scale conflicts between diﬀerent
factions of players – wars. There is no explicit ‘winning’ in Pardus as there is no
inherent set of goals nor allowed or forbidden ‘moves’ (with a few exceptions mainly
concerning decent language and behavior towards fellow players). Pardus is a virtual
world or synthetic world with a gameplay based on socializing and role-playing, with
interaction of player characters with others and with non-player characters as its
core elements [45].
Action Points – the unit of time
Every game action carried out by a player (trade, travel, etc.) costs certain amount
of so-called Action Points (APs). These points can not exceed a maximum of 6,100
APs per character. For characters owning less APs than their maximum, every six
minutes 24 APs are automatically regenerated, i.e. 5,760 APs per day. Once a
player’s character is out of APs, she has to wait for being able to play on. As a
result the typical Pardus player logs in once a day to spend all her APs on several
activities within a few minutes (for each character/universe). This makes APs, the
game’s unit of time, the most valuable factor: Those players who use their APs
most eﬃciently can experience the fastest progress or earn the highest profits. Social
activities such as chatting (see Section 3.6.1) do not consume APs. Highly involved
players usually spend a lot more real time on the game’s features of socialization as
well as on planning and coordinating their future moves than on actually spending
their APs.
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of number of active characters in the game universes. The large increase of
players in Orion between days ≈ 800 and 1,000 is due to advertisement campaigns after October
2006. At day 1,000 (dotted line) the Artemis and Pegasus universes were opened. Some thousand
players abandoned their Orion characters focusing on their new Artemis characters. This explains
the mirrored development in these two universes after day 1,000.
3.3 The game universes
There exist three separate game universes: Orion, Artemis, and Pegasus. Presently
Pardus is actively played by ≈ 13,000 players, over 380,000 have registered so far.
Orion and Artemis each inhabit ≈ 6,000 active characters, Pegasus with its ≈ 1,000
characters is for paying customers only. We count existing characters who have
mastered the game’s tutorial environment as active (characters which are inactive for
120 days get deleted automatically, see Section 3.5). Figure 3.2 depicts the evolution
of universe populations for the time range where data is available, see Section 3.4.
The majority plays the game for free, paying members receive Premium accounts
which bestow them with additional features not available to users with Free account
status (such as the possibility of character creation in the Pegasus game universe).
Orion was opened on September 14th 2004, Artemis and Pegasus 1,000 days later,
on June 10th 2007. Between universes it is impossible to move, trade, or exchange
game money. The universes are independent3.
Orion has the longest history but has some missing data at its beginning, see
Section 3.4. Orion has converged to social structures and ties which are relatively
constant over time, as seen in a number of measures (not shown). In contrast,
Artemis and Pegasus can be observed from their start on, and measuring the evolu-
tion of social networks from the time of their “birth” is possible. Here we do not face
the problem of the ‘missing past’ [144]. Since Pegasus is only accessible to paying
3This is not entirely correct since some players have openly revealed their identities, i.e. they
have disclosed which characters they are controlling in diﬀerent game universes. It is not clear
how many attempts have been made to copy existing social ties between universes. Although it
is discouraged, it may happen that e.g. vendettas between players who are aware of their mutual
identities in diﬀerent universes are carried out within more than one universe.
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Figure 3.3: Map of a Pardus universe. Each colored square represents a sector, consisting of 15×15
fields on average. Colors indicate cluster membership. A cluster is a number of sectors, usually
around 20, pre-defined as a political region. Nearby sectors are connected by wormholes (not
shown). See Chapter 5 for a detailed account on clusters and the topology of the universe.
customers of the game, it has much less players. It is due to these reasons that
most parts of this work consider only data from Artemis. However, since character
creation in Orion and Artemis is free but not so in Pegasus, the former universes
display considerably higher fluctuations in player numbers and activity rates than
the latter.
Note that the Pardus universes are virtual worlds, permanently evolving without
a scheduled end. They are far from being in equilibrium due to often added new
and changed game features (especially in the game’s oﬃcial test phase before 2006-
10-01), due to fluctuations in player numbers, or due to large-scale collective actions
of players, etc. The distinction between transient phase and steady state may be
hard to determine for certain network properties, due to the large amount of strong
mutual influences naturally present in systems of high complexity.
Space in Pardus is two-dimensional. The topology of all universes is equivalent,
however there is the possibility for players to block regions of space from being
entered by other players, see Chapter 5. Each game universe is divided into 400
sectors. Figure 3.3 shows the map of the Pardus universe on which the sectors are
displayed as colored squares. Each sector consists of 15×15 fields on average. Fields
are the smallest units of space and are displayed as square images in-game. They
form a square grid on which continuous ship movement is possible by clicking on the
desired destination field within the space chart. This chart is a 7×7 fields cut-out of
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Figure 3.4: Space chart. A cut-out of 7×7 fields of the universe (green lines, not shown in-game)
visible to every player on his navigation screen; the current position is in the central field (yellow
box). By clicking on another field, the ship moves to that location and all fields are updated so the
ship is again located in the center.
the universe visible to every player with their current position located on the central
field, see Fig. 3.4. A sector’s boundary is impenetrable; moving between nearby
sectors is possible by tunneling through field objects called wormholes. A collection
of nearby ≈ 20 sectors is called a cluster. The typical spatial range of activities of a
character is usually confined to one cluster for several weeks or longer. In Chapter 5
we give a more detailed account on socio-economic and topological properties of the
universe due to its importance for mobility.
3.4 The data analyzed
Daily database backups recorded at 05:32 GMT4 are available from 2005-09-09. The
day 2005-09-09 is the 360th after 2004-09-14, i.e. the 360th day after Orion was
opened. Backups from the following dates are not available due to unknown reasons:
2006-03-24 to 2006-04-23, 2006-04-28 to 2006-04-30, 2006-10-24 to 2006-10-26, 2007-
03-20, 2007-05-10, 2007-09-21, 2008-02-09, 2008-06-09. Since we have complete data
4This time was chosen for the daily backup and maintenance scheduler because it is the time of
lowest player activity.
41
3. Quantification of socio-economic behavior using an online society
<15
15−19
20−24
25−29
>29
(a)
US
GB CA
AT
DE
AU
Other
(b)
Figure 3.5: Distribution of player age (a), nationality (b) in 2005.
only for Artemis and Pegasus (with the exception of three days), and because Artemis
has more active characters than Pegasus, in this work we refer only to Artemis data
unless explicitly stated otherwise. For clarity only weekly data points are shown in
all time evolution plots of Chapter 6, except for Figs. 6.5 and 6.11. The range of days
from which data was considered varies from Chapter to Chapter due to the diﬀerent
times when these Chapters where developed. The legal department of the Medical
University of Vienna has attested the innocuousness of the used anonymized data.
3.5 Players and census of characters
3.5.1 Age and nationality
In a poll taken in the Pardus forums in the beginning of 2005 the age of players was
assessed. From a total of 255 votes, 5% reported their age to be less than 15 years,
18% between 15–19, 34% between 20–24, 23% between 25–29, and 20% are older
than 29 years, Fig. 3.5 (a). The distribution of player nationalities can be estimated
by technical means and reads approximately as follows: United States (US) 40%,
United Kingdom (GB) 14%, Canada (CA) 5%, Austria (AT) 4%, Germany (DE)
4%, Australia (AU) 4%, Other 29%, Fig. 3.5 (b).
3.5.2 Lifetimes of characters
Characters are automatically deleted after an inactivity (not logging in) period of
120 days. Additionally, every player has the option to delete her account or single
characters at any time. Rarely, it happens that accounts get deleted due to breaking
of game rules, such as the operation of multiple accounts. We call all deletions which
are not due to inactivity self-induced. Figure 3.6 shows the cumulative distribution
of character lifetimes (in days) of all 16,980 characters who existed for at least one
day, but not on the last one. If a character’s lifetime lies before day 120 (dotted line),
her deletion could have been self-induced only. If a character’s lifetime is longer than
120 days, her deletion was either self-induced or automatic due to inactivity. These
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Figure 3.6: Cumulative distribution of character lifetimes (in days) of all 16,980 characters who
existed at least for one day but not on the last one. The dotted line marks day 120. The inset
shows the distribution of lifetimes of < 120 days in a double-logarithmic scale.
two regimes are evident in the figure: the regime of only self-induced deletion follows
a power-law with exponent γ = −0.063. In the second regime, the distribution
is neither a power-law nor an exponential probably due to the overlay of the two
deletion schemes.
Of all characters, 7.6% have a lifetime of 0 days, i.e. they delete themselves on
the first day of their existence. At least 31.4% of all deletions are self-induced, and
≈ 13% of all characters become inactive after their first day.
3.5.3 Gender of characters
When signing up for the first time, players have to choose between a male and female
character; this decision is irrevocable. Depending on gender a male or female avatar
(profile-like picture) of characters is displayed in certain places in the game. In the
Artemis universe, ≈ 90% of all characters are male.
3.6 Life within Pardus
3.6.1 Social interaction
Means of communication
There are three ways for players to communicate inside the game, facilitating social
activity. Players may use these facilities independently from game-mechanic states
(such as their ship’s location within the universe, their wealth, etc.):
1. Chat: Pardus oﬀers several built-in chat channels per universe where players
can simultaneously communicate with many others. Chat entries scroll up and
disappear; thus the chat is well-suited only for temporary talks.
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2. Forum: In the forum, messages, called posts, can consist of several lines and
stay for a long time. This enables more thorough discussions than in chat.
Posts are organized within threads which correspond to a topic. There are
universe-specific subforums as well as global subforums which can be accessed
from all universes.
3. Private message: Within a universe it is possible to send private messages
(PMs) to any other player; this action and the PM’s content is only seen
by sender and receiver – a system similar to email. When a PM is sent the
receiver gets immediately notified in a status bar. PMs always have exactly
one recipient. Presently a daily total of ≈ 10, 000 PMs are exchanged within
Pardus.
Alliances and factions
Players are able to create or join alliances, which are entities with the purpose to
combine groups of individual players allowing them to operate with joined forces
for their possibly common aims. A player can be member of not more than one
alliance at the same time and may leave or be kicked out by its leader anytime.
Each alliance has a private chat channel; members are able to send alliance-PMs to
all other members at once. Alliances can be interpreted as loose analogies to firms
or societies. Although there is no explicit limitation, they consist of up to about two
hundred players, a value not far from the Dunbar number of 150 [73], a number that
also appears in the maximum number of friends in social networks, see Section 6.3.3.
Besides alliances there exist three factions, pre-defined groups which can be joined
by players independent of alliance membership. Doing so yields certain benefits such
as the possibility to gain access to faction technology: ships and equipment. The
majority of all players are members of a faction; as alliance membership, faction
membership is unique, meaning that at one point in time a player can only be member
of one faction. Sometimes two factions are conducting war where aﬃliated players
receive certain incentives for joining the (armed) conflict with their opponents.
Friends and enemies
For a small amount of APs, players can mark others as friends or enemies. This can
be done for any reason. The marked characters are added to the markers personal
friends or enemies list. Additionally, every player has a personal friend of and
enemy of list, displaying all players who have marked them as friend or enemy,
respectively. When being marked or un-marked as friend or enemy the aﬀected player
immediately receives an informatory system message. It is only possible to mark
someone either as friend or as enemy, but not both simultaneously. Besides names
and online statuses being displayed in the PM contacts for quick access, the friends
and enemy list serve game-mechanic purposes: friends/enemies are automatically or
optionally included/excluded for certain actions. For example, enemies of building
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or starbase owners are not able to use the services oﬀered in the respective places
(see Section 3.6.2).
We stress that friend/enemy lists and friend of/enemy of lists are completely pri-
vate, meaning that no one except the marking and marked players have information
about ties between them. It is not possible to see second degree neighbors (e.g.
friends of friends) or the number of ties another player has5. Note that this is in
contrast to many online social networking services such as Facebook, where usually
second degree neighbors and number of friends are visible. Thereby Pardus’ sys-
tem does not introduce potentially strong biases concerning accumulation of friends
(some users may tend to accumulate friends for the main purpose of increasing their
publicly visible number of friends [93]). Our data thus represents a more realistic
social situation, in the sense that social ties are not immediately accessible but need
to be discovered by e.g. communication with or careful observation of others.
Besides character names and online status being displayed on every player’s per-
sonal PM contacts page for quick access, the friends and enemies lists serve game-
mechanic purposes: friends/enemies are automatically or optionally included/ex-
cluded for certain actions. For example, enemies of building owners are not able
to use the services oﬀered in the respective places. Note that friend and enemy
markings need not necessarily denote aﬀective friendships or enmity, they rather in-
dicate a certain degree of cooperative or uncooperative stance motivated by aﬀective
and/or cognitive incentives. However, we assume these two motives to coincide to
a great extent, e.g. it seems highly unlikely that someone marked as enemy/friend
due to rational considerations at the same time constitutes the aﬀective opposite of
friend/enemy within the game (and vice versa). PMs as well as friend and enemy
relations can be displayed as networks, Fig. 3.7, see also Section 6.1.
3.6.2 Economy
Besides social interactions, a variety of diﬀerent economic activities form the basis of
life within Pardus. While he have not yet analyzed economic aspects of the game in
detail, it is important to describe the rich economic environment for an understanding
of the complexity of the socio-economic system in Pardus. The currency of game
money is the so-called credit. This money is not convertible to real money. Every
player starts her life with 5,000 credits. Since most assets needed for making progress
– such as ships, ship equipment, buildings – are traded in credits, it is of basic interest
to earn money during the game (the richest players currently possess hundreds of
millions of credits).
There exist over 30 commodity types, such as food, water, energy, or metal. Five
of these can be mined (see Mining below) and are therefore called resources. In
contrast, we label all other commodities luxuries. The basic indivisible unit in which
5On 2008-08-24 the so-called profile feature of the game was extended, allowing players with
Premium accounts to publicly display their numbers of friends or enemies. Since this feature was
introduced at the very end of our last measured data (2008-09-01) and only a negligible proportion
of players are making use of it, it can be regarded as irrelevant here.
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(a) Pajek
(b) Pajek
Figure 3.7: (a) Accumulated PM communications over 445 days between 78 randomly selected
individuals who existed on the first and last day. Link colors of light gray, gray, and black
correspond to 1–10, 11–100 and 101–1000 PMs sent, respectively. (b) Friend (green, solid) and
enemy (red, dashed) relations on day 445 between the same individuals. See our Youtube chan-
nel http://www.youtube.com/user/complexsystemsvienna for animated time evolutions of these
networks.
the amount of commodities as well as storage and cargo capacity is measured is the
ton.
A variety of techniques for generating revenues are practiced in Pardus:
• FWE Run
The game’s primary trade centers are planets and starbases (both subsequently
referred to as bases), one or two to be found in most sectors. These are immobile
and indestructible entities provided by the game with a practically unlimited
amount of credits available. Bases oﬀer essential services such as the repair
of ship equipment or access to local trade markets. Because of these essential
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features, most activities in the game take place on or in the neighborhood of
bases. For being able to provide certain services in a reasonable scope, bases
need to have reached a certain extent of population. The population of a base
is an integer value, usually between 500 and 200, 000, which is also directly
related to the capacity and spending power of the base, see below. Generally,
a base’s population grows when it is provided with enough commodities of a
specific sort by players. In case these upkeep-commodities are not delivered, a
base loses population. Every three hours the upkeep is automatically checked,
followed by the corresponding calculation and execution of population shift
(this recurring event is called tick). Thus, it is a basic long-time interest of
most players to regularly provide upkeep to the bases they tend to interact
with.
This interest is fueled naturally by the opportunity for profit: Prices on bases
are exclusively determined by local supply and demand. For every commodity
type i available for trade on base k, there exists a balance value bi,k(sk), depen-
dent on commodity type and the base’s current population sk6. The number
bi,k is a negative (positive) integer and indicates how many tons of commodities
will be consumed (produced) at the next tick. The base’s storage capacity mi,k
for commodity type i is defined by:
mi,k := |bi,k| · 20 + 20. (3.1)
Finally, the commodity’s price ci,k is determined via the exponential relation
ci,k :=
￿
ci,0 · 10−
ai,k
mi,k
￿
, (3.2)
where floor brackets denote the floor function, c·,0 refers to pre-defined, globally
constant basic prices, and ai,k denotes the presently stocked amount of the
respective commodity type. Equation (3.2) corresponds to sale prices. For
purchase prices, c·,0 is replaced with 0.8 · c·,0, i.e. by a single base commodities
are always purchased for a 20% lower price than sold.
Every tick, this dynamic system of supply and demand creates economic dis-
equilibria throughout the universe: Due to changed amounts a, prices of con-
sumed commodities go up, while the prices of produced commodities go down.
As a trader, closing this price gap by shuttling to and from bases with full loads
of the appropriate kinds of commodities immediately after a tick can yield high
profits. Since planets produce food and water but need energy in large quan-
tities for upkeep, for starbases vice versa, the widely practiced trade technique
involving these commodities has been coined Food-Water-Energy Run (FWE
Run) by the Pardus community. Note the dynamic, self-regulating nature of
6The latter dependence is non-linear and not the same for all commodities. Values for |b| usually
range between 1 and 1000, where luxuries typically have low balance values, while resources and
upkeep-commodities have high balance levels.
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this process: Where many players practice the FWE Run, price gaps close
quickly. In sparsely inhabited regions however, where there is less competition,
more or easier profits can be achieved. Thus, the system is naturally regulated
by diﬀusion of certain player activities over the game universe.
• Long-range trade
Since the sectors which connect diﬀerent clusters contain no planets and are
designed to take slightly more APs to travel through, profitable FWE Runs
are usually confined to sectors within the same cluster; i.e. the FWE Run is
an intra-cluster trade technique. There are however commodities which must
be hauled through several clusters in order to gain a reasonable profit. The
“indecent” version of this inter-cluster trade consists of four kinds of body parts
available in the black markets of bases, the “decent” version consists of three
kinds of jewels available at special places. Each brand is produced in certain
clusters only and purchased by non-player characters (NPCs) in remote clusters
for relatively high prices - the farther away, the higher the payout in general.
Since purchasing body parts leads to a slight reduction of a base’s population,
the trade of these commodities is despised by those players who wish to see
their bases prosper. There is a mechanism which makes it possible to find out
the last trader of body parts on a base, allowing every member of the society
to trace and punish the oﬀenders if desired.
• Bulletin board missions
On every base, the game automatically generates missions which are oﬀered
to players on a local bulletin board. These are assignments limited in time
having destination within the cluster – e.g. deliver 10 tons of packages to
a planet in a nearby sector within 60 minutes – which among other benefits
generate a payout by the base when fulfilled. There are also special missions
to destinations outside of the cluster.
• Mining
Almost every field contains an amount r of one of the natural resources which
regenerate once every day. By using APs, every player can mine resources
without any additional costs, e.g. for the purpose to sell them to bases or to
other players. When mining, a certain percentage of the available field resources
is gathered. Again, note the self-regulating nature: In remote sectors where
field resources are abundant, players can achieve high profits with relatively
little eﬀort. In highly populated regions however, money is hard to earn this
way since a lot of miners have already drained substantial fractions of the
possibly available resources7.
7The derogatorily used term stripminer was coined by players to refer to myopic or ignorant
miners who make their earnings by draining natural resources as much as possible. Regularly,
heated ecological debates are raised in the Pardus forums about the moral badness of stripminers
and about joint eﬀorts to antagonize them.
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• Climbing the production tree
Usually luxuries are processed out of resources or less valuable luxuries in
player-owned buildings. For example, a brewery manufactures expensive liquor
out of cheap energy, water, food, and chemical supplies. Every player has the
possibility to construct a small number of such buildings. On each field, only
one building or base may reside. Buildings are immobile and act as production
sites as well as outlets: The owner may freely specify limits and prices for
consumed and produced commodities and may set her building to open trade.
In this case, every player is able to carry on commerce with the building at
any time, to provide upkeep or to purchase its output for the pre-set prices.
Analogously to bases, buildings tick every six hours at which times upkeep is
consumed and output produced. The credits a building has available coincides
with the owner’s credits – whenever there is trade happening in a building, the
owner’s credits are aﬀected directly, independent of her (i.e. her ship’s) current
location. If a player is out of credits, it is not possible to sell commodities to
her buildings.
Only by collaboration of players may high profits be achieved: Pardus’ produc-
tion tree has multiple layers of interdependencies [3], requiring several players
to coordinate the construction of local industry chains. Once established, it is
up to the owners to provide their buildings with upkeep themselves or to let
others do this work. A method of trade is practiced in densely industrialized
sectors, consisting of players flying from low-level to high-level buildings one
by one, reusing the purchased commodity outputs as upkeep stock for the next
outlet. These suppliers can profit only if building owners arrange reasonable
prices. This is usually in the owners’ interest since delegated supply work
allows the owner to spend APs for other activities.
Most end-products, i.e. the produced luxuries at the top of the production tree
which cannot be reused as upkeep in other outlets, are usable commodities.
For example, drugs may be consumed to gain APs, robots are used to repair a
ship’s armor, or droid modules can be installed on buildings to provide powerful
defenses. Therefore, the motivation for developing industries is to some part
based on the Pardus society’s tangible needs.
• Player starbases
Every player has the option to build one player-owned starbase (PSB). The
fields on which PSB construction is possible have certain distance require-
ments, e.g. a Chebyshev distance of at least 15 to fields containing a planet
or a starbase, and a distance of at least 5 to wormholes. Because of these
requirements, there is only a limited amount of ≈ 400 PSBs that can exist in
a universe at the same time. As NPC starbases8, PSBs tick every 3 hours. Un-
like buildings, PSBs have separate credit pools, e.g. the owner has to deposit
8In cases where it is necessary to distinguish entities in the game not owned by players from
player owned ones, the former receive the prefix NPC (for non-player character).
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credits in her PSB if it should be able to buy commodities through open trade.
Also, prices do not dynamically adjust to supply and demand, see Eq. (3.2),
but can be freely set as flat rates by the owner similar to buildings.
A PSB has the following sources of income: every tick, credits equal to 20%
of its population are earned as taxes. Successful bulletin board missions taken
by players on the starbase pay 10% of their rewards. Any ship repairs done
at the starbase pay by default 11% of their cost to the starbase – the owner
is able to set higher or lower repair surcharges. Commodity trade and pro-
duction/sale of ships and equipment are further ways to supplement starbase
income. Ships and equipment are produced out of commodities and cred-
its, where the credit requirement is a fraction of the (globally constant) basic
ship price at NPC bases. Hence by setting a sale price for constructed ships
and equipment between production cost and basic price, both seller and buyer
profit. Competition between ship and equipment constructors drives sale prices
down, occasionally below production costs, e.g. to lure new players into joining
the constructor’s alliance with the bargain of receiving a ship for a low price
or even for free.
• Pardus PSB subsidy
Players receive a daily subsidy from their faction if they maintain a faction-
aligned PSB in the special Pardus cluster, which is only accessible to Premium
Account characters. This enforces competition within this region.
• Ship-to-ship trade
If players meet on the same field, they may “donate” any amount of their
cargo hold or available credits to the trade partner. Remote donations are not
possible9.
• Raid
Evil-minded players have the possibility to raid ships or buildings, taking away
commodities by force. Currently social pressure, player organization and build-
ing defenses are however so highly developed that raid is rarely practiced. The
situation may have been diﬀerent in the universes’ early build-up phases.
• Bounty hunting
A bounty is an amount of credits placed by a player on another player; everyone
has the possibility to place bounties, for any reason. Anyone who destroys an-
other player’s ship receives the sum of bounties which were placed on her head
9By using indirect methods of money transaction it is however very well possible to remotely
transfer credits – for example by taking advantage of the fact that a player’s credits coincide with
the credits available in her buildings. A player therefore does not need to meet with another player
directly, but credits between two players can be transfered remotely by using the trade feature of
buildings. It is remarkable that there have been attempts by some players to organize banks by
specifically utilizing this function in declared buildings, completely altering their purpose originally
intended by the game developers.
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Figure 3.8: Evolution of total money owned by players. Arrows mark all times of war between
two factions, where large amounts of credits are spent for military eﬀorts or annihilated due to
destructions of player starbases. The dotted line at day 640 marks the opening of the Artemis and
Pegasus universes; gaps appear due to unavailable data.
and thereby cancels them. A “shot down” player loses some of her progress10
but otherwise continues playing the game as before. On every base there are
global bounty boards displaying all existing bounties and bounty reasons.
• Scamming
A rarely practiced but very profitable if well-executed method, which is not
supported by the game system per se, is scamming, i.e. tricking other players
into giving you money by means of deception or by earning their trust. Al-
though their short-time profits may be huge, scammers are usually “out-laws”
for the rest of their lifes within the game’s society.
We make the following observation: all presented classes of traders (FWE-runners,
miners, suppliers, long-range traders) as well as classes of players defined by other
in-game activities (fighter, bounty hunter, hacker,. . . ) are not pre-determined explic-
itly, but arise out of a potential for profit of some kind. Any player acts as she pleases
according to her own perception, the game’s framework facilitates certain ways of
(continuous) action however, leading to the evolution of a complex socio-economic
system with emerging collective phenomena, such as wars or the formation of eco-
nomic cartels11. In case of traders the profit is of financial nature, other classes of
players may be motivated by diﬀerent values such as social (or anti-social) prestige.
10The loss of progress consists of one piece of ship equipment, as well as a fraction of the player’s
so-called skill and experience points which are needed in combat or for constructing buildings.
11Note that the game’s oﬃcial phase of public testing lasted for two years. During this time,
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“Economic realism” becomes apparent on the following level: Money is generally
earned to be utilized as a means to an end, e.g. for being invested into more pres-
tigious ships or into military eﬀorts to prevail over one’s enemies. Figure 3.8 shows
how the total money owned by players grows over time except for times of war, where
player spend large amounts of credits to destroy their enemies. Therefore, players are
driven by tangible motivations to make profits, in contrast to models where arbitrary
utility functions are assumed to be maximized by virtual agents.
Through these mechanics players find themselves strongly encouraged to take
part in the struggles of every day economic life, as known from the real world:
collaboration, competition, cartelization, fraud, etc. We plan to analyze the Pardus
economy in detail in further works.
the developers had to undertake several acts of balancing and fine-tuning to the system to make
every dynamic game feature as well-adjusted as possible in terms of equalization. For example,
there are three competing factions with diﬀerent strenghts and weaknesses which may be joined
by players. Balancing their features or adding new ones to achieve similar levels of attractivity
while maximizing incomparability was several years of work. Insofar some tuning had to be done,
however the system found its stationary states surprisingly fast every time.
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Chapter 4
On the statistical nature of social
actions and reactions
Before analyzing the structure of human relations and interactions, as expressed
by single and interacting socio-economic networks, see subsequent Chapters 6 and
7, respectively, in this Chapter we focus on the statistical nature of sequences of
human behavioral actions in the virtual universe of the previously introduced MMOG
Pardus. We do so to understand the constituents of the system first, i.e. their
statistical properties of performing actions and reactions. In this first approach we
do not consider the topology of the networks spanned by these actions.
Sequential behavioral data is available on the scale of an entire society, which
is in general impossible to obtain. The unique data of the online game Pardus [2]
allows to unambiguously track all actions of all players over long time periods. We
focus on the stream of eight types of actions which are translated into an 8-letter
alphabet. This code of actions of individual players is then analyzed by means of
standard timeseries approaches as have been used, for example, in DNA sequence
analyzes [177, 201]. The data set considered in this Chapter contains practically all
actions of all players of Pardus, over 1,238 days. From all sequences of all 34,055
Artemis players who performed or received an action at least once within 1,238 days,
we removed players with a life history of less than 1000 actions, leading to the set of
the most active 1,758 players which are considered throughout this Chapter. This
Chapter is based on Ref. [208].
4.1 Human behavioral sequences
Using the data set from our online game, it is possible to extract multiple social
relationships between a fixed set of humans [203]. We consider eight diﬀerent actions
every player can execute at any time. These are communication (C), trade (T),
setting a friendship link (F), removing an enemy link (forgiving) (X), attack (A),
placing a bounty on another player (punishment) (B), removing a friendship link
(D), and setting an enemy link (E). While C, T, F and X can be associated with
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Figure 4.1: (a) Short segment of action sequences of three players, A146, A199, and A701. Some
actions of players 146 and 701 are directed toward player 199. This results in a sequence of received-
actions for player 199, R199 = {· · ·ATTCE · · · }. The combined sequence of actions (originated from
- and directed to) player 199, C199, is shown in the last line; red letters mark actions from others
directed to player 199. (b) Schematic illustration showing the definition of a binary walk in ‘good-
bad’ action space (good-bad ‘world line’). A positive action (C, T, F or X) means an upward move,
a negative action (A, B, D and E) is a downward move. Good people have rising world-lines.
positive (good) actions, A, B, D and E are hostile or negative (bad) actions. We
classify communication as positive because only a negligible part of communication
takes place between enemies [205]. Segments of action sequences of three players
(146, 199 and 701) are shown in the first three lines of Fig. 4.1 (a).
We consider three types of sequences for any particular player. The first is the
stream of N consecutive actions Ai = {an|n = 1, · · · , N} which player i performs
during his ‘life’ in the game. The second sequence is the (time-ordered) stream of
actions that player i receives from all the other players in the game, i.e. all the actions
which are directed towards player i. We denote by Ri = {rn|n = 1, · · · ,M} received-
action sequences. Finally, the third sequence is the time-ordered combination of
player i’s actions and received-actions, which is a chronological sequence from the
elements of Ai and Ri in the order of occurrence. The combined sequence we denote
by C i; its length is M + N , see also Fig. 4.1 (a). The nth element of one of these
series is denoted by Ai(n), Ri(n), or C i(n). We do not consider the actual time
between two consecutive actions which can range from milliseconds to weeks, rather
we work in ‘action-time’.
If we assign +1 to any positive action C, T, F or X, and −1 to the negative actions
A, B, D and E, we can translate a sequence Ai into a symbolic binary sequence Aibin.
From the cumulative sum of this binary sequence a ‘world line’ or ‘random walk’ for
player i can be generated, W igood−bad(t) =
￿t
n=1A
i
bin(n), see Fig. 4.1 (b). Similarly,
we define a binary sequence from the combined sequence C i, where we assign +1
to an executed action and −1 to a received-action. This sequence we call C ibin, its
cumulative sum, W iact−rec(t) =
￿t
n=1C
i
bin(n) is the ‘action-receive’ random-walk or
world line. Finally, we denote the number of actions which occurred during a day
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Table 4.1: First row: total number of actions by all players (with at least 1000 actions) in the
Artemis universe of the Pardus game. Further rows: first 4 moments of rY (d), the distribution of
the log-increments of the NY processes (see text). Approximate log-normality is indicated. The
large values of kurtosis for T and A result from a few extreme outliers.
D B A E F C T X￿1238
d=1 NY (d) 26,471 9,914 558,905 64,444 82,941 5,607,060 393,250 20,165
mean 0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.003 0.002
std 1.13 0.79 0.54 0.64 0.35 0.12 0.28 0.94
skew 0.12 0.26 0.35 0.08 0.23 0.11 1.00 -0.01
kurtosis 3.35 3.84 6.23 3.67 3.41 3.76 13.89 3.72
in the game by NY (d), where d indicates the day and Y stands for one of the eight
actions.
The number of occurrences of the various actions of all players over the entire time
period is summarized in Tab. 4.1 (first line). Communication is the most dominant
action, followed by attacks and trading which are each about an order of magnitude
less frequent. The daily number of all communications, trades and attacks, NC(d),
NT (d) and NA(d) is shown in Fig. 4.2 (a), (b) and (c), respectively. These processes
are reverting around a mean, RY . All processes of actions show an approximate
Gaussian statistic of its log-increments, rY (d) = log
NY (d)
NY (d−1) . The first 4 moments of
the rY series are listed in Tab. 4.1. The relatively large kurtosis for T and A results
from a few extreme outliers. The distribution of log-increments for the NC , NT and
NA timeseries are shown in Fig. 4.2 (d). The lines are Gaussians for the respective
mean and standard deviation from Tab. 4.1. As maybe the simplest mean-reverting
model with approximate lognormal distributions, we propose
NY (d) = NY (d− 1)ρY eξ(d)R(1−ρY )Y , (4.1)
where ρY is the mean reversion coeﬃcient, ξ(d) is a realization of a zero mean
Gaussian random number with standard deviation σY , and RY is the value to which
the process NY (t) reverts to. σ is given by the third line in Tab. 4.1.
4.2 Transition probabilities
With p(Y |Z) we denote the probability that an action of type Y follows an action
of type Z in the behavioral sequence of a player. Y and Z stand for any of the eight
actions, executed or received (received is indicated by a subscript r). In Fig. 4.3 (a)
the transition probability matrix p (Y |Z) is shown. The y axis of the matrix indi-
cates the action (or received-action) happening at a time t, the probabilities for the
actions (or received-actions) that immediately follow are given in the corresponding
horizontal place.
This transition matrix specifies to which extent an action or a received action
of a player is influenced by the action that was done or received at the previous
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Figure 4.2: Timeseries of the daily number of (a) trades, (b) attacks, (c) communications in the
first 1238 days in the game. Clearly a mean reverting tendency of three processes can be seen.
(d) Simulation of a model timeseries, Eq. (4.1), with ρ = 0.94. We use the values from the NC
timeseries, R = 4000, and standard deviation σ = 0.12. Compare with the actual NC in (c). The
only free parameter in the model is ρ. Parameters are from Tab. 4.1. Mean reversion and log-
normality motivate the model presented in Eq. (4.1). (e) The distributions of log-increments rY of
the processes and the model. All follow approximate Gaussian distribution functions.
time-step. In fact, if the behavioral sequences of players had no correlations, i.e.
the probability of an action, received or executed, is independent of the history of
the player’s actions, the transition probability p (Y |Z) simply is p (Y ), i.e. to the
probability that an action or received action Y occurs in the sequence is determined
by its relative frequency only. Therefore, deviations of the ratio p(Y |Z)p(Y ) from 1 indicate
correlations in sequences. In Fig. 4.3 (b) we report the values of p(Y |Z)p(Y ) for actions and
received actions (received actions are indicated with the subscript r) classified only
according to their positive (+) or negative (-) connotation. In brackets we report the
Z -score with respect to the uncorrelated case. We find that the probability to perform
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a good action is significantly higher if at the previous time-step a positive action has
been received. Similarly, it is more likely that a player is the target of a positive
action if at the previous time-step he executed a positive action. Conversely, it is
highly unlikely that after a good action, executed or received, a player acts negatively
or is the target of a negative action. Instead, in the case a player acts negatively, it is
most likely that he will perform another negative action at the following time-step,
while it is highly improbable that the following action, executed or received, will be
positive. Finally, in the case a negative action is received, it is likely that another
negative action will be received at the following time-step, while all other possible
actions and received actions are underrepresented. The high statistical significance of
the cases P (−|−) and P (−r|−r) hints toward a high persistence of negative actions
in the players’ behavior, see below.
Another finding is obtained by considering only pairs of received actions followed
by performed actions. This approach allows to quantify the influence of received
actions on the performed actions of players. For these pairs we measure a probability
of 0.02 of performing a negative action after a received positive action. This value
is significantly lower compared to the probability of 0.10 obtained for randomly
reshuﬄed sequences. Similarly, we measure a probability of 0.27 of performing a
negative action after a received negative action. Note that this result is not in
contrast with the values in Fig. 4.3 (b), since only pairs made up of received actions
and performed actions are taken into account.
4.3 World lines
The world lines W igood−bad of good-bad action sequences are shown in Fig. 4.4 (a),
the action-reaction world lines in Fig. 4.4 (b).
As a simple measure to characterize these world lines we define the slope k of
the line connecting the origin of the world line to its end point (last action of the
player). A slope of k = 1(−1) in the good-bad world lines Wgood−bad indicates that
the player performed only positive (negative) actions. The slope ki is an approximate
measure of ‘altruism’ for player i. The histogram of the slopes for all players is shown
in Fig. 4.4 (b), separated into good (blue) and bad (red) players, i.e. players who
have performed more good than bad actions and vice versa. The mean and standard
deviation of slopes of good, bad, and all players are k¯good = 0.81 ± 0.19, k¯bad =
−0.40± 0.28, and k¯all = 0.76± 0.31, respectively. Simulated random walks with the
same probability 0.90 of performing a positive action yield a much lower variation,
k¯sim = 0.81 ± 0.01, pointing at an inherent heterogeneity of human behavior. For
the combined action–received-action world line Wact−rec the slope is a measure of
how well a person is integrated in her social environment. If k = 1 the person only
acts and receives no input, she is ‘isolated’ but dominant. If the slope is k = −1
the person is driven by the actions of others and does never act nor react. The
histogram of slopes for all players is shown in Fig. 4.4 (e). Most players are well
within the ±45 degree cone. Mean and standard deviation of slopes of good, bad,
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Figure 4.3: (a) Transition probabilities p (Y |Z) for actions (and received-actions) Y at a time t+1,
given that a specific action Z was executed or received in the previous time-step t. Received-
actions are indicated by a subscript r. Normalization is such that rows add up to one. The large
values in the diagonal signal that human actions are highly clustered or repetitive. Large values
for C → Cr and Cr → C reveal that communication is a tendentially anti-persistent activity –
it is more likely to receive a message after one sent a message and vice versa, than to send or
to receive two consecutive messages. (b) The ratio p(Y |Z)p(Y ) , shows the influence of an action Z at
a previous time-step t on a following action Y at a time t + 1, where Y and Z can be positive
or negative actions, executed or received (received actions are indicated by the subscript r). In
brackets, we report the Z -score (significance in number of standard deviations) in respect to a
sample of 100 randomized versions of the data set. The cases for which the transition probability is
significantly higher (lower) than expected in uncorrelated sequences are highlighted in red (green).
Receiving a positive action after performing a positive action is highly overrepresented, and vice
versa. Performing (receiving) a negative action after performing (receiving) another negative one is
also highly overrepresented. Performing a negative action has no influence on receiving a negative
action next. All other combinations are strongly underrepresented, for example after performing
a negative action it is very unlikely to perform a positive action with respect to the uncorrelated
case.
and all players are k¯good = 0.02 ± 0.10, k¯bad = 0.30 ± 0.19, and k¯all = 0.04 ± 0.12,
respectively. Bad players are tendentially dominant, i.e. they perform significantly
more actions than they receive. Simulated random walks with equal probabilities for
up and down moves for a sample of the same sequence lengths, we find again a much
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Figure 4.4: (a) World lines of good-bad action random walks of the 1,758 most active players,
(b) distribution of their slopes k and (c) of their scaling exponents α. By definition, players who
perform more good (bad) than bad (good) actions have the endpoints of their world lines above
(below) 0 in (a) and only fall into the k > 0 (k < 0) category in (b). (d) World lines of action-
received random walks, (e) distribution of their slopes k and (f) of their scaling exponents α. The
inset in (d) shows only the world lines of bad players. These players are typically dominant, i.e.
they perform significantly more actions than they receive. In total the players perform many more
good than bad actions and are strongly persistent with good as well as with bad behavior, see (c),
i.e. actions of the same type are likely to be repeated.
narrower distribution with slope k¯sim = 0.00± 0.01.
As a second measure we use the mean square displacement of world lines to
quantify the persistence of action sequences. The mean square displacement M2 of
a world line W is defined as
M2(τ) = ￿∆W (τ)− ￿∆W (τ)￿￿2, (4.2)
where ∆W (τ) ≡ W (t+ τ)−W (t) and ￿.￿ is the average over all t. The asymptotic
behavior of M(τ) yields information about the ‘persistence’ of a world line. M(τ) ∝
τ
1
2 is the pure diﬀusion case, M(τ) ∝ τα with scaling exponent α ￿= 12 indicates
persistence for α > 12 , and anti-persistence for α <
1
2 . Persistence means that the
probability of making an up(down) move at time t + 1 is larger(less) than p = 12 , if
the move at time t was an up move. For calculating the exponents α we use a fit
range of τ between 5 and 100. We checked from the mean square displacements of
single world lines that this fit range is indeed reasonable.
The histogram of exponents α for the good-bad random walk, separated into
good (blue) and bad (red) players, is shown in Fig. 4.4 (c), for the action–received-
action world line in (f). In the first case strongly persistent behavior is obvious,
in the second there is a slight tendency towards persistence. Mean and standard
deviation for the good-bad world lines are αgood−bad = 0.87 ± 0.06, for the action-
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received actions αact−rec = 0.59 ± 0.10. Simulated sequences of random walks have
– as expected by definition – an exponent of αrnd = 0.5, again with a very small
standard deviation of about 0.02. Figure 4.4 (a) also indicates that the lifetime of
players who use negative actions frequently is short. The average lifetime for players
with a slope k < 0 is 2528 ± 1856 actions, compared to players with a slope k > 0
with 3909 ± 4559 actions. The average lifetime of the whole sample of players is
3849± 4484 actions.
4.4 Motifs, entropy and Zipf law
By considering all the sequences of actions Ai of all possible players i, we have an
ensemble which allows to perform a motif analysis [198]. We define an n-string as
a subsequence of n contiguous actions. An n-motif is an n-string which appears in
the sequences with a probability higher than expected, after lower-order correlations
have been properly removed. In particular, we define n-strings a subsequence of
n contiguous actions. With an alphabet size of 8 (number of action types), across
the entire ensemble 8n diﬀerent n-strings can appear, each of them occurring with
a diﬀerent probability. The frequency, or observed probability, of each n-string can
be compared to its expected probability of occurrence, which can be estimated on
the basis of the observed probability of lower order strings, i.e. on the frequency of
(n − 1)-strings. For example, the expected probability of occurrence of a 2-string
(At, At+1) is estimated as the product of the observed probability of the single actions
At and At+1,
pexp(At, At+1) = p
obs(At)p
obs(At+1). (4.3)
Similarly, the probability of a 3-string (At, At+1, At+2) to occur can be estimated as
pexp(At, At+1, At+2) = p
obs(At, At+1)p
obs(At+2|At+1), (4.4)
where pobs(At+2|At+1) is the conditional probability to have action At+2 following
action At+1. By definition of conditional probability, one has
pobs(At+2|At+1) = p
obs(At+1, At+2)
pobs(At+1)
(4.5)
(see [198] for details). An n-motif in the ensemble is then defined as a n-string
whose observed probability of occurrence is significantly higher than its expected
probability. This definition of motif is not to be confused with network motifs,
i.e. overrepresented configurations of subgraphs such as certain triad classes [159].
We computed the observed and expected probabilities pobs and pexp for all 82 =
64 2-strings and for all 83 = 512 3-strings, focusing on those n-strings with the
highest ratio p
obs
pexp . Higher orders are statistically not feasible due to combinatorial
explosion. We find that the 2-motifs in the sequences of actions A are clusters of
same letters: BB, DD, XX, EE, FF, AA with ratios p(obs)p(exp) ≈ 169, 136, 117, 31, 15, 10,
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respectively. This observation is consistent with the previous first-order observation
that actions cluster. The most significant 3-motifs however are (with two exceptions)
the palindromes: EAX, DAF, DCD, DAD, BGB, BFB, with ratios p(obs)p(exp) ≈ 123, 104,
74, 62, 33, 32, respectively. The exceptions disappear when one considers actions
executed on the same screen in the game as equivalent, i.e. setting or removing
friends or enemies: F, D, E, X. This observation hints towards processes where
single actions of one type tend to disrupt a flow of actions of another type.
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Figure 4.5: Rank ordered probability distribution of 1 to 6 letter words. Slopes of κ = −1 and
κ = −1.5 are indicated for reference. The inset shows the Shannon n-tuple redundancy as a function
of word length n.
Finally, we partition the action sequences into n-strings (‘words’). Fig. 4.5 shows
the rank distribution of word occurrences of diﬀerent lengths n. The distribution
shows an approximate Zipf law [226] (slope of κ = −1) for ranks below 100. For
ranks between 100 and 25,000 the scaling exponent approaches a smaller value of
about κ ∼ −1.5. The Shannon n-tuple redundancy (see e.g. [177, 201]) for symbol
sequences composed of 8 symbols (our action types) is defined as
R(n) = 1 +
1
3n
8n￿
i
P (n)i log2 P
(n)
i , (4.6)
where P (n)i is the probability of finding a specific n-letter word. Uncorrelated se-
quences yield an equi-distribution, Pi = 8−n, i.e. R(n) = 0. In the other extreme of
only one letter being used, R(n) = 1. In Fig. 4.5 (inset) R(n) is shown as a function
of sequence length n. Shannon redundancy is not a constant but increases with n.
This indicates that Boltzmann-Gibbs entropy might not be an extensive quantity for
action sequences [102].
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4.5 Discussion of behavioral sequences
The analysis of human behavioral sequences as recorded in a massive multiplayer on-
line game shows that communication is by far the most dominant activity followed
by aggression and trade. Communication events are about an order of magnitude
more frequent than attacks and trading events, showing the importance of informa-
tion exchange between humans. It is possible to understand the collective timeseries
of human actions of a particular type (NY ) with a simple mean-reverting log-normal
model. On the individual level we are able to identify organizational patterns of
the emergence of good overall behavior. Transition rates of actions of individuals
show that positive actions strongly induces positive reactions. Negative behavior on
the other hand has a high tendency of being repeated instead of being reciprocated,
showing the ‘propulsive’ nature of negative actions. However, if we consider only
reactions to negative actions, we find that negative reactions are highly overrepre-
sented. The probability of acting out negative actions is about 10 times higher if
a person received a negative action at the previous timestep than if she received
a positive action. The action of communication is found to be of highly recipro-
cal ‘back-and-forth’ nature. The analysis of binary timeseries of players (good-bad)
shows that the behavior of almost all players is ‘good’ almost all the time. Negative
actions are balanced to a large extent by good ones. Players with a high fraction
of negative actions tend to have a significantly shorter life. This may be due to
two reasons: First because they are hunted down by others and give up playing,
second because they are unable to maintain a social life and quit the game because
of loneliness or frustration. We interpret these findings as empirical evidence for self
organization towards reciprocal, good conduct within a human society. Note that
the game allows bad behavior in the same way as good behavior but the extent of
punishment of bad behavior is freely decided by the players.
Behavior is highly persistent in terms of good and bad, as seen in the scaling ex-
ponent (α ∼ 0.87) of the mean square displacement of the good-bad world lines. This
high persistence means that good and bad actions are carried out in clusters. Simi-
larly high levels of persistence were found in a recent study of human behavior [81].
A smaller exponent (α ∼ 0.59) is found for the action–received-action timeseries.
Finally we split behavioral sequences of individuals into subsequences (of length
1-6) and interpret these as behavioral ‘words’. In the ranking distribution of these
words we find a Zipf law to about ranks of 100. For less frequent words the exponent
in the rank distribution approaches a somewhat smaller exponent of about κ ∼
−1.5. From word occurrence probabilities we further compute the Shannon n-tuple
redundancy which yields relatively large values when compared for example to those
of DNA sequences [177, 201]. This reflects the dominance of communication over all
the other actions. The n-tuple redundancy is clearly not a constant, reflecting again
the non-trivial statistical structure of behavioral sequences.
After having analyzed and characterized the nature of actions of the individu-
als, we consider their motions and diﬀusive properties through their universe in the
following Chapter 5, before we shift our viewpoint to the topology of interaction
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networks in Chapter 6, and to the correlations between these structures, Chapter 7.
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Chapter 5
Mobility in a society: Diﬀusion,
long-time memory, and borders
Understanding the statistical patterns of human mobility, predicting trajectories and
uncovering the mechanisms behind human movements [21] is a considerable chal-
lenge with important practical applications to traﬃc management [98, 108], plan-
ning of urban spaces [149, 190], epidemiology [15, 55, 120, 176], information spread-
ing [160, 173], and geo-marketing [122, 178]. In the last years, advanced digital
technologies have provided huge amounts of data on human activities, allowing to
extract information on human movements. For instance, observations of banknote
circulation [39, 206], mobile phone records [95], online location-based social networks
[193, 194], GPS location data of vehicles [25], or radio frequency identification traces
[21, 48, 190], have been used as proxies for human movements. These studies have
provided insights into several aspects of human mobility, uncovering distinct features
of human travel behavior such as scaling laws [39, 199], predictability of trajectories
[200], and impact of motion on disease spreading [15, 26, 55, 120]. However, from a
comparative analysis of the diﬀerent works it emerges clearly that a “unified theory”
of human mobility is still outstanding, since results, even on some very basic features
of the motion, often appear to be contrasting [21]. One example is the measured
distribution of human trip lengths in various types of transportation: some stud-
ies agree that mobility is generally characterized by fat-tailed distributions of trip
lengths [39, 199], while others report exponential or binomial forms [21, 25, 190].
The discrepancies arise due to the diﬀerent mobility data sets used, where mobility
is indirectly inferred from some specific human activity in a particular context. For
instance, mobile phone records typically provide location information only when a
person uses the phone [199], while radio frequency identification traces like the ones of
Oyster cards1 in the London subway [190] only log movements based on public trans-
portation systems. Analyses of these data sets can then result in a possibly biased
view of the underlying mobility processes. Furthermore, most of the analyzed data
sets have poor information on how socio-economic factors influence human mobility
1Oyster cards are a form of electronic ticketing used on public transport services within the
London region of England.
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Figure 5.1: The universe map of the massive multiplayer online game Pardus. The universe can
be represented as a network with N = 400 nodes, called sectors (playing the role of cities), and
L = 1160 links. Sectors are organized into 20 diﬀerent regions, called clusters, shown in the figure
as diﬀerent color-shaded areas. There is no explicit set of goals in the game. Players are free to
interact in a number of ways to e.g. increase their virtual wealth or status. Players move between
sectors to interact with other players, e.g. to trade, attack, wage war, or to explore the virtual
world.
patterns. More generally, the lack of an all-encompassing record set with positional
raw data including complete information on the socio-economic context and on the
behavior of all members of a human society, has so far limited the possibilities for a
comprehensive exploration of human mobility.
Using positional data of the players in the game universe2, in combination with
other socio-economic information from the game, we uncover various fundamental
features of mobility, and we provide a possible description of the mechanisms causing
the observed anomalous diﬀusion. First, we find the emergence of diﬀerent spatial
scales, due to the strong tendency of the players to limit their economic activities to
some specific areas over long time periods and to avoid crossing the borders between
diﬀerent areas. Making use of this observation, we propose an eﬃcient method to
identify socio-economic regions by means of community detection algorithms based
solely on the measured movement dynamics. Our second result unveils the driving
mechanism behind the movement patterns of players: Locations are visited in a
specific order, leading to strong long-term memory eﬀects which are essential to
understand and reproduce the observed trajectories. Finally, we provide large-scale
evidence that neglecting either of these spatial or temporal constraints may obstruct
the possibility of understanding the processes behind human mobility.
2Whenever we address the position or the movement of ‘a player’ in the game universe, this
is meant as a short form for referring to the virtual avatar which is uniquely associated to and
controlled by the player. This abbreviation is consistent with the tendency of players to identify
themselves with their avatars.
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5.1 Game universe properties
The topology of the universe can be represented as a network with 400 nodes, called
sectors, embedded in a two-dimensional space, the so-called universe map shown in
Fig. 5.1. Each sector is like a city where players can have social relations (establish
new friendships, make enemies and wage wars), and entertain economic activities
(trade and production of commodities), see Section 3.6.2. Typically, sectors adjacent
on the universe map, as well as a few far-apart sectors, are interconnected by links
which allow players to move from sector to sector. At any point in time, each sector
is typically attended by a large number of players. The network is sparse and,
similarly to other spatial networks, is not a small world, see Section 2.3.4. It has a
characteristic path length g¯ = 11.89 and a diameter gmax = 27, which means that, on
average, players have to move through a non-negligible number of sectors to traverse
the universe.
The universe network is sparse, displaying an average degree of k¯ = 2.9 with
N = 400 nodes and L = 1160 links. It is highly clustered (clustering coeﬃcient
C = 0.089, which is 12 times larger than Cr, the average clustering coeﬃcient for
corresponding random networks, i.e. networks having the same number of nodes
and the same average degree as the universe network), but is not small-world [33]:
the characteristic path length dmax = 11.89 is more than twice Lr, the average path
length on a random graph with the same number of nodes [68] and the same average
connectivity, and relative to the number of nodes the diameter gmax = 27 is large.
This means that, on average, players have to move through a non-negligible number
of sectors to traverse the universe. However, in a rough estimation, it takes only
around 1, 500 APs to traverse a typical cluster, and approximately 10, 000 (around
2 days worth of APs) to traverse the whole universe. With a few exceptions, the
universe is a planar network, i.e. it has no intersecting links. In this sense it is
similar to Euclidean networks such as street networks, with the diﬀerence that the
length of links has no eﬀect in Pardus. Locally, the universe is lattice-like, which
is reflected in the relatively high local eﬃciency Eloc = 0.80 [139] and the narrow
degree distribution (almost all sectors have degree 2, 3, or 4).
Besides the clusters, which are pre-defined, there is the possibility for players to
build obstacles called ‘military outposts’ blocking almost any region of space from
being entered by single or groups of other players. This option adds player-driven
‘political borders’ to the natural ones, just as borders of nations often constitute
significant limitations to mobility of human beings. Such player-built obstacles can
be taken down by other players through the use of (usually organized) hostile force.
Considering the political dynamics of military outposts is beyond the scope of this
work. Note, however, that often groups of players construct military outposts at
the borders of clusters, possibly further adding to the mobility-hindering eﬀect of
clusters (see below).
The sectors have been originally organized by the developers of the game into 20
diﬀerent clusters, which are perceived by the players as diﬀerent political or socio-
economic regions such as countries. For example, a player who is member of a
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N 400
L 1160
k¯ 2.9
C 0.089
C/Cr 12.33
L 11.89
g¯/g¯r 2.11
Eloc 0.80
Eglob 0.03
gmax 27
Table 5.1: Network properties of the Pardus universe: number of nodes N , number of (undirected)
links L, average degree k¯, clustering coeﬃcient C, clustering coeﬃcient to corresponding coeﬃcient
of random graph C/Cr, average geodesic L, average geodesic to corresponding average geodesic of
random graph g¯/g¯r, local eﬃciency Eloc, global eﬃciency Eglob, diameter gmax.
.
political faction in the game is provided some game-relevant protection in all clusters
which are controlled by the faction, and has the opportunity of social promotion when
accomplishing certain tasks within these clusters. Each cluster is shown in Fig. 5.1
with a diﬀerent background color. All clusters contain about 20 sectors each, with
the exception of the central cluster, consisting of just one sector, and its surrounding
three clusters having only 6-7 sectors. Sectors belonging to the same cluster are
geographically close on the map, meaning that the distance between any two sectors
in the same cluster is small, with an average distance around 3. Players typically
have a “home cluster” where they focus their socio-economic activities over long time
periods. Occasionally, they also move to sectors belonging to other clusters in order
to explore the universe, to relocate their home (migrate), or during extreme game
events such as wars.
5.2 Data set description
As in the other Chapters of this work, we focus on the Artemis game universe. To
make sure we only consider active players, we select all players who exist in the
game between the days 200 and 1,200. We discard the first 200 days because social
networks between players of Pardus have shown aging eﬀects in the beginning of
the universe, i.e. there seems to exists a transient phase in the development of the
society, possibly aﬀecting mobility, which we would like to avoid considering [205].
This cut selects 1,458 players active over a time-period of 1,000 days. The field-ID
(position within a sector) of these players is logged every day at 05:35 GMT. From
these field-IDs, we select the corresponding sector-IDs, i.e. the player positions on
the nodes of the universe network, leaving us with a 1, 458× 1, 000 mobility matrix
containing 1,458 sequences each consisting of 1,000 sector-IDs. Note that we use
daily snapshots of position data since we are interested in the long-time mobility
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of jump distances and of waiting times. With each player a time series
consisting of the sector positions over 1000 days is associated. A jump is said to occur when the
sector position in the time series changes from one day to the following. The length d of a jump
is measured in terms of graph distance and can take an integer value between 1 and gmax = 27,
the diameter of the network. (a) The probability distribution of jump distances is reported in a
semi-log plot. For d ≤ 15, the distribution follows an exponential P (d) ∼ e− dλ with a characteristic
length λ ≈ 3. Players can also remain in the same sector for several days, without moving to other
sectors. We define as waiting time ∆t the number of consecutive days a player spends in one sector.
(b) We show the probability distribution of waiting times ∆t in a log-log plot, which is well fitted
by a power-law P (∆t) ∼ ∆t−β , with β ≈ 2.2.
and not in the detailed paths the players take during the (typically) few minutes of
their daily navigations. The eﬀects of this ‘systematic coarse-graining’ seem mod-
est compared to biases occurring for example in mobile phone data, where location
information is usually only available at the heterogeneously distributed times when
a mobile phone is used, and locations, hence distances, have to be triangulated via
heterogeneously scattered mobile phone towers [200]. These issues inherent in previ-
ously studied mobile phone data may become resolved in future studies, considering
recent disclosures that exact location data (GPS) is constantly recorded by a number
of mobile phone devices [1].
5.3 Basic features of motion
A jump occurs when a player’s sector position changes from one day to the following.
The associated length d of a jump is measured in terms of graph distance, an integer
value between 1 and gmax = 27. The probability distribution of jump distances, com-
puted for all players over the whole observation period, is reported in Figure 5.2 (a).
For d ≤ 15, the distribution is well-fitted by an exponential:
P (d) ∼ e− dλ , (5.1)
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Figure 5.3: Average daily jump distance versus average daily activity as measured in Action Points
(APs) spent, for each player. Circles and error bars are binned averages with standard deviations.
The green line is a least-squares fit, making a trend visible between mobility and activity. High
activity is necessary, but not suﬃcient, for high mobility: in order to have a high mobility, a player
needs to spend many APs (there are no data points in the top left part), but there exists a number
of players with low mobility who spend a high number of APs (there are data points in the lower
right part).
with a characteristic jump length λ ≈ 3. The existence of a typical travel distance,
as also recently found in other mobility data [25, 190], is maybe related to the use of
a single transportation mode in Pardus [133]. This allows to disentangle the intrinsic
heterogeneity of the players from the eﬀects due to the presence of diﬀerent means
of transportation [15], which might be the cause of the scale-free distributions found
in mobile phone or other mobility data sets [39, 95]. It has in fact been suggested
that power laws in distance distributions of movement data may emerge from the
coexistence of diﬀerent scales [21, 101].
In some cases, players stay in the same sector for a number of consecutive days.
For instance, 11 of the 1,458 considered players, although being active in the game,
never jump within the entire observation period. On average, a player does not
change sector in approximately 75% of the days. To better characterize the motion,
we computed the waiting times ∆t (measured in terms of number of days) between
all pairs of consecutive jumps, over all players. The distribution of these waiting
times, shown in Fig. 5.2 (b) follows a power-law distribution
P (∆t) ∼ ∆t−β, (5.2)
with an exponent β ≈ 2.2, in agreement with other recent measurements on human
dynamics [17], where a slope of β ≈ 2 was reported. In addition, we found that
the average waiting times of individual players are distributed as a power-law. This
implies a strong heterogeneity in the motion of diﬀerent players, which is related to
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Figure 5.4: Cumulative distribution of average waiting times ∆ t of single players. The dashed
line is a power law with slope −1, which fits well the distribution. The fat-tailed nature of this
distribution shows the heterogeneity in movement behaviour of players.
the heterogeneity in their general activity.
In fact, Fig. 5.3 shows the average daily jump distance versus the average daily
number of APs spent for each player. The number of APs used per day is distributed
heterogeneously, i.e. some players are much more active than others. In general, the
more APs a player uses, the more she travels. However, high activity is necessary
but not suﬃcient for high mobility: in order to travel far, a player needs to spend
many APs (corresponding to a lack of data points in the top left part of the figure),
but there exists a number of players with low mobility who spend a high number of
APs (there exist data points in the lower right part of the figure).
Another quantity which indicates the extent of activity in mobility is the average
waiting time ∆ t of a single player, i.e. how many days a player stays on a sector on
average. The cumulative distribution of these average waiting times of all players,
Fig. 5.4, displays a power law with slope −1, showing further the heterogeneity of
player activity with respect to mobility, motivating the transformation from real-
time t to jump-time τ for determining the distribution of first return times P←￿(τ)
(see below).
5.4 Mobility reveals socio-economic clusters
Mobility patterns are influenced by the presence of the socio-economic regions in
the network, highlighted in colors in Fig. 5.1. The typical situation is illustrated in
Fig. 5.5 (a), with jumps within the same cluster being preferred to jumps between
sectors in diﬀerent clusters. In order to quantify this eﬀect, we report in Fig. 5.5 (b),
blue circles, the observed number of jumps of length d within the same cluster,
divided by the total number of jumps of length d. This ratio is a decreasing function
of the distance d, and reaches zero at d = 12, since no sectors at such distance do
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belong to the same cluster. As a null model we report the fraction of sector pairs at
distance d which belong to the same cluster, see red squares in the same figure. The
significant discrepancy between the two curves indicates that players indeed tend to
avoid crossing the borders between clusters. For example, a jump of length d = 8
from one sector to another sector in the same cluster is expected only in 3% of the
cases, while it is observed in about 20% of the cases.
Now, the propensity of a player to spend long time periods within the same cluster
might be simply related to the topology of the network, as in the case of random
walkers whose motions are constrained on graphs with strong community structures
[82]. Nodes belonging to the same cluster are in fact either directly connected or are
at short distance from one another. This proximity is reflected in the block-diagonal
structure of the adjacency matrix A and of the distance matrix D, respectively
shown in Fig. 5.6 (a) and (b). We have therefore checked whether the presence of
the socio-economic clusters originally introduced by the developers of the game can
be derived solely from the structure of the network. For this reason we adopted
standard community detection methods based on the adjacency and on the distance
matrix [11, 166]. The results, reported respectively in Fig. 5.6 (d) and (e), show that
detected communities deviate significantly from the clusters, implying that in our
online world the socio-economic regions cannot be recovered merely from topological
features. In comparison we considered the player transition count matrix M , shown
in Fig. 5.6 (c), which displays a similar block-diagonal structure as A andD, but with
the qualitative diﬀerence that it contains dynamic information on the system. The
entry mij of the transition count matrixM is equal to the number of times a player’s
position was on sector i and then, on the following day, on sector j. This number
is cumulated for all players. The entry πij of the transition probability matrix Π
corresponds to the probability that a player moves to a sector j given that on the
previous day the player’s location was sector i. It reads: πij =
mij￿
lmil
, wheremij is the
number of observed player movements from sector i to sector j, and the sum over l is
over all sectors of the universe. The matrix Π has the property that the entries of each
row sum to one. Figure 5.6 (f) shows that community detection methods applied to
the transition count matrixM reveal almost perfectly all the socio-economic areas of
the universe. This finding demonstrates that mobility patterns contain fundamental
information on the socio-economic constraints present in a social system. Therefore,
a community detection algorithm applied to raw mobility information, as the one
proposed here, is able to extract the underlying socio-economic features, which are
invisible to methods based solely on topology.
In the remainder of this section, we give a detailed treatment of adopted com-
munity detection methods and measures. Since the Pardus universe is divided into
a number of clusters, defining political, independent units in the game universe, we
have shown that the mobility patterns of players are influenced by such borders. At
the same time, the topology of the Pardus universe itself might aﬀect the mobility
patterns. In order to investigate the importance of these two elements, one needs to
compare the topological modules that can be extracted from the adjacency matrix A
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Figure 5.5: Influence of socio-economic clusters on mobility. (a) Sketch of jump patterns from
a sector i to sectors within the same cluster, j and l, and to sectors in a diﬀerent cluster, j￿,
l￿. Although sectors j￿ and l￿ have the same graph distance from sector i as sectors j and l
respectively, transitions across cluster border have smaller probabilities. (b) Quantitative evidence
of the tendency of players to avoid crossing borders. Red squares show the null model, i.e. the
fraction of all pairs of sectors at a given distance d being in the same cluster. Blue circles show
the fraction of measured jumps leading into the same cluster, per distance. Coincidence of the two
curves would indicate that clusters have no eﬀect on mobility. Clearly this is not the case – there
is a strong tendency of players to avoid crossing the borders between clusters.
or distance matrix D, with the dynamical communities emerging from the collective
movement behaviour of players.
At the sector level, the Pardus universe is a directed weighted network with
L = 1, 160 links and N = 400 nodes. The majority of links are wormholes (∼ 95%),
mutual links that connect nearby nodes (see Fig. 5.1) and have a small traveling
cost (in terms of APs). The long-range links in Fig. 5.1 instead represent X-holes
and Y-holes. Players moving along such links incur significantly higher traveling
costs than in the case of wormholes. Since X/Y-holes may be only scarcely used
in-game, in addition to studying the complete directed weighted adjacency matrix,
A, we also study the adjacency matrix Awh where X/Y-holes were removed, yielding
a symmetric and unweighted network. Finally, we consider the weighted network
Dinv, defined element-wise as dij = d(i, j)−1 ∀ i ￿= j and dii = 0 ∀i, where d(i, j) is
the shortest path distance on the Pardus network.
The player dynamics was studied at the aggregate level through the transition
count matrix M and the normalized transition matrix Π. Each element mij of M
corresponds to the total number of times a player was found at position i at time
t and at position j at time t + 1. The transition matrix Π = (πij) is obtained by
row-normalizing M so that πij =
mij￿
lmil
. Hence, for all rows i,
￿
j πij = 1 and Π
is a well-defined probability matrix for the transitions between pair of nodes in the
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Figure 5.6: Extracting communities from network topology and from mobility patterns. (a) The
adjacency matrix A of the universe network, (b) the matrix D of shortest path distances, and (c) the
matrixM of transition counts of player jumps. Each of the three matrices contains 400×400 entries,
whose values are color-coded. Sector IDs are ordered by cluster, resulting in the block-diagonal
form of the three matrices. We have used modularity-optimization algorithms to extract community
structures from the information encoded in the three matrices. Diﬀerent node colors represent the
diﬀerent communities found, while the 20 diﬀerent color-shaded areas indicate the predefined socio-
economic clusters as in Fig. 5.1. The displayed Fowlkes and Mallows index F ∈ [0, 1] quantifies
the overlap of the detected communities with the predefined clusters. The closer F is to 1, the
better the match, see the detailed treatment of measures in the text. (d) Although information
contained in the adjacency matrix A allows to find 18 communities, a number close to the real
number of clusters, the communities extracted do not correspond to the underlying color-shades
areas (F = 0.66). (e) Extracting communities from the distance matrix D only results in 6 diﬀerent
groups (F = 0.49). (f) The 23 communities detected using the transition count matrixM reproduce
almost perfectly the real socio-economic clusters (F = 0.96), with only a few mismatched nodes
detected as additional clusters.
network. Note that for both M and Π the diagonal elements can be significantly
diﬀerent from zero and therefore the resulting networks display self-loops. More-
over, both matrices M and Π correspond to directed, weighted networks, and there-
fore can be thought as representing flows across the networks. For completeness,
we also define the symmetrized versions of the matrices above, namely the sym-
metrized jump matrix M symm = (M +MT)/2, Π and the symmetrized transition
matrix Πsymm = (Π+ ΠT)/2. The corresponding weighted networks are undirected
and represent a first coarse-graining of the information contained in the dynamical
flows. It is thus interesting to compare these two to understand how much informa-
tion is lost in the coarse-graining.
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We performed community detection algorithms by optimizing modularity [11,
166]. To ensure consistency, we checked the results under diﬀerent heuristics and
repeated detections [130, 184]. Figure 5.7 shows the communities extracted from the
M , M symm, Π and Πsymm matrices. The colored hulls are included for comparison
and indicate the Pardus cluster to which each sector belongs. For comparison, in
Fig. 5.8 we plot the communities obtained from the topological quantities, namely the
directed weighted adjacency matrix A, the undirected unweighted matrix Awh and
the inverse distance matrix Dinv. One can easily see that the communities extracted
from the transition matrices appear to reproduce much better the cluster structure
as opposed to the topological communities.
Note also that the partitions obtained for the dynamical transition matrices con-
tain communities composed of a single node. Although unusual in community de-
tection, this result is consistent with the mobility patterns. In fact, we measure the
positions of players at the same time every day. Then, the presence of non zero
values on the diagonal of M , M symm, Π and Πsymm simply means that there is a
positive probability for a player to be found again on the same node after 24 hours,
implying that the player either stayed still on the node or traveled but came back to
its original position within 24 hours. These self-loops are responsible for the presence
of single-node communities in the dynamical matrices and for their absence in the
topological ones, where there are no self-loops.
We find a diﬀerent number of communities for diﬀerent matrices, necessitating
the use of community overlap measures, to quantify which result is the closest to the
actual Pardus cluster structure. To quantify the relative goodness of the partitions
obtained from the various matrices, we calculate three measures of clustering simi-
larity: the Fowlkes and Mallows index F [85], the Rand’s criterion R [179] and the
normalized information variation (NVI) [58], see Section 2.3.5.
Table 5.2 reports the values obtained for the studied matrices. The values of the
Fowlkes-Mallows and Rand indices for the dynamical communities are much closer
to 1 than the ones for the topological communities. The result is confirmed also by
the NVI values, where we measured very small values for the dynamical partitions,
indicating that player mobility follows closely the Pardus cluster structure.
It could be argued that this similarity emerges from the topological structure of
the network. However, we also found a substantial diﬀerence between the topological
partitions and the actual Pardus clusters, one order of magnitude larger than the
diﬀerences between dynamical partitions and the Pardus clusters. Therefore, the
clusters of Pardus genuinely influence the motions of players, and this influence is
not an eﬀect resulting from the topological features of the network, or at least not
significant. Moreover, this result is robust under diﬀerent measures of player move-
ment, as shown by the remarkable stability of the values of the clustering similarity
measures for the other dynamical cases, M symm, Π and Πsymm, which are close to the
ones obtained for M , see Table 5.2.
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Figure 5.7: Extracting communities from mobility patterns. Communities found for (a) the jump
matrix M , (b) the symmetrized jump matrix M symm = (M +MT)/2, (c) the transition matrix Π
and (d) the symmetrized transition matrix Πsymm = (Π + ΠT)/2. Diﬀerent node colors represent
the diﬀerent communities found, while the 20 diﬀerent color-shaded areas indicate the predefined
socio-economic clusters as in Fig. 5.1. The communities found through the information of motions
reproduces well the bulk of the Pardus cluster structure, with a few exceptions along borders where
some nodes are assigned to wrong clusters. The Fowlkes and Mallows index F is close to 1 for all
detected partitions, reflecting the good match. For more measures, see Table 5.2.
5.5 A long-term memory model
In order to characterize the diﬀusion of players over the network, we have computed
the mean square displacement (MSD) of their positions, σ2(t), as a function of time.
The MSD is defined as σ2 (t) = ￿(r (T + t)− r (T ))2￿, where r (T ) and r (T + t)
are the sectors a player occupies at times T and T + t respectively, and where
(r (T + t)− r (T )) denotes the distance between the two sectors. The average ￿·￿
is performed over all windows of size t, with their left boundaries going from T=0
to T=1,000-t, and over all the 1,458 players in the data set. If σ2 has the form
σ2(t) ∼ tν with an exponent ν < 1, the diﬀusion process is subdiﬀusive, in the case
ν > 1 it is super-diﬀusive. An exponent of ν = 1 corresponds to classical Brownian
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Figure 5.8: Extracting communities from topological information. Communities found for (a) the
adjacency matrix A, (b) the adjacency matrix Awh in which the X/Y-holes were removed yielding an
undirected unweighted network, and (c) the distance matrix Dinv. Diﬀerent node colors represent
the diﬀerent communities found, while the 20 diﬀerent color-shaded areas indicate the predefined
socio-economic clusters as in Fig. 5.1. The partitions obtained from the adjacency matrices produce
communities that cross over the borders between clusters and therefore do not recover the clusters
well. This is particularly evident in the case of Dinv where only 6 communities are found. The
Fowlkes and Mallows index F is not close to 1 for all detected partitions, reflecting the bad match.
For more measures, see Table 5.2.
motion [155, 218].
Results reported in Fig. 5.9 (a) indicate that, for long times, the MSD increases
as a power-law:
σ2(t) ∼ tν , (5.3)
with an exponent ν ≈ 0.26. This anomalous subdiﬀusive behavior is not a simple
eﬀect of the topology of the Pardus universe. In fact, as shown in Fig. 5.9 (b),
gray stars, the simulation of ordinary random walks on the same network produces
a standard diﬀusion with an exponent ν ≈ 1 up to t ≈ 100 days, and then a rapid
saturation eﬀect which is not present in the case of the human players. Insights from
the previous section suggest that the anomalous diﬀusion behavior might be related
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Matrix Network Properties ncomm F R NVI
Clusters — 20 1 1 0
A directed, unw. 18 0.678 0.963 0.179
Awh undirected, unw. 17 0.655 0.957 0.180
Dinv directed, weight. 6 0.489 0.864 0.271
M directed, weight. 23 0.963 0.996 0.025
M symm symmetrized, weight. 22 0.957 0.995 0.026
Π directed, weight. 14 0.812 0.973 0.075
Πsymm symmetrized, weight. 19 0.999 0.993 0.036
Table 5.2: Overview of community detection results for the studied matrices. From left to right,
the columns correspond to: the studied matrix, the properties of the corresponding network, the
number of communities found ncomm, the scores for the Fowlkes-Mallows index F [85], the adjusted
Rand’s criterionR [179] and, finally, the normalized information variation (NVI) [58]. For reference,
the first row contains the values for the Pardus cluster structure. The closer the indices F and R
are to 1, and the closer the NVI is to 0, the better a found partition matches the clusters. The
values reported clearly indicate that the Pardus cluster structure is faithfully reproduced by the
player mobility. On the other hand, the topological, non-dynamic properties (e.g. adjacency matrix,
distance matrix) produce partitions that are very diﬀerent from the Pardus cluster structure.
to the tendency of players to avoid crossing borders. We have therefore considered a
Markov model in which each walker moves from a current node i to a node j with a
transition probability πij = mij/
￿
lmil, where mij is the number of jumps between
sector i and sector j, as expressed by the transition count matrix M of Fig. 5.6 (c).
The probabilities πij are the entries of the transition probability matrix Π, which
contains all the information on the day-to-day movement of real players, such as the
preference to move within clusters, the length distribution of jumps, as well as the
tendency to remain in the same sector. Despite this detailed amount of information
used (the matrix Π has 160,000 elements), the Markov model fails to reproduce the
asymptotic behavior of the MSD, see magenta diamonds in Fig. 5.9 (b). Since the
model considers only the position of the individual at its current time to determine its
position at the following time, deviations from empirical data appear presumably due
to the presence of higher-order memory eﬀects. For this reason we have considered
the recently proposed preferential return model [199] which incorporates a strong
memory feature. The model is based on a reinforcement mechanism which takes into
account the propensity of individuals to return to locations they visited frequently
before. This mechanism is able to reproduce the observed tendency of individuals
to spend most of their time in a small number of locations, a tendency which is also
prevalent in the mobility behavior of Pardus players, see Fig. 5.10.
However, the implementation of the preferential return model on the Pardus
universe network is not able to capture the scaling patterns of the MSD, as shown
in Fig. 5.9 (b). The reason is that in the model the probability for an individual to
move to a given location does not depend on the current location, nor on the order of
previously visited locations. Instead, we observe that individuals tend to return with
higher probability to sectors they have visited recently and with lower probability to
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Figure 5.9: Diﬀusion scaling in empirical data and simulated models. (a) The mean square dis-
placement (MSD) of the positions of players follows a power relation σ2(t) ∼ tν with a subdiﬀusive
exponent ν ≈ 0.26. The inset shows the average probability P←￿(τ) for a player to return after τ
jumps to a sector previously visited. The curve follows a power law P←￿(τ) ∼ τ−α with an exponent
of α ≈ 1.3 and an exponential cutoﬀ. We report, for comparison, (b) the MSD for various models
of mobility. For random walkers and in the case of a Markov model with transition probability
πij = mij/
￿
jmij we observe an initial diﬀusion with an exponent ν ≈ 1 and then a rapid satura-
tion of σ2(t), due to the finite size of the network. A preferential return model also shows saturation
and does not fit the empirical observed scaling exponent ν. Conversely, a model with long-time
memory (Time Order Memory) reproduces the exponent almost perfectly. Such a model makes
use of the empirically observed P←￿(τ) while the Markov model and the preferential return model
over-emphasize preferences to locations visited long ago and does not recreate the empirical curve
well. Curves are shifted vertically for visual clarity.
sectors visited a long time before. Consequently a sector that has been visited many
times but with the most recent visit dating back one year has a lower probability to
be visited again than a sector that has been visited just a few times but with the
last visit dating back only e.g. one week.
To highlight this mechanism we measured the return time distribution in the
jump-time series, which is the transformation of the time-series of daily sector IDs
occupied by the players from real-time to jump-time, in order to be able to compare
time-series of diﬀerent length and to focus on the movements between sectors. An
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Figure 5.10: Distribution of occupation probabilities, averaged over the distributions of all single
players, ordered by rank. The dashed line is a power law with slope −1.4, which fits well the
distribution. Single players may have diﬀerent locations which they prefer, however the averaged
distribution over these single, rank-ordered occupation probabilities shows a fat tail, and therefore
the common pattern of significantly prefering the stay in certain locations over other locations.
example of this conversion is provided: a time series
[5, 5, 5, 32, 32, 104, 5, 5, 104, 104, 104, 32, 337, 337, 32. . .]
becomes in jump-time
[5, 32, 104, 5, 104, 32, 337, 32, . . .] .
We denote jump-time by the greek letter τ , that is, at jump-time τ a player has
performed exactly τ jumps. We use τ in the computation of the first return time
distribution. In the hypothetical time series of sectors [5, 32, 104, 5, 104, 32, 337, 32]
a first return to a sector lying τ = 1 jumps back happens 2 times (104, 5, 104
and 32, 337, 32), for τ = 2 this happens once (5, 32, 104, 5), for τ = 3 also once
(32, 104, 5, 104, 32). Hence, in this example, P←￿(1) = 0.5, P←￿(2) = P←￿(3) = 0.25
The sum over all P←￿(τ) is equal to 1.
In particular, we extracted the probability P←￿(τ) for an individual to return
again (for the first time) to the currently occupied sector after τ jumps. As shown
in the inset of Fig. 5.9 (a), we found that the return time distribution reads
P←￿(τ) ∼ τ−α, (5.4)
with an exponent α ≈ 1.3. We used this information for constructing a model which
takes into account the higher re-visiting probability of recently explored locations.
In this way we capture the long-term scaling properties of movements. Exactly
these asymptotic properties are relevant for issues of epidemics spreading or traﬃc
management.
79
5. Mobility in a society: Diﬀusion, long-time memory, and borders
This “Time Order Memory” (TOM) model incorporates a power-law distribution
of first return times, together with a power-law distribution of waiting times and an
exponential distribution of jump distances, as those observed empirically in Fig. 5.2.
We show below that these ingredients are suﬃcient to reproduce the subdiﬀusive
behavior reported in Fig. 5.9 (a). The model works as follows: an individual stands
still in a given sector for a number of days drawn from the waiting time distribu-
tion, Eq. (5.2). Then, the individual jumps. There are two possibilities: (i) with a
probability v she returns to an already visited sector, (ii) with the probability 1− v
she jumps to a – so far – unexplored sector. In case (i), one of the previously visited
sectors is chosen according to Eq. (5.4). In the exploration case (ii), the individual
draws a distance d from the distance distribution, Eq. (5.1), and jumps to a randomly
selected, unexplored sector at that distance. The model has four parameters. The
parameters λ, β and α of equations (5.1), (5.2) and (5.4) respectively, are fixed by
the data. Further, averaging over all jumps and players, the probability of returning
to an already visited location is v ≈ 0.83. Similarly to the measured data, the MSD
of the TOM model, black squares in Fig. 5.9 (b), exhibits no saturation eﬀects and
displays an exponent νTOM = 0.23± 0.02 (the standard error was calculated over an
ensemble of 50 times 100 realizations) in full agreement with the exponent observed
for the players.
5.6 Discussion of mobility of players
The slope of ν = 0.26 and the lack of saturation of the MSD of the players over
the whole observation period shows the substantial level of subdiﬀusivity in the
motions of individuals, consistent with previous findings [155, 192, 199, 214, 218].
However, the mere tendency of individuals to return to already visited locations
is not suﬃcient to understand these subdiﬀusive properties of the MSD, but it is
fundamental to consider a mechanism that takes into account the temporal order
of visited locations, as achieved by the TOM model. Moreover, the TOM model is
realistic in the sense that, in contrast to Markov models, it takes into account the
tendency of individuals to develop a preference for visiting certain locations. At the
same time it allows for the possibility that a previously preferred location becomes
not frequented anymore. This view provides an alternative to recently suggested
reinforcement mechanisms in preferential return models [199]. The possibility for
individuals to “change home” is relevant when the model should be able to account
for migration, which is an important feature in the long-time mobility behavior of
humans.
Finally, we discuss to which extent the findings from our “social petri dish” are
valid also for human populations unrelated to the game. Previous analyses of human
social behavior in Pardus [203, 205] have shown agreement with well-known socio-
logical theories and with properties on comparable behavioral data. Examining the
preference of players to move within socio-economic regions is of obvious importance
for understanding the role of political or socio-economic borders on the movement
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and migration of humans, where the presence of borders has a strong influence on
mobility [138, 163, 181, 206]. In the next Chapter, we analyze the evolution and
topology of networks of social relations between these acting, re-acting, and mobile
individuals.
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Chapter 6
Measuring social dynamics with
socio-economic networks
In this Chapter we focus on the analysis of complex network structures/dynamics
and on testing classic sociological hypotheses. Along these lines we establish further
evidence that online game communities may serve as a model for real world commu-
nities. It is not obvious a priori that a population of online players is a representative
sample of real-world societies [220]. However, several recent studies are providing
evidence that human behavior on a collective level is remarkably robust, meaning
that statistical diﬀerences of real-world communities and game-societies are often
marginal [124, 126].
6.1 Network extraction
We represent all measured networks as digraphs with nodes representing the charac-
ters of players. Note that we do not consider isolated nodes, i.e. characters having
no PM communication or friend/enemy relations. In the following we use ‘link’ short
for ‘directed link’.
Private messages – communication networks
The first set of networks is extracted by considering all PM communications on a
weekly timescale. Within the timeframes [d−6, d] for all days d > 6 all PMs between
all characters (who exist over these timeframes) were used to define the PM network
at day d: a weighted link pointing from node ni to node nj is placed if character i
has sent at least one PM to character j within a given week. Weights correspond to
the total number of PMs sent within this week. Figure 3.7 (a) illustrates a subgraph
of PM networks of accumulated PM communications over all 445 days between 78
randomly selected characters.
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Figure 6.1: Fraction of PM partners per relation class.
Friends and enemies
Friend and enemy markings constitute the second and third sets of extracted net-
works: A link is placed from ni to nj if character i has marked character j as
friend/enemy. Note that friend/enemy markings exist until they are removed by
players (or as long as the related players exist), while PM networks are constructed
through an accumulating process. Friend and enemy networks are unweighted, since
it is not possible mark friends/enemies more than once.
Since links of friend and enemy networks never coincide (it is not possible to
mark someone as both friend and enemy), we can consider the union of friend-
and enemy networks as signed networks. Figure 3.7 (b) illustrates a subgraph of
the friend/enemy network of day 445. Note the intense cliquishness/reciprocity of
friends and the strong enemy in-hub. We show below that these features are typical
for these networks.
Friend and enemy relations between PM partners
A connection between PM networks and friend/enemy networks can be made visible
by partitioning all pairs of characters {ni, nj} into four classes of friend and/or enemy
relations, corresponding to the possible valency matrix entries vij of a signed digraph.
These classes o, p, n, a correspond to dyads without friend/enemy ties (o), dyads with
asymmetric or mutual friend markings (p), dyads with asymmetric or mutual enemy
markings (n), dyads with one friend and one enemy marking (a). Figure 6.1 depicts
the fraction of all PM partners as partitioned into these classes. Relations of class
a are not shown since they almost never appear. From the fact that the majority
(> 95%) of PM partners consists of positively related characters (≈ 40% on the last
day) and of characters having no friend or enemy relation (≈ 58% on the last day),
we expect a much stronger correlation of PM networks with friend networks than
with enemy networks.
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PMs Friends Enemies
day 50 day 150 day 445 day 50 day 150 day 445 day 50 day 150 day 445
N 2,466 2,461 2,879 2,712 3,709 4,313 1,253 2,161 2,906
L 10,705 9,773 16,272 15,367 21,563 31,929 4,468 11,077 21,183
k¯ 5.25 4.80 6.77 6.85 7.36 9.79 6.69 9.77 13.77
C 0.24 0.19 0.17 0.34 0.28 0.25 0.02 0.03 0.03
C/Cr 112.14 99.10 74.08 133.30 143.32 109.52 3.47 5.87 6.13
g¯ 4.45 4.71 4.11 4.78 4.45 3.97 3.99 3.64 3.38
g¯/g¯r 0.94 0.95 0.99 1.16 1.08 1.08 1.06 1.08 1.11
Eloc 0.29 0.23 0.23 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.02 0.04 0.05
Eglob 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.32
ρ 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.73 0.68 0.12 0.09 0.11
rC(k) -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.19 0.08 -0.09 0.02 -0.02 -0.00
rundir -0.13 -0.17 -0.04 0.06 -0.06 -0.00 -0.19 -0.23 -0.24
Γ 0.981 0.991 0.987 0.929 0.952 0.973 0.954 0.975 0.992
Table 6.1: Network properties at days 50, 150, and the last day 445, for PM, friend and enemy
networks.
6.2 Evolution of networks
We measure the time evolution of the following basic network properties: number
of nodes N , directed links L and average degree k¯, relative size of largest connected
component Γ, average geodesic g¯, clustering coeﬃcient C, as well as the comparison
values g¯/g¯r and C/Cr, see Section 2.3.5. Average degrees, geodesics and clustering
coeﬃcients are measured on the reflexive closures of the networks. Geodesics and
clustering coeﬃcients were calculated using the MatlabBGL package1, which eﬃciently
implements standard procedures such as Johnson’s algorithm for finding all geodesics
in sparse graphs. The measured network properties are displayed in Fig. 6.2, values
of days 50, 150, and 445 are shown in Table 6.1. We use some of these properties
to test for the preferential attachment model in Section 6.2.1, to check for network
densification in Section 6.2.2, and we report several observations on other non-trivial
network features in Section 6.2.3.
6.2.1 Testing for preferential attachment
The model of preferential attachment (PA) assumes that nodes which link to a net-
work for the first time preferably attach to nodes with high degrees, i.e. to ‘popular’
nodes [19], see Section 2.3.3. In the extracted directed networks of friends (enemies)
we assume this popularity (‘disdain’) being well expressed by the in-degree. We call
characters who get connected to a network for the first time newcomers. To test
1We used version 4.0.
http://www.stanford.edu/∼dgleich/programs/matlab bgl.
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Figure 6.2: Network properties: (a) number of nodes N , (b) number of (directed) links L, (c)
average degree k¯, (d) clustering coeﬃcient C, (e) clustering coeﬃcient C divided by clustering
coeﬃcient of corresponding random graph Cr, (f) local eﬃciency Eloc, (g) average geodesic g¯,
(h) average geodesic g¯ divided by average geodesic of corresponding random graph g¯r, (i) global
eﬃciency Eglob, (j) reciprocity ρ, (k) assortative mixing coeﬃcient (of clustering in undirected
network) rC(k), (l) assortative mixing coeﬃcient (in undirected network) rundir. Arrows mark the
outbreak of an in-game war at day 422.
whether evolutions of present networks display a PA bias we measure in-degrees of
characters who are marked by newcomers as friend (enemy). Whenever there exists
a link lij on day d + 1 which has not existed on the previous day d we say that a
(one-day) link event has taken place between ni and nj on day d; we call ni the
source and nj the destination of this event.
If preferential attachment holds in its classical form, the following facts should
be observed:
1. Linking probability P (k) ∝ kα, with α = 1
2. Degree distribution follows a power-law P (k) ∼ k−γ
3. Clustering coeﬃcient C versus degree k is uniform
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Figure 6.3: Empirical probability P (kin) for newcomers connecting to nodes with in-degree kin.
Data is used between days 200 and 400. The black line depicts slope α = 1 and indicates the linear
dependence assumption needed in the PA model. Green lines denote least squares fits. Values for
enemies are vertically displaced by a factor 0.1 for better visibility.
A linking probability P (k) ∝ kα, with α = 1, means that the probability P of
a newcomer connecting to an existing node ni with in-degree kini is P (k
in) ∝ ￿kin￿α
with α = 1. Figure 6.3 shows P (kin) versus kin for friend and enemy networks; all
link events between newcomers and their destinations have been used from day 200
to 400. Least squares fits in double-logarithmic scale yield an exponent of α = 0.62
for friend markings with kin < 30, but α = 0.90 for all enemy markings. We observe
an increased upward bending for players having in-degrees larger than about 100, i.e.
for very popular players. A similar eﬀect of ‘super-preferentiality’ has been measured
in [142] for LinkedIn, a social networking site for professional contacts. There an
exponent α = 0.6 is reported. This first observation shows that the formation process
behind friendship networks cannot be explained with classical PA. Actual preferential
attachment has been measured in relatively few works [117, 123, 142]; the evolution
of preferential attachment parameters was measured in [60].
Concerning the degree distribution, it does not follow a power-law in friend net-
works, see Fig. 6.4 (b). However, the situation is diﬀerent for enemy networks,
where the distribution of in-degrees follows an approximate a power-law with ex-
ponent γ ≈ 1 (in the cumulative distribution), see Fig. 6.4 (c). Note that – while
not clearly visible on the last day’s plot in Fig. 6.4 (c) – we find the distribution
of out-degrees in enemy networks separated into two regimes following approximate
power-laws with diﬀerent exponents, γ ≈ −0.6 and γ ≈ −2.5, respectively (in the
cumulative distribution). This is the case for many days in the Artemis universe and
also for most days in the Orion universe (not shown).
Finally, the clustering coeﬃcient versus degree exhibits a clear downward trend
in friend networks and PM networks, see Figs. 6.4 (d) and (e). The exponent of the
clustering coeﬃcient C(k) versus degree k is γ ≈ −0.4. Note also the clearly negative
value of rC(k) at the last days in the friend networks, Fig. 6.2 (k). About the same
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Figure 6.4: Cumulative degree distribution of (a) PM, (b) friend and (c) enemy networks; clus-
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nearest neighbor degree knn versus degree of the (g) PM, (h) friend, and (i) enemy networks. All
distributions were taken at the last day.
exponent has been measured in a game-theoretic model on co-evolving networks [30];
an exponent of γ ≈ −0.33 was found in another large-scale social network [59]. The
situation is again diﬀerent in enemy networks: Clustering coeﬃcients and degrees
are to a large extent independent; deviations for large degrees can be explained by
two diﬀerent mechanics of marking enemies, see Section 6.4.
In conclusion the model of preferential attachment can not be applied for friend
networks. The situation of the enemy networks might be closer to a PA mechanism,
but also there the situation is more intricate.
6.2.2 Network densification
In Ref. [144] intriguing observations concerning universal features of growing real-
world networks have been made. Their empirical observations apparently challenge
two conventional assumptions of popular network models such as PA [19], namely
constant average degrees and slowly growing network diameters:
1. Shrinking diameters: As networks grow their diameters decrease.
2. Densification power-laws: Over time, networks become more dense. Densi-
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Figure 6.5: Links L versus nodes N for all timepoints. Values for enemies and PMs are shifted
vertically for clarity.
fication – measured in number of edges versus number of nodes – follow a
power-law. The average degree grows.
All growing networks measured in this work confirm the observations of growing
average degrees and shrinking diameters (Fig. 6.2 (g) shows shrinking geodesics; we
observe the same evolution for diameters and eﬀective diameters as defined in [144]
(not shown)). Merely the enemy network reaches a steady state shortly before day
400. Concerning power-law densification, even though our data does not allow for a
statistically conclusive quantitative statement, visual inspection clearly reveals that
growth is super-linear, Fig. 6.5. The L versus N curves for the most part have slopes
between 1 and 2. Due to heavy fluctuations and limited extension over N , fits to
power-laws are not reliable. Network densification has previously been studied under
the name of accelerated growth [67, 68]. Growing average degrees were observed in
all three time evolution studies of growing networks we are aware of [116, 144, 182].
From decreasing distances it follows that global eﬃciency increases, Fig. 6.2 (i).
At the same time, evolution of local eﬃciency follows the evolution of clustering
coeﬃcients, Fig. 6.2 (f). PM networks have approximately the same local and global
eﬃciency (around 0.25), in friend networks local eﬃciency (around 0.33) is higher
than global eﬃciency (around 0.22), in enemy networks local eﬃciency is much lower
(around 0.04) than global eﬃciency (around 0.28).
6.2.3 Measuring non-trivial network properties
We make the following observations on the evolving network measures shown in
Fig 6.2 and Table 6.1 which have not been discussed in previous sections.
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Average geodesics close to random network value
For all networks the comparison parameter g¯/g¯r lies well within the band [0.5, 2] as
reported for various scale-free networks by [68], Fig. 6.2 (h). It fluctuates slightly
above 1 for enemy and friend networks, growing for the former, decreasing for the
latter. In PM networks g¯/g¯r is slightly below 1 for most time points.
Changing clustering coeﬃcients
Clustering coeﬃcients of friend networks decrease, those of enemy networks increase,
Fig. 6.2 (d). Concerning C/Cr, values fall in friend and PM networks but grow in
enemy networks, Fig. 6.2 (e). C/Cr curves of PM networks fall between the curves of
enemy and friend networks. Decreasing clustering coeﬃcients have been reported for
co-authorship networks [182], online social networks [117], and appear in a model of
growing social networks [125]. Note that C/Cr has a high value for friend networks
(C/Cr > 100), as is expected for most social networks of positive ties [170].
Positive reciprocity
All networks are reciprocal, Fig. 6.2 (j). At the last day the PM network has a
reciprocity of ρ ≈ 0.80, the friend network has ρ ≈ 0.68 after having reached a
maximum of ρ ≈ 0.83 in the first days. Excluding the first few days, the reciprocity
indices of enemy networks lie around ρ ≈ 0.1. The naive reciprocity R displays
qualitatively similar behavior (not shown). Low reciprocities in enemy networks
may be explained by deliberate refusal of reciprocation, to demonstrate aversion by
lack of any response.
Holme et al. [116] report a naive reciprocity value around R = 0.4 for a message
network, a value much lower than our measured ones around R ≈ 0.7 in PM net-
works. We suspect two factors responsible for this discrepancy: A higher community
coherence – i.e. more social pressure to respond – in Pardus, and a possibly high in-
activity rate of users on the dating site. Probably for the same reason of community
coherence, reciprocities ρ ≈ 0.8 of Pardus PM networks are well above ρ = 0.194, a
value reported for messages in email networks [90].
No assortativity
For PM networks, all five considered assortative mixing coeﬃcients reach steady
state values slightly below zero, Fig. 6.2 (l) (only plots of rundir are shown). PM
networks are therefore disassortative, i.e. a player who sends/receives PMs to/from
players with many PM-partners displays a slight tendency of having few PM-partners
and vice versa. For a possible explanation see [116] who attest this observation
as being in contrast to collaboration networks, for which positive assortativity has
been measured. There it has been claimed that in friend networks individuals are
substitutable and negative mixing is optimal. The approximate steady state of friend
networks displays no clear tendency towards assortativity or disassortativity after a
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Figure 6.6: Fraction of nodes in the largest connected component Γ.
transient phase of falling assortativity. Note that by using an assortativity profile it
is possible to uncover families of networks, similar to TSPs [84, 157].
Structural change of PM networks due to times of war
On day 422 a war between a substantial number of players broke out in the game
universe. A structural change of PM networks is identifiable, most clearly in the
number of links L, average degree k¯, average geodesic g¯, local eﬃciency Eloc and
global eﬃciency Eglob, see arrows in Fig. 6.2.
Growing largest connected component
The fraction of nodes in the largest connected component, Γ, is growing in friend and
enemy networks over almost all 445 days, Fig. 6.6. On the last day we find Γ ≈ 0.973
for friends and Γ ≈ 0.992 for enemies. The value for PM networks fluctuates around
Γ ≈ 0.985.
6.3 Testing classical sociological hypotheses
6.3.1 Confirmation of the Weak ties hypothesis
The Weak ties hypothesis of Granovetter is an important proposition of sociology
and builds upon the assumption that “the degree of overlap of two individual’s
friendship networks varies directly with the strength of their tie to one another”
[97]. By Granovetter’s paradoxical formulation of the Weak ties hypothesis (“The
Strength of Weak Ties”), weak ties (e.g. casual acquaintanceships) are proposed to
be strong in the sense that they link communities in an essential way – i.e. they are
local bridges of high degree – while strong ties (standing for e.g. good friendships)
correspond to replacable intra-community connections. Under given social balance
90
6.3. Testing classical sociological hypotheses
101 102 103 104
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100 (a)
b
P(
≥ 
b)
100 101 102 103
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100 (b)
w
P(
≥ 
w)
Figure 6.7: Cumulative distribution of (a) betweenness and (b) weight values in the mutual part of
the largest connected component of the PM network at the last day.
assumptions, except for very unlikely conditions, “no strong tie is a bridge”, and “all
bridges are weak ties” [97]. As an intuitive notion of strength of an interpersonal tie,
Granovetter mentions “the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy
(mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie”.
For validating the Weak ties hypotheses, see below, we measured overlap versus
PM weight (number of exchanged PMs) and overlap versus betweenness in the largest
connected component of the mutual part of the last PM network. For definitions of
overlap and betweenness see Section 2.3.5, we report the cumulative distributions of
these quantities in Fig. 6.7. We used this reduced network because it can be directly
compared to [172]. Results on full PM networks and on PM networks accumulated
over diﬀerent time-spans are very similar however (not shown). Betweenness for all
links was calculated with the algorithm provided in the MatlabBGL package.
Quantitatively the hypothesis concerning the connection between tie strength and
overlap of friendship circles should manifest itself in an increasing function O(w) of
overlap versus weight. This is clearly the case for PM networks, Fig. 6.8 (b), where
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an approximate cube root law is suggested,
O(w) = w0.30 ≈ 3√w. (6.1)
Note that our method does not encounter sampling issues as in e.g. [172]; in this
sense our results are free of bias.
A direct way of testing the Weak ties hypothesis is to examine the correlation
between betweenness and overlap. By the Weak ties hypothesis, the overlap O(b)
as a function of betweenness should be decreasing. Our data strongly confirms this
prediction, Fig. 6.8 (a) and suggests an inverse square root law. Logarithmically
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Figure 6.9: One transition representing triadic closure: id 6 → id 13.
binned average values lie on a line with slope γ ≈ −0.54.
O(b) = b−0.54 ≈ 1√
b
. (6.2)
These results are in agreement with mobile phone call network data [172], and are
robust across game universes and accumulation times. The Weak ties hypothesis has
also previously been tested by [87] on a small-scale social network of biologists.
6.3.2 Confirmation of triadic closure
In this section we give large-scale quantitative evidence for another important pre-
diction of [97], the hypothesis of triadic closure. This conjecture follows balance
considerations of Ref. [107] and reads as follows: In a social network in which there
exist weak and strong (or no) ties between individuals, “the triad which is most
unlikely to occur, [. . . ] is that in which A and B are strongly linked, A has a strong
tie to some friend C, but the tie between C and B is absent” [97]. The phenomenon
of triadic closure [180] states that individuals are driven to reduce this cognitive
dissonance, Fig. 6.9.
Triad significance profiles (implicit evidence)
If triadic closure – as formulated by Granovetter [97] – holds, it causes the triad in
which there exist strong ties between all three subjects A, B and C to appear in a
higher than expected frequency. The statistical tool we use to quantify this possible
eﬀect is the triad significance profile (TSP), see Section 2.3.5. Comparing TSPs of
various types of networks can reveal “superfamilies” of evolved or designed networks
which have similar local structures in common [157].
For calculating the TSP, we draw random networks from the U(X∗+, X+∗,M∗)
distribution by using the same switching algorithm and Monte Carlo method as
[157, 159]. We use the same program mfinder2. See [158, 185] for details. We
calculate the TSPs for all three network types at the last day with the following
2We used version 1.2.
http://www.weizmann.ac.il/mcb/UriAlon.
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Figure 6.10: Triad significance profiles for the three network types (day 445).
parameters: 100 random networks, each generated by performing Q · L switches,
where Q is drawn uniformly from {100, . . . , 200}. Resulting TSPs are displayed in
Fig. 6.10.
Following the considerations of Granovetter about tie strength we identify the
concept of weak/strong ties with asymmetric/mutual dyads in our digraphs. Trans-
lated into our formalism the hypothesis reads: “In friend networks, triad class 6
should have smallest Z score, triad class 13 should have highest Z score”. In other
words, triad class 13 should be the network’s strongest three-node motif, triad class
6 should be it’s strongest three-node antimotif [159]. More generally, if we focus
on completeness, we expect underrepresentation of the incomplete triad classes 1–6
and overrepresentation of the complete triad classes 7–13. Note that quantitative
evidence for triadic closure given this way is implicit at best, since the overrepresen-
tation (underrepresentation) of triad class 13 (6) does not explain how or if there is
a direct connection in the evolution of these triad classes. We give explicit evidence
for triadic closure in the subsequent section by measuring triad transition dynamics.
The question about the reverse situation, networks of negative ties, has been
raised in the outlook of [97] but, to our knowledge, has never been measured on
large scales. Following the same social balance considerations we expect reversed
roles of completeness: Instead of the absence of a completing third link, its presence
should cause cognitive dissonance (however, note that a complete triad with only
negative links may be seen as ambiguous concerning balance [61, 64]). Thus triad
classes 1–6 should be overrepresented, triad classes 7–13 underrepresented in enemy
networks.
For friend and PM networks, excellent agreement is found with Granovetter’s
prediction: Triad class 6 has the minimum, class 13 a maximal Z score, Fig. 6.10.
Our findings further coincide with the TSPs of the superfamily of social and hyperlink
networks found in [157] and with TSPs of other social networks [99]. Concerning
enemy networks, we observe confirmation of our reverse hypothesis to a large extent:
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Most enemy Z scores have opposite signs of those in friend networks. Note the
exceptions: triad id 4 is not clearly overrepresented, ids 9 and 11 are not clearly
underrepresented. The circular triad (id 8) should be considered an exceptional or
‘neutral’ class, having no clear tendency in all network types.
An attempt at explaining the order of Z scores. When facing the TSP of
the PM and friend networks in Fig. 6.10 in this ordering of triad ids, one can-
not help but notice an approximate monotonic decrease of Z scores within the
ordered set (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) and an approximate monotonic increase within the or-
dered set (7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13) of triad ids. Recall that we adopted the notation of
[157, 159] who apparently (or coincidentally?) number the connected triad classes
by first considering completeness, and as a second criterion increasing naive reci-
procity R. If a triad class i is complete, we write c(i) = 1, else c(i) = 0. The
reciprocities of all triad classes are R(1) = R(2) = R(3) = R(7) = R(8) = 0,
R(9) = R(10) = R(11) = 13 , R(4) = R(5) =
1
2 , R(12) =
2
3 , R(6) = R(13) =
1. These two types of orderings can be understood as total orders of all consid-
ered triad classes: {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} <c {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13}3 for completeness and
{1, 2, 3, 7, 8} <R {9, 10, 11} <R {4, 5} <R 12 <R {6, 13} for reciprocity. The lexi-
cographical order <c,R induced by relations <c and <R, i.e. the latter takes eﬀect
should the former yield equivalence, applies to the ordering of [157, 159] as follows:
{1, 2, 3} <c,R {4, 5} <c,R 6 <c,R {7, 8} <c,R {9, 10, 11} <c,R 12 <c,R 13.
We now order all triad ids by increasing Z score of the friendship network of
the Orion universe of day 1087, O+, and attempt to explain the emergence of this
specific order by incorprating the two above and two additional well-founded socio-
logical properties. It is important to stress the speculative nature of this explanation.
Besides, a certain variance of error in resulting TPSs is expected, since they were
derived via a Monte Carlo method which is approximative by definition.
One property not considered so far is transitivity, for which “strong, statistical
evidence [was provided, that it] is a very important structural tendency in social
networks” [215]. An ordered triad involving actors i, j, and k is transitive (T) if
the existence of arcs (ni, nj) and (nj, vk) implies the existence of (ni, vk). If either
of the two conditions of this statement is not met (i.e. (ni, nj) and/or (nj, vk) does
not exist), the triad is called vacuously transitive (VT). A triad isomorphism class
is T if all its six realizations of ordered triads are T or VT [215]. In our notation,
triad classes {7, 9, 10, 13} are T, {1, 2} are VT, {3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12} are intransitive
(IT). We introduce this new property via the function t where t(i) = −1 for an IT,
t(i) = 0 for a VT, and t(i) = 1 for a T class i. Note that we expect IT (T) classes to
have a negative (positive) impact on Z score. A second property is the (for clarity
of order negative) amount of close friends disagreeing which we term f . This value
is f(6) = −2, f(4) = f(11) = f(12) = −1, for all other triad classes it is 0 [215].
3For two triad classes i and j we write i <E j short for E(i) < E(j) and i =E j short for
E(i) = E(j), where E is a function which – based on a property – assigns each triad class a
numerical value. If i and j are sets of triad ids, the relation x <E y holds for all pairs of elements
x ∈ i and y ∈ j and the equivalences x1 =E x2 and y1 =E y2 hold for all pairs of elements x1, x2 ∈ i
and y1, y2 ∈ j.
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Whenever f(i) < 0, an additional tendency towards lower Z score is expected.
In this new order, Table 6.2 depicts all considered attributes. By generaliz-
ing Granovetter’s considerations, in the group of incomplete triads {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
relation <c,R is supposed to order by monotonically decreasing Z score, within
{7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13} by monotonically increasing Z score. For O+, this is true for
all classes except for pair {7, 11}; an additional exception is pair {10, 12} for the
friendship networks of the Artemis and Pegasus universes, A+ and P+ respectively.
For these pairs, note that while reciprocity of one class is higher than the other one’s,
both transitivity and close friends disagreeing are inconsistent with reciprocity (i.e.
i <R j but i >t j and i >f j). This observation suggests that the eﬀect of reciprocity
may be “outweighed” by these two properties. Further note that using above con-
siderations, we are not able to explain the clear ordering of classes 2 <Z 1 <Z 3 in
friend networks. For the properties considered these triad classes are too similar as
to allow substantiated diﬀerentiation4.
Time evolution of TPSs. In the previous paragraphs of this Section, triad
significance profiles of one day were analyzed. By measuring evolutions of TSP,
we are able to confirm the robustness of the results. Figure 6.11 shows the time
evolution of TSPs in PM, friend, and enemy networks, each day measured with the
same parameters as in the previous section. For visual clarity, all single Z score
evolutions were smoothed with a moving average filter using a time window of 7
days. Z scores of PM networks stay constant, see Fig. 6.11 (a). For friend networks
the order of Z scores stays relatively constant except for the pairs {2, 4} and {10, 12},
which switch order abruptly at day ≈ 290, Fig. 6.11 (b). At this time, a new game
feature was introduced in Pardus, which allowed players to join syndicates. Because
of this a number of players reconsidered their friend and enemy relations. Besides
these abrupt changes, some trends are discernable, such as the slow decrease of triad
classes 1 and 3 or the increase of triad classes 9 and 11. In enemy networks, Fig. 6.11
(c), TSPs undergo heavy fluctuations but settle into three groups of triad classes
after some hundred days: {1, 2, 3, 5, 6} being highly overrepresented (Z score > 0.2),
{4, 8, 9, 11} being neither clearly over- nor underrepresented (Z score between −0.1
and 0.1), and {7, 10, 12, 13} being highly underrepresented (Z score < −0.15). In
conclusion, TSPs may need some hundred days to reach an approximate steady state.
On the other hand it is apparent from Fig. 6.11 (b) that as social networks evolve,
their microscopic structures do not always stay completely constant. Sudden jumps
in the TSP trajectories signal abrupt global systemic changes.
Triad transition rates (explicit evidence)
To obtain insight in triad dynamics and to test for triadic closure explicitly, we
directly count all transformations of all triads in friend networks, enabling us to
deduce empirical transition probabilities from one type to another. We measure
4Note that there are several nuances of transitivity. For example, triad class 3 has 5 VT realiza-
tions and only 1 IT one [215]. Thus there is only the smallest possible diﬀerence between classes 1,
2, and 3 by the considered properties.
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Figure 6.11: Evolution of triad significance profiles for (a) PM, (b) friend, and (c) enemy networks.
A moving average filter with a time window of 7 days was used for smoothing.
13 × 16 matrices Πd of day-d-to-day-(d + 50) triad transition probabilities for each
day d ∈ {150, . . . , 200}. This matrix is constructed by using an algorithm adapted
from [23]. Its entries πdij are the empirical probabilities that triads of class i on day
d become triads of class j on day d + 50. Note that the sum of each row of Πd
equals 1. Values between diﬀering rows are not directly comparable due to a highly
heterogeneous triad census. For example, the census of all connected triads of day
200 reads (20503, 19872, 13286, 36737, 48320, 58137, 1510, 20, 1209, 4862, 453, 4788,
7887), ordered by increasing triad id. The number of unconnected triads, especially
null triads, is much larger namely
￿
N
3
￿
minus the number of connected triads; in
our case this amounts to an order of magnitude of ∼ 1010. Similarly, we define the
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matrices Kd containing empirical transition counts kdij of triads of class i becoming
class j. For both matrices only those triads are counted in which all three of the
involved characters still exist on day d+ 50.
We denote the matrix of element-wise time averages of Πd and Kd over all con-
sidered days by Π and K, respectively. Entries kij of matrix K are empirical average
50-day transition counts of triads changing from class i to class j, entries πij of matrix
Π the corresponding transition probabilities. Figures 6.12 (a) and (b) show Π and
K. Figure 6.12 (c) displays the matrix of asymmetries in 50-day transition counts
K for friend networks, i.e. K−KT . Similar matrices for enemy networks have very
diﬀerent entries (not shown), matrices for PM networks were not calculated.
We first discuss transitions between the groups of incomplete and complete con-
nected triads, i.e. on values in the center right and lower center zones of K. Ac-
cording to the hypothesis of triadic closure, k6,13 should contain high values, its
counterpart k13,6 lower ones. As apparent from Fig. 6.12 (b), this is the case:
k6,13 = 305.5 > 22.6 = k13,6. This result is directly visualized in Fig. 6.12 (c),
which depicts the matrix K −KT . The darker a square ij, the higher the outflow
i → j compared to the inflow j → i; the lighter a square ij, the higher the inflow
j → i compared to the outflow i→ j.
In general, we measure more incomplete → complete transitions between con-
nected triad classes (upper right zone of K) than vice versa (lower center zone of K).
On the other hand, some exceptions can be identified, for example k5,13 = 20.0 <
39.2 = k13,5. Whenever these exceptions appear they are comparably mild; again,
observations are robust across game universes and time spans. Note that in [203]
we measured transition rates of signed triadic closure, i.e. triadic closure in signed
networks, and clear up dynamics in signed networks.
6.3.3 Confirmation of the Dunbar number
Out-degrees of networks studied here are limited by kout ≈ 150, Fig. 6.4 (a), (b), and
(c). This number was conjectured by [73] to be a limiting number in group sizes of
humans and human-like mammals, due to their limited cognitive capacities.
6.3.4 Inconclusive social balance dynamics
Social balance theory goes back to the cognitive balance considerations of [107]. A
complete triad ninjnk is defined to be balanced if the product of signs sijsjkski = 1,
and is unbalanced otherwise. Members of a balanced complete triad thus fulfill the
following adage [10, 107]:
– a friend of my friend is my friend
– a friend of my enemy is my enemy
– an enemy of my friend if my enemy
– an enemy of my enemy is my friend
In physics the first statement corresponds to a ferromagnetic system, the other
three to a ‘frustrated’ system. In graph theory, the concept of social, or structural,
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Figure 6.12: (a) Matrix Π of empirical average 50-day transition probabilities of triad classes in
friend networks over the days 150 to 200. Circles mark transitions which never occured. Black
squares mark average transition probabilities ≥ 0.02. (b) Matrix K of empirical average 50-day
transition counts of triad classes in friend networks. Black squares mark average transition counts ≥
50. (c) Matrix of asymmetries between empirical average 50-day transition countsK of triad classes
in friend networks. Black and white squares mark average transition counts with asymmetries ≥ 50.
Black crosses mark entries without data. Red circles mark the asymmetry of transitions between
triad classes 6 and 13.
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balance has been generalized to an arbitrary amount of subjects by [42]; hypotheses
about the evolution of social balance have been conjectured [64, 66]. We measure the
evolution of social balance by using optimizational partition algorithms implemented
in Pajek5. Here we face three concrete problems: (i) Algorithmic complexity: Due
to algorithmic complexity runtime diverges for large numbers of nodes (Pajek limits
the number of nodes to 250). Thus for measurements of balance we are forced to
select groups of characters. (ii) Group selection: Characters have diﬀerent sign-up
dates. This starts to matter for any selected group when long-time considerations
are carried out. One gets inhomogeneous groups, where some characters have a long
history of relations whereas others have not. (iii) Growth of average degrees: The
permanent growth of average degrees, Fig. 6.2 (a), is inconsistent with the necessary
assumption of constant degrees, such as taken as basis for the monastery study of
[191] analyzed in [65]. This assumption is also needed in models and analytical work
[10], where dynamics takes place only on complete graphs, i.e. graphs displaying
a dichotomy of link types (positive or negative link) in contrast to the trichotomy
(positive, negative or no link) of the Pardus networks.
Ignoring these three issues, our attempts to measure the evolution of social bal-
ance in several groups of characters at various time scales and cluster sizes yield no
conclusive results. Neither an increase nor a decrease in balance could be observed.
Measuring social balance of fixed groups over time seems inherently futile, for the
following reason: Signs of links do almost never switch [203], so there may be no
propagation of balance in social systems. This observation is diametrically opposed
to aforementioned classical assumptions [10]. Also, system complexity is so high (fac-
tions, alliances, wars, . . . ), that simple analytical steady states (e.g. two internally
positively – but among each other negatively connected sets of nodes) are impossible
to reach. For a deeper discussion about these and several other problems related to
social balance theory and inconsistencies in empirical findings see [64, 121].
Note that the friend relation is transitive, but not so the enemy relation6. By
construction, complete triads in the reflexive closure of friend (enemy) networks are
balanced (unbalanced). In enemy networks one therefore expects less complete triads
and clustering coeﬃcients C closer to their random graph values – i.e. smaller C/Cr
– than in networks of friends. As apparent from Fig. 6.2 (e), this is fully confirmed.
6.4 Two categories of enemies
It has been suggested that identifying negative social tie mechanics is more important
for gaining insight in social group dynamics than identifying mechanics of positive
social ties [137]. Our measurements provide first steps toward this direction.
We observe that in-degrees in enemy networks grow much bigger (kin ≈ 500) than
in-degrees in friend and PM networks (kin ≈ 150), Figs. 6.4 (b) and (c). Also, the
assortativity coeﬃcient rundir of enemy networks is clearly negative, Fig. 6.2 (l). In
5We use version 1.24. [63, 65, 66]
6A binary relation R is transitive if xRy and yRz implies xRz.
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the average neighbor degree knn versus degree k one observes two classes or types,
Fig. 6.4 (i). The first class consists of characters with low degrees (k < 50), all
having an average neighbor degree of knn ≈ 100. The second class of characters has
a degree of k > 100 and an average neighbor degree of knn ≈ 28. Between these
classes a sharp transition occurs. This impression is robust across time and game
universes.
As mentioned in Section 6.2.1, on many individual days the distribution of out-
degrees of enemy networks is separated into two regimes roughly following power-laws
with markedly diﬀerent exponents. We find clear qualitative diﬀerences between in-
and out-degree distributions in enemy networks, in contrast to the other network
types. Further, reciprocity is very low in enemy networks, as opposed to high reci-
procity in the other network types, Fig. 6.2 (j). These measurements suggest two
distinct mechanics of enemy marking dynamics at work:
1. Private enemies: A player who directly experiences a negative (asocial) action
by another player, such as an attack of her building or a verbal insult, is likely to
immediately react by marking the oﬀender as enemy. If the two involved players
keep this a private aﬀair, only a local, dyadic vendetta without envolvement of
more players may ensue.
2. Public enemies: Some players have a destructive personality or, more com-
monly, want to try out a destructive personality [45]. For this purpose they
may (role)play evil characters, such as ‘pirates’. These players tend to take en-
joyment in destroying other players’ work or see it as their ‘task’. Anonymity
of the internet facilitates this behavior to some degree since possible social
repercussions in real-world reputation are absent. For this reason these few
individuals tend to cause a lot of oﬀenses to a big number of players. If such
a subject is identified by the community (players are very busy in using the
forums to keep others up-to-date of the latest oﬀenses), she may receive pre-
emptive enemy markings, either by friends of oﬀended friends or by otherwise
non-involved players who happen to read the forums. This destructive be-
havior and the indirect marking mechanism leads to the emergence of ‘public
enemies’, i.e. a few characters with a very high in-degree of enemy markings.
The strength of positive social ties is likely to be boosted by people who share
the same common enemies: “A world that includes self-proclaimed and loudly
advertised Evil people running about represents a great boon to those who are
hungry to fight for the Good. Without Evil people, who could be Good?” [45].
It is an open question to which extent negative social behavior in real society
deviates from the behavior of humans in our game society. Due to lack of other high-
frequency analyses on large-scale negative tie networks, it remains to be established
whether the above findings can be referred to as ‘universal’.
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6.5 Diﬀerences in network types
Diﬀerent network types have diﬀerent properties [157, 170], and show a diﬀerent
evolution of these properties. The clear asymmetries of evolutions of reciprocity,
clustering per degree, and assortativity between friend and enemy networks are ob-
vious, Fig. 6.2 (j), (k), and (l). These asymmetries originate from diﬀerences in
the corresponding formation processes. Intuitively, someone either is your enemy or
not – which is apparent to determine and declare –, but friendship comes in several
shades of gray more likely being dependent on long-time social dynamics. This in-
tuition is confirmed by [137]: “The evolution of negative relationships may be very
diﬀerent from positive relationships. Friendship development is viewed as a gradual
process. According to social penetration theory [. . . ], friendship development pro-
ceeds from superficial interaction in narrow areas of exchange to increasingly deeper
interaction in broader areas. [. . . ] Qualitative work indicates that negative relation-
ship development is a much faster process that tends to lead to the other person
being included in coarse-grained categories such as “rival” or “enemy”. Thus, the
formation of negative relationships is not the mere opposite of the way that positive
relationships form.” Properties of and interactions between several of the measured
networks are discussed in detail in [203].
Further, we observe that reciprocities as well as assortative mixing coeﬃcients
need much more time to reach steady state in friend networks than in other networks.
It seems to be clear why equilibria of the properties of PM networks are reached fast:
Writing or responding to a PM is an administrative, immediately executable action
to a large extent independent of social ties. On the other hand, choosing your friends
or the reciprocation of friendships is a much more delicate operation, necessitating
in-depth considerations about e.g. social balance.
Another issue is the possible ‘import’ of social ties. In a recent study of online
social networks, the eﬀect of a transition from assortative social networks to disas-
sortative or non-assortative networks has been observed [117]. While there it could
not be checked if networks are at their initial stage or not, here we are able to do
so (for the Artemis and Pegasus universes). Our following hypothesis coincides with
the reasoning of [117]: At the initial stage of social online networks, some people
may ‘import’ their social relations from existing previous ones. This is possible since
many players who previously played in Orion created characters in Artemis and Pe-
gasus when these new universes opened. At later times (in our case 100 or more
days), evolving new relations of online interaction take overhand and decrease assor-
tativity, down to disassortativity. The same eﬀect may lead to the observed changes
in clustering coeﬃcients, reciprocity, and other network properties.
6.6 Summary of social network dynamics
We explore novel possibilities of a quantification of human group-behavior on a fully
empirical and falsifiable basis. We study network structure and its evolution of
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several social networks extracted from a massive multiplayer online game data set.
Practically all actions of all 300,000 players over a period of three years are available
within one unique and coherent source. Players live a second economic life and are
typically engaged in a multitude of social activities within the game. With this data
we can show for the first time marked diﬀerences in the dynamics of friend and en-
emy dynamics. A detailed analysis of high-frequency log files focuses on three types
of social networks and allows to subject a series of long-standing social-dynamics
hypotheses to empirical tests with extraordinary precision. Along these lines we
propose two social laws in communication networks, the first expressing betweenness
centrality as the inverse square of the overlap, the second relating communication
strength to the cube of the overlap. These laws not only provide strong quantita-
tive evidence for the validity of the Weak ties hypothesis of Granovetter, they are
also fully falsifiable. Our study of triad significance profiles confirms several well-
established assertions from social balance theory. We find overrepresentation (under-
representation) of complete (incomplete) triads in networks of positive ties, and vice
versa for networks of negative ties. We measure empirical transition probabilities
between triad classes and find evidence for triadic closure, again with unprecedented
precision. We compare our findings with data from non-virtual human groups and
conclude that online game communities should be able to serve as a model for a
wide class of human societies. We demonstrate the realistic chance of establishing
socio-economic laboratories which allow to measure dynamics of our kind at levels
of precision so far only known from the natural sciences.
In recent work on an extended data set [203], compiled in the next Chapter,
further non-trivial structures of social systems in our online world were uncovered,
reasserting its potential for harnessing knowledge about the fundamental nature of
the organization and dynamics of human society. There we first study the basic
network properties of the newly added network types, relate them to the old ones,
and finally analyze them in conjunction to uncover the interdependencies between
the diﬀerent network types, showing the nontrivial organization of the social system
in Pardus.
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Chapter 7
Multi-relational organization of
societies: Network–network
interactions
Human societies can be regarded as large numbers of locally interacting agents,
connected by a broad range of social and economic relationships. These relational
ties are highly diverse in nature and can represent e.g. the feeling a person has
for another (friendship, enmity, love), communication, exchange of goods (trade) or
behavioral interactions (cooperation or punishment). Each type of relation spans
a social network of its own. A systemic understanding of a whole society can only
be achieved by understanding these individual networks and how they influence
and co-construct each other. The shape of one network influences the topologies
of the others, as networks of one type may act as a constraint, an inhibitor, or
a catalyst on networks of another type of relation. For instance, the network of
communications poses constraints on the network of friendships, trading networks are
usually constrained to positively connoted interactions such as trust, and networks
representing hostile actions may serve as a catalyst for the network of punishments.
A society can therefore be characterized by the superposition of its constitutive
socio-economic networks, all defined on the same set of nodes. This superposition
is usually called multiplex, multi-relational, multi-modal or multivariate network,
see Fig. 7.1. The study of small-scale multiplex networks has a long tradition in
the social sciences [215], and has been applied to areas such as homophily in social
networks [152], the eﬀect of combined interactions on an agent’s behavior [76] and the
non-trivial inter-relation between family and business networks [174]. Multiplexity
is thought to play an important role in the organization of large-scale networks. For
example the existence of diﬀerent link types between agents explains the overlap
of community structures observed in social networks, where nodes may belong to
several communities, each associated to one diﬀerent type of interaction [7, 80].
Methodological work on multiplex networks includes the development of multiplex
community detection [161], clustering [196] and other network analysis algorithms
[187]. The role of multiple relation types in measured social networks has recently
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Figure 7.1: Multiplex networks consist of a fixed set of nodes connected by diﬀerent types of links.
This multi-relational aspect is usually neglected in the analysis of large social networks. In our
MMOG data set, six types of social links can exist between any two players, representing their
friendship or enmity relations, their exchanged private messages, their trading activity, their one-
to-one aggressive acts against each other (attacks), and their placing of head-money (bounties) on
other players as e.g. means of punishment.
been investigated across communication media [24], in an online game [119], as well
as in ecological networks [92].
The increased use of large-scale data sets on specific human behaviors in the past
decade [140] suﬀers from the drawback of a relatively coarse-grained representation
of social processes taking place between individuals and of blindness in respect to
the existence of diﬀerent types of social interactions. For example in most works
on email [169] or mobile phone networks [138, 173], the existence and weight of a
link is determined by the volume of information exchanged between two individu-
als. Although nodes can be generally well characterized (age, sex, zip code, etc.), the
corresponding type of interaction (e.g. family or work interaction), is usually unavail-
able in the data and can only be inferred from behavioral patterns [74]. Moreover,
research on large social networks has focused on single types of interaction only,
e.g. phone or email communication, and has ignored the wide spectrum of human
interactions in real life [152]. Whenever inter-dependencies and feedbacks between
multiple relational interactions are significant, an aggregate representation of the
diﬀerent network types, or the representation of one single type will lead to a biased
and misleading characterization of the organization of the system.
In this Chapter we present an attempt toward fully characterizing the multiplex
nature of a large-scale social system. To this end we analyze a data set from the
Pardus society as in Chapter 6, extended with data on three types of one-to-one rela-
tions, see below. Having become extremely popular over the past years, there exists
a multitude of large-scale online games – often played by thousands, sometimes even
millions. These games oﬀer the possibility to experience alternative lives in which
players can engage in diﬀerent types of social interactions, ranging from establishing
friendships and economic relations to the formation of groups, alliances, fighting and
even waging of war [205], see Chapter 3.
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The data allows to identify the nature of one-to-one interactions between players;
the topological properties of the corresponding networks – defined on the same set of
agents – can be studied. We show in the following that diﬀerent types of interactions
are characterized by distinct connectivity patterns. Exploring the inter-dependence
of the diﬀerent networks reveals how multiplexity shapes the organization of the
system at diﬀerent levels, from the stability of local motifs to the global overlap be-
tween the networks. Moreover, the existence of positively and negatively connoted
interactions between players, e.g. through declared friendship or enmity, allows to
analyze the organization of the system from the point of view of signed networks
[215]. Within this framework it becomes possible to experimentally verify struc-
tural balance [75], a long-standing theory in social psychology [107] proposed for
understanding emergence of conflict and tension in social systems [42]. The cen-
tral idea behind structural balance is that some configurations of signed motifs, i.e.
local ‘building blocks’ of networks containing positive and/or negative ties, are so-
cially and psychologically more stable than others and are therefore more likely to
be present in human societies. By measuring the dynamics and abundance of signed
triads (sets of three nodes connected by positive or negative links), we perform a
large-scale validation of structural balance and provide insights indispensable for a
realistic modeling of conflicts.
To our knowledge, the only large-scale data set incorporating multiple interac-
tions is the Facebook network of Lewis et al. [145]. Pardus oﬀers several advantages
over this Facebook data. The Facebook network consists of three types of inter-
actions between users: declared friendship relationships, picture friendships (being
tagged in an online photo by a user), and dorm/roommate friendships. However,
two of these three types of interactions lead to a tainted representation of the social
system. First, the friendship network of Facebook is known to be biased by the
visibility of the friends of a user on its webpage [93]. In Pardus, friend and enemy
lists are completely private, meaning that no one except the marking and marked
players have information about positive or negative ties between them. Our data
thus represents a more realistic social situation, in the sense that social ties are not
immediately accessible to the public but need to be found out by communication
with or by careful observation of others. Second, dorm membership is obtained from
the projection of a bipartite network. This procedure is known to distort the number
of cliques in a network [171]. For this reason, we only focus on one-to-one interac-
tions between players and discard indirect interactions such as the participation to
a chat.
The data set considered in this Chapter contains practically all actions of all
players of the MMOG Pardus, of the game universe, Artemis, in which N = 18, 819
players have interacted with at least one other player over the first 445 consecutive
days of this universe’s existence. This data set contains longitudinal and relational
data allowing for an almost complete and dynamical mapping of multiplex relations
of an entire society. The data is free of interviewer eﬀects since agents are not
conscious of their actions being logged. Measurement errors which usually aﬀect
reliability of survey data [41], are practically absent. The longitudinal aspect of the
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7.1. Nature of the various networks
data allows for the analysis of dynamical aspects such as the emergence and evolution
of network structures. Finally, it is possible to extract multiple social relationships
between a fixed set of humans. We focus on the following set of six types of one-to-
one interactions between players: friendship and enmity relations, private message
(PM) communication, trades, attacks, and revenge/punishment through head money
(bounties). We label these networks by Greek indices: α = 1 refers to friendship
networks, . . . , α = 6 to bounties. We focus on one-to-one interactions only (without
projections as e.g. used in [145, 171]) and discard indirect interactions such as mere
participation in a chat.
Friendship and enmity networks are taken as snapshots at the last available day
445. All other networks are aggregated over time, meaning that whenever a link ex-
isted within day 1 and 445, it is counted as a link. For simplicity, we use unweighted,
directed networks. Further, we define undirected networks as follows: A link exists
between nodes i and j if there exists at least one directional link between those
nodes. We construct triads (motifs of three connected nodes [215]) from undirected
links.
7.1 Nature of the various networks
Diﬀerent types of connectivity patterns may signal diﬀerent organization principles
behind the formation of networks [9, 165]. Statistical properties of the six networks,
when considered as separated entities, are collected in Table 7.1. There, Nα is the
number of nodes in the network α, Ldir(undir)α is the number of (un)directed links.
Reciprocity is labeled by rα, ρ(kinα , k
out
α ) is the correlation of in- and out degrees within
the α network. Average degree, clustering coeﬃcient, and clustering coeﬃcient with
respect to the corresponding random graph are marked by k¯α, Cα and Cα/Crandα ,
respectively. For definitions of the measures, see Section 2.3.5.
Positive links are highly reciprocal, negative links are not
Table 7.1 shows that networks with a positive connotation (friendship, private mes-
sages (PMs) and trades) are strongly reciprocal [90] (see Section 2.3.5), in the sense
that node pairs have a high tendency to form bi-directional connections, while net-
works with a negative connotation (enmity, attack and bounty) all show significantly
smaller reciprocity. Low reciprocation in enemy networks may partially be explained
by deliberate refusal of reciprocation to demonstrate aversion by total lack of re-
sponse [205]. For attack networks, it may originate from the asymmetry in the
strength of the players (a strong player is more likely to attack a weaker player to
secure a win). Asymmetry in negative relations is confirmed in the correlations be-
tween node in-degrees and out-degrees. Positive links are almost balanced in the in-
and out-degrees, ρ ∼ 1, whereas negative links show an obvious suppression in doing
to others what they did to you.
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Power-law degree distributions indicate aggressive actions
Studying cumulative in- and out-degree distributions, we find pronounced power-law
distributions for aggressive behavior, i.e. attacking (out-degree for attacks), being
declared an enemy (in-degree for enmity), and punishing/being punished (out- and
in- degree for bounty). Power-laws are absent for positive (friendship, communica-
tion, trade) and passive links (being attacked), see Fig. 7.2. This discrepancy in
degree distributions hints at qualitatively diﬀerent link-growth/rewiring processes
taking place in positive tie networks compared to the negative ones. For example,
the classic network growth model of preferential attachment [19] leads to a power-law
degree distribution. As we have shown in [205], the growth of enemy networks is well
characterized by this model, but not the growth of friend networks.
Positive links cluster
From Table 7.1 it is clear that positively connoted links show higher clustering coef-
ficients than negatively connoted ones. High values of the clustering coeﬃcient are
intuitively plausible for positive interactions due to their cohesive nature and the
benefits of dense sub-graphs for better performance [54]. The significantly lower val-
ues of clustering for negative values suggests that mechanisms such as triadic closure
[180] are not dominant for negative interactions, and has its origin in the balance of
signed motifs, see later.
The independent analysis of the diﬀerent networks reveals distinct types of orga-
nization which depend on the nature of the links. It is crucial to account for these
distinct topological properties in models for the dynamics of cooperation and con-
flict in human societies. To demonstrate the danger of not diﬀerentiating between
types of interactions we include data on the “envelope network” in Table 7.1. Ne-
glecting the nature of social ties and mixing diﬀerent interactions (even within the
same data set) may result in a gross mis-representation of the system, in this case
at least by losing the typical low reciprocity and clustering observed in negative tie
sub-networks.
For a detailed analysis of the time-evolution of single network properties on the
same data set (first 445 days in the Artemis game universe), see [205]. There sev-
eral ‘aging’ or ‘maturing’ eﬀects were reported, such as a decrease of the clustering
coeﬃcient and reciprocity in friend networks over time.
7.2 Network–network interactions
Due to strong interactions between diﬀerent social relations, a next level of complex-
ity enters when considering the co-existence of diﬀerent types of links [141]. From
now on, we only focus on undirected versions of the networks. To quantify the
resulting inter-dependencies between pairs of networks, we follow two approaches.
On one hand, we focus on the link-overlap between networks and calculate the
Jaccard coeﬃcient Jαβ between two diﬀerent sets of links α and β. The Jaccard co-
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Figure 7.2: Cumulative in-degree and out-degree distributions for the six types of networks spanning
the same set of agents: (a) friendship, (b) communication, (c) trade, (d) enmity, (e) attack, (f)
bounty. Note the diﬀerences between in- and out-degree distributions and the presence of power-
laws (with cutoﬀs) for negatively connoted interactions (right column), which are absent for positive
ties (left column). It is immediately clear that topological properties of social networks depend
strongly on the nature of their ties. Ignoring this multi-relational composition can lead to loss of
essential information.
eﬃcient quantifies the interaction between two networks by measuring the tendency
that links simultaneously are present in both networks, see Section 2.3.5.
On the other hand, we compute correlations ρ(kα, kβ) between node degrees in
diﬀerent networks, see Section 2.3.5. These coeﬃcients measure to which extent de-
grees of agents in one type of network correlate with degrees of the same agents in
another one. If ρ(kα, kβ) is close to 1, players who have many (few) links in network
α have many (few) links in network β. Note that both measures might be aﬀected
by diﬀerent network sizes or average degrees. To account for this possibility, we
additionally compute the correlations ρ(rk(kα), rk(kβ)) between rankings of node de-
grees, where rk represents rank, see Section 2.3.5. Overlap and correlation quantities
provide roughly complementary insights into the organization of social structures. In
Fig. 7.3 for all pairs of networks the three measures are shown. Note that no obvious
causal directions are implied and that all correlations are positive. From highest to
smallest overlap (from left to right), Fig. 7.3 provides the following conclusions:
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Figure 7.3: Link overlap (Jaccard coeﬃcient), degree correlation ρ(kα, kβ) and degree rank corre-
lation ρ(rk(kα), rk(kβ)) for all pairs of networks (ordered by link overlap), with the notations E for
Enmity, F for Friendship, A for Attack, T for Trade, C for Communication and B for Bounty. Pairs
of equal connotation (positive-positive or negative-negative) are marked with a gray background.
These pairs have high overlaps, while oppositely-connotated pairs have lower overlaps. The vari-
ous relations are organized in a non-trivial way, suggesting that agents play very diﬀerent roles in
diﬀerent relational networks.
Communication–Friendship. The pronounced overlap implies that friends tend
to talk with each other. The equally pronounced correlation attests that play-
ers who communicate with many (few) others tend to have many (few) friends.
The former result was already reported in [205], where a high fraction of com-
munication partners was shown to be friends.
Trade–Communication. The high overlap shows that trade partners have a
tendency to communicate with each other, while the high correlations shows a
tendency of communicators being traders.
Enmity–Attack. The high overlap shows that enemies tend to attack each other,
or that attacks are likely to lead to enemy markings. The high correlations
imply that aggressors or victims of aggression tend to be involved into many
enemy relations.
Communication–Attack. The relatively high overlap shows that there is a ten-
dency for communication taking place between players who attack each other.
The relatively high correlation implies that players who communicate with
many (few) others tend to attack or be attacked by many (few) players. Ag-
gression is not anonymous, but accompanied by communication.
Enmity–Bounty and Attack–Bounty. Similar to Enmity–Attack.
Communication–Enmity. Similar to Communication–Attack.
Trade–Friendship. Similar to Trade–Communication, however with a smaller
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overlap. It is more diﬃcult for traders to become friends than to just commu-
nicate.
Friendship–Attack. The low overlap shows that attacks tend to not take place
between friends, or that fighting players do not tend to become friends. The
relatively high correlations mean that players with many (few) friends attack
or are attacked by many (few) others.
Trade–Attack. Similar to Friendship–Attack.
Communication–Bounty. Similar to Communication–Attack and Communica-
tion–Enmity, however with much smaller overlap and degree correlations.
Trade–Enmity. For this and all other interactions, overlap vanishes. Players
who trade with each other almost never become enemies and vice versa.
Friendship–Bounty. Similar to Communication–Bounty.
Friendship–Enmity. The degree (rank) correlation is substantial, suggesting
that players who are socially active tend to establish both positive as well as
negative links. However, the vanishing overlap shows the absence of ambivalent
relations. Friends are never enemies.
Trade–Bounty. This interaction shows the smallest values for all three prop-
erties, which could be due to substantial diﬀerences in network sizes. The
relatively small correlation may suggest that players who are experienced in
trade have a tendency to not act out negative sentiments by spending money
on bounties.
The exact values of the two correlation measures have to be interpreted with some
caution. High values might be biased by e.g. the time a player spent in the game
or by ignoring link weights for the number of exchanged private messages or traded
money. Nevertheless, low values of ρ(kα, kβ) indicate that hubs in one network are
not necessarily hubs in another (see e.g. the Trade–Enmity case), suggesting that
agents play very diﬀerent roles in diﬀerent relational networks. For example agents
can be central for flows of information but peripheral for flows of goods [106]. In the
following we present further relations between the above network-network measures
and study their evolutions in time.
Correlating network–network measures reveals a strong relation between link
overlap and degree correlation (ρ = 0.88, p-value < 10−5), see Fig. 7.4 (a). Pairs of
networks of the same connotation have a higher overlap than oppositely-connotated
pairs; a similar tendency for degree correlation is apparent. A correlation between
link overlap and degree rank correlation is also present, however with lower signif-
icance (ρ = 0.63, p-value < 0.01), see Fig. 7.4 (b). We mark pairs including a
communication network as neutral, since messages may involve both positively or
negatively connotated content.
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Figure 7.4: Correlation between the network–network measures of (a) link overlap and degree
correlation (p-value < 10−5), (b) link overlap and degree rank correlation (p-value < 0.01). Pairs of
networks with equal connotation (positive-positive or negative-negative) have a higher overlap then
oppositely-signed pairs, with a similar tendency for degree correlation. We mark pairs including
a communication network as neutral, since messages may involve both positively or negatively
connotated content.
To assess to what extent network–network properties of link overlap, degree cor-
relation, and degree rank correlation change over time, we show these properties at
days 150, 300, and 445 for all pairs of networks in Fig. 7.5. Here, accumulated net-
works, i.e. all except friendship and enmity networks, are accumulated over days 1 to
150, over days 1 to 300, and over days 1 to 445, respectively. Friendship and enmity
networks are taken at these times. The number of players involved in the envelope
network (i.e. in any relation) changes from 9,862 to 15,103 to 18,819 at these points
in time, respectively. Changes are relatively small, except for degree correlations of
pairs including bounty networks. Overlap values generally tend to decrease slightly
over time.
7.3 Large-scale empirical test of structural balance
To analyze the nature of large-scale multiplex networks and to draw conclusions from
our observations, we need to address an issue that is usually obsolete for experiments
on small social systems. When considering diﬀerent types of interactions between
students of a class or diplomatic positions between countries, it is reasonable to
assume that all agents in the network are aware of each other’s existence. In large-
scale social networks, in contrast, the absence of any type of link between two nodes
may either correspond to the existence of an indiﬀerent/neutral interaction, or to
the absence of any past and present contact between both agents. The fact that
agents only know a fraction of the total set of agents is typical of sparse networks
and originates from the finite capacities of its nodes, i.e. agents have limited time,
resources, and cognitive capacities. In the Pardus networks this finiteness is aﬃrmed
by the observation that out-degrees of friendship and enmity networks have an upper
bound, limited by the Dunbar number of about 150 [205], presumed as a natural limit
for social ties humans are able to sustain [73]. The average degree k¯α is well below
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Figure 7.5: Evolving network–network properties (a) link overlap, (b) degree correlation, (c) degree
rank correlation, on the days 150, 300, and 445, for all pairs of networks, with the notations E
for Enmity, F for Friendship, A for Attack, T for Trade, C for Communication and B for Bounty.
Changes are relatively small, except for degree correlations in the E:B, A:B, C:B, and F:B interac-
tions.
O(100), for all network types α.
In the following we assign +(-) to a positively (negatively) connoted link. All
friendship links have a value of +, all enemy links -. Social balance focuses on signed
triads where the sign of a triad is the product of the signs of its three links. Social
balance theory – in its strong form [42] – claims that positive triads are ‘balanced’
while negative triads are ‘unbalanced’, see Fig. 7.6. Unbalanced triads are sources
of social stress and therefore tend to be avoided by agents when they update their
personal relationships. From a physics point of view, the resulting dynamics can
be viewed as an energy minimization process which may lead to jammed states [10]
due to a rugged energy landscape [150]. There is a ‘weak formulation’ of structural
balance [61] which postulates that triads with exactly two positive links are under-
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Figure 7.6: Diﬀerent types of signed triads, balanced (B) or unbalanced (U) according to the strong
or weak formulation of structural balance. We show the number of each type of triad N∆ in the
friendship-enmity multiplex network, the expected number N rand∆ of such triads when averaged
over 1000 sign-randomizations and the corresponding z-score (see Section 2.3.5). Triads +++ and
+−− are over-represented, + +− triads are underrepresented with extraordinary significance.
represented in real networks, while the three other kinds of triads should be much
more abundant. In the weak formulation only situations where “the friend of my
friend is my enemy” are unstable, whereas in the strong form of structural balance,
“the enemy of my enemy is my enemy” is also unstable, see Fig. 7.6.
To test social balance we focus on the multiplex network of friendship and enmity
interactions. The number of diﬀerent types of triads are labeled N∆. They are
compared to the expected number of such triads in the following null model (re-
shuﬄed signs of links, N rand∆ .
The aspect of a null model becomes important when assessing the relevance of
topological structures in a network. A standard procedure consists in comparing this
observation against similar observations in null models, i.e. randomized versions of
the original network under adequate constraints [151]. In order to test predictions
of structural balance theory, we focus on friendship and enmity relations, and leave
aside other types of interactions. In a first step, we remove the negligible number of
ambiguous links (links between players where one marks the other as friend but is
marked back as enemy). Our strategy is now to compare the numbers N∆i of triads
with i positive links with the expected numbers N rand∆i of triads in a null model.
A standard choice for a null model consists of random graphs with fixed degree
sequences. It has been applied for each network separately in Table 7.1, where we
observe that friendship and enmity networks are both more clustered than a random
graph. However, this choice is not appropriate to test the arrangement of positive
and negative links on the set of existing relations between agents – a reshuﬄing
of topology by keeping degrees fixed would for example considerably change the
number of triads which we want to keep fixed. For this reason we define a null
model by keeping the topology fixed and by randomly assigning the L+ plus-signs
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Figure 7.7: Ratio of signed triad types over time. Left: Measured in the data. Center: Expected
in the random null model. Right: Simulation of signed triadic closure (STC) with a model based
on wedge transition rates. Initial condition: Measured network of day 100. All ratios measured in
the data deviate significantly from ratios in the null model, except for the −−− triads. The STC
model reproduces the observed ratios considerably better.
and L− minus-signs on the existing links, where L+ (L−) are the original numbers
of friendship (enmity) links respectively. N rand∆ is measured by averaging over 1000
realizations of the null model. Moreover, the deviation of the data from the reshuﬄed
data is evaluated by the so-called z-score:
zi =
N∆i −N rand∆i
σ∆i
, (7.1)
where σ∆i is the standard deviation of the number of triads ∆i from the 1,000
reshuﬄed realizations.
Given the ratio p := L+L++L− of positive to all links in a signed network, the ex-
pected ratio of triad types in the sign-shuﬄed null model is, following straightforward
combinatorial arguments, p3, 3(1−p)p2, 3(1−p)2p, and (1−p)3 for triad types +++,
+ +−, +−−, −−−, respectively.
In Fig. 7.6, a standard measure of statistical deviation, the z-score (see Section
2.3.5), shows that +++ and +−− triads are heavily over-represented, while ++−
triads are heavily under-represented with respect to the unstructured case. Triads
of type − − − are under-represented to a lesser degree than the three other types,
favoring the weak formulation of structural balance over Heider’s original formulation
of balance theory. It is obvious that triads are characterized by diﬀerent levels of
stability. The robustness of these results is further confirmed by examining the time
evolution of the number of triads in friendship/enmity networks over all 445 days,
Fig. 7.7.
A detailed dynamical analysis of our data further reveals that a vast majority of
changes in the network are due to the creation of new positive and negative links,
not due to switching of existing links from plus to minus or vice versa. We illustrate
this dominance of link destruction and creation over sign switching on the dynamics
of the following triadic structures. Let us define a wedge as a signed undirected triad
with two links, i.e. a triad with one link missing (a ‘hole’). There are three possible
wedge types: ++, +−, −−. We measure day-to-day transitions from wedges to other
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Figure 7.8: Measured day-to-day transition probabilities from wedges to staying the same or to
other triadic structures, in the multiplex network consisting of friend and enmity relations. For
visual clarity a moving average filter with a time window of 14 days was applied. (a) Probabilities
of wedges being closed with a positive link. (b) Probability of a wedge being closed with a negative
link. (c) Probability of a wedge having one or both links removed. (d) Probability of a wedge
staying unchanged. Note how ++ wedges have a clear preference of being closed by a positive
link, while +− wedges have a clear preference of being closed by a negative link. Wedges of type
−− have no sign preference for closure and are more likely to remain unchanged than other wedge
types.
possible triadic structures. In the vast majority of all cases (> 99.9%), a wedge stays
unchanged, see Fig. 7.8 (d). In case of change, most often a hole is closed by either
a positive or a negative link, see Fig. 7.8 (a) and (b). The removal of a link is less
frequent, see Fig. 7.8 (c); sign switches almost never occur. This result is in marked
contrast with many dynamical models of structural balance [10] which assume that a
given social network is fully connected from the start and that only the link-signs are
the relevant dynamical parameters, which evolve to reduce stress in the system. Our
observation underpins that network sparsity and growth are fundamental properties
and they need to be incorporated in any reasonable model of dynamics of positive
and antagonistic forces in social systems. In full agreement with the results shown
in Fig. 7.6, wedges of type ++ close preferentially (about 7 times more likely) with
a positive link, wedges of type +− close preferentially (about 11 times more likely)
with a negative link. There is no clear sign preference in the closure of type −−
wedges.
Indeed, by measuring all day-to-day transitions from wedges (triads with two
links, with the possible forms ++, +−, and −−) to the other triadic structures
(+++, ++−, +−−, −−−, ++, +−, −−, +, −, and the empty triad) we clarify
some of the mechanisms which lead to the social balance observed in Pardus. We
measure the following possible transition types: A wedge stays the same, closes with
a positive/negative link (with the original links unchanged), has one or both links
removed, or has the sign of one or both links switched. Figure 7.8 (a), (b), (c) and
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Figure 7.9: Evolution of number of wedges of each type, in the multiplex network consisting of
friend and enmity relations. For visual clarity a moving average filter with a time window of 14
days was applied.
(d) show the daily transition probabilities of + closures, - closures, link removals,
and of no change, respectively, normalized by the total number of wedges of the
corresponding type on that day. Due to lack of notability no panel for the transition
type of switching links (with a probability less than a tenth of that of link removal,
on average) was included in Fig. 7.8.
Wedges of type ++ close preferentially with a positive link, see green line in
Fig. 7.8 (a), wedges of type +− with a negative link, see blue line in Fig. 7.8 (b).
These probabilities are decreasing over time and seem to eventually level out. There
is no clear sign preference in the closure of type −− wedges (red lines). These
observations consistently explain the social balance results shown in Fig. 7.6 and
Fig. 7.7. Further, note that −− wedges are much more likely to remain unchanged
than other types of wedges, see Fig. 7.8 (d). We conclude that the mechanism of
triadic closure [180] has a much weaker influence as a driving force in purely negative
tie networks than in positive tie or signed networks.
Figure 7.9 depicts the total number of wedges of each type, for every day. Note
how the majority of wedges is of type −−, although there are more positive than
negative links, see Table 7.1. Also the growth rate for −− wedges is higher than for
the other two types (until about day 350, where the number of −− wedges starts to
equilibrate). This seemingly paradoxical circumstance is consistent with the marked
diﬀerences in clustering coeﬃcients, see Table 7.1. It is further consistent with the
observation that a number of aggressive players frequently oﬀend many others and
consequently get marked as enemy by unconnected players [205]. Since the clustering
coeﬃcient measures the ‘closedness’ of all possible triads, a high clustering coeﬃcient
in friendship networks implies a relatively small number of ++ wedges, whereas a
low clustering coeﬃcient in enmity networks implies a relatively high number of −−
wedges.
For assessing to what extent network growth is driven by the closure of triads, we
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Figure 7.10: (a) Closure ratio, defined as the number of new links which closed at least one wedge
divided by all new links, here for each day. For visual clarity a moving average filter with a time
window of 14 days was applied. (b) Link churn, defined as the number of links removed divided
by the number of links added, here for each time window of 14 days. Evolutions of these ratios
are depicted for positive and negative links, within the multiplex network consisting of friend and
enmity relations.
define the closure ratio as the number of newly added links which close at least one
wedge, divided by the number of all new links, over a certain time-window during
the evolution of the network. The closure ratio lies between 0 and 1; the higher
it is the more new links close a wedge. In practice, the closure ratio is strictly
smaller than 1, since a number of cases unavoidably do not allow for the possibility
of new links closing a wedge (for example the first and second links which are added
into an empty network because no wedges exist at that stage). The measured time-
evolution of daily closure ratios in the friend-enmity multiplex network is depicted in
Fig. 7.10 (a). Over time the ratio slightly increases and seems to level out at around
0.5 for both positive and negative links. We conclude that half of all links added
close at least one wedge, while the other half does not. Thus, a model for network
growth using only wedge transition rates shown in Fig. 7.8 could only account for
the dynamics of about half of the added links.
Another quantity important for modeling social network dynamics is the number
of removed links per time. We define the link churn as the number of removed
links divided by the number of new links, over a given time-window. The churn
is non-negative; there are 3 possible cases: i) Growth (0 ≤ churn < 1): More
new than removed links, ii) Equilibrium (churn = 1): The same number of new
as removed links, iii) Shrinkage (churn > 1): More removed than new links. The
higher the churn, the more links are removed relative to the number of added links.
Note that in the majority of classic network growth models, such as preferential
attachment [19], no removal of links is assumed (churn = 0) and the eﬀect of churn
is ignored. The measured time-evolution of link churns over time windows of 14 days
in the friend/enmity network is depicted in Fig. 7.10 (b). Over time ch increases
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and fluctuates around churn = 0.7 for both positive and negative links (taken over
days 200 to 445, churn = 0.66 for friend links and churn = 0.72 for enemy links).
Therefore, at the end for every three new links about two links are removed. Since
the number of links removed from wedges is much smaller than links added to close
wedges, we conclude that many links are removed from triadic structures other than
wedges.
7.4 A network evolution model of signed triadic clo-
sure
We collect empirical transition rates in a transition matrix MSTC, which we use in
a simple dynamical model for Signed Triadic Closure (STC). The measured daily
transition rates define a transition matrix
MSTC = P
 ++→ +++ ++→ ++− ++→ +++− → +−+ +− → +−− +− → +−
−− → −−+ −− → −−− −− → −−

=
 0.000212 0.000029 0.9997590.000025 0.000279 0.999696
0.000040 0.000036 0.999924
 ,
where the entries are the probabilities of a wedge of given type to another triadic
structure. Rows 1, 2, and 3 of MSTC distinguish between wedge types ++, +−, and
−−, respectively; columns 1, 2 and 3 distinguish between probabilities for closure
with either a positive or a negative link, or the probability of no change, respectively.
The constant probabilities of columns 1 and 2 are determined by averaging the
corresponding evolving probabilities over the days 100 to 445 (this time window was
chosen due to a relatively decreased level of fluctuations in transition probabilities,
see Fig. 7.8). The third column is one minus the sum of values in column 1 and 2,
since we neglect link-removals and sign-switches. With these parameters we design
the following network evolution model, to understand STC:
• At time t pick wedge i at random (random sequential update)
• Determine the type of wedge i and close (or do not close) it according to the
relevant entry in MSTC
• Pick next wedge until all wedges are updated
• Continue with time step t+ 1
As the initial condition we take the observed friendship and enmity multiplex-
network at day 100. Simulating this process leads to the results shown in Fig. 7.7 (right),
reproducing the ratio of triads in the data considerably better than the null model.
The STC model ignores three possibly important aspects:
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• It does not take into account links added by means other than triadic closure.
As we have shown above, the closure ratio ≈ 0.5, i.e. only half of all new links
are added in the process of triadic closure. For the other half of new links, one
could for example take into account the mechanism of preferential attachment
[19], for which exponents were reported in Section 6.2.1 and [205].
• The model does not take into account the removal of links. Because removal
happens in a relatively high frequency (churn ≈ 0.7), a possible extension of
the model could involve the measurement and implementation of decay rates,
i.e. of transition rates from complete signed triads to wedges (or other triadic
structures with a smaller number of links). We suspect that balanced triads
are more stable than unbalanced triads.
• The model could be expanded to incorporate directed links and in/out-degree
distributions, clustering coeﬃcients, assortativity, etc.
Despite these potential shortcomings, with this model we are able to reproduce
the empirical observations to a reasonable extent, see Fig. 7.7 (right).
7.5 Discussion of the multi-relational organization of
societies
Most empirical studies of large-scale social networks focus on node properties [80],
for instance to uncover the topological centrality of social agents or patterns of ho-
mophily between agents [51], while being blind to the multiple nature of the links
connecting agents. In many social systems, however, a proper description of multi-
plexity is essential to capture the stress caused by diﬀerent forces acting on social
agents and therefore to uncover the principles shaping the large-scale organization
of social interactions. For instance, the interaction and co-existence of multiple rela-
tions are crucial to describe the emergence of conflict in social systems [35, 52, 146]
or the development of trust in commercial networks [62].
Our work begins to quantitatively measure the multi-dimensionality of human
relationships. Its results shed light on macroscopic implications of interaction types:
Relations driven by aggression lead to markedly diﬀerent systemic characteristics
than relations of non-aggressive nature. Network-network interactions reveal a non-
trivial structure of this multi-dimensionality, and how humans play very diﬀerent
roles in diﬀerent relational networks. The richness of the data set allows to explore
the eﬀect of multiple relations on the structure and stability of a large-scale social net-
work, thereby providing a first empirical basis for the modeling of multiplex complex
networks. Future research perspectives include diﬀerent generalizations of structural
balance theory, e.g. to a larger set of social relations, to the case of weighted and/or
directed networks or to larger motifs, an extension of the concept of modularity for
multiplex [161] or signed [211] networks but also dynamical aspects, for instance the
dynamics of non-cooperative organizations [100].
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Chapter 8
Summary and outlook
In this thesis we have presented a new methodological approach, the extraction and
detailed study of the data set of an entire human society from a self-developed mas-
sive multiplayer online game. To the growing number of studies on large-scale social
systems, in particular on societies in online worlds, we have added a unique, data-
driven collection of works on exploring social systems with statistical physics. We
have demonstrated the eﬃciency and fruitfulness of studying these systems from a
network perspective using recent statistical physics approaches. In particular, we
first studied the “building blocks” of the society, the individuals, their subdiﬀusive
motions and actions, then the evolving network topology spanned by their interac-
tions, and finally the interplay between the diﬀerent types of interaction networks.
In the large-scale social system constituted by the players of our MMOG, we have
first analyzed actions and reactions as isolated events, independent of the topology
spanned by these (inter)actions. We have shown that between diﬀerent types of
human behavioral sequences, communication is by far the most dominant activity,
followed by aggression and trade. Communication events are about an order of mag-
nitude more frequent than attacks and trading events, and feature typical “back-and-
forth” patterns, showing the importance of information exchange between humans.
It is possible to understand the collective timeseries of human actions of particular
types with a mean-reverting log-normal model. Considering positive and negative
actions, we uncovered qualitative diﬀerences on the action-reaction level, where neg-
ative behavior is likely to be repeated and positive behavior is likely to induce a
positive reaction. In a statistical analysis of the actions as world lines in good-bad
space we measured high scaling exponents in the mean square displacements, quan-
tifying the high level of persistency in both positive and negative actions. We also
related the lifetimes of players to their relative number of negative actions and found
a tendency in the system to favor good behavior. Also, bad players are typically dom-
inant, i.e. they perform significantly more actions than they receive. When splitting
the behavioral sequences into words of finite lengths, we found a Zipf law, typical
for complex systems, as well as the Shannon n-tuple redundancy growing with word
length, reflecting again the non-trivial statistical structure of behavioral sequences.
We next focused on the mobility of human-controlled avatars within their virtual
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game universe. The motion of individuals is characterized by an anomalous diﬀusion
process, again typical for a variety of complex systems including real human motions,
where the mean square displacement grows as a power law with an exponent of
ν = 0.26. We uncovered the presence of memory eﬀects and of long-range correlations
in time – caused by players who tend to return to locations which where visited
more recently – which turned out to be the essential ingredient for modeling the
motions of players. Using four measured parameters and a non-Markovian approach
we formulated a Time-Order Memory (TOM) model which is able to recover the
statistical properties of the observed movements. Further, we found that socio-
economic regions have a strong influence on the movement patterns of players, leading
to a preference to move within such regions than between them. Again, making use
of the comprehensive nature of our data set, we were able to quantify this eﬀect
with high precision. Moreover, using only the raw movement data and ignoring the
existence of socio-economic regions, we were able to recover – almost perfectly – the
underlying socio-economic structures by applying methods of community detection.
These results could be relevant to some degree for example to understand the role
of borders in the spreading of epidemics.
Shifting our focus to the interactions between players, we measured the properties
of the underlying evolving network topologies. We found “aging eﬀects” and a den-
sification of our society, where over time individuals come closer and closer to each
other in terms of graph distance. We showed for the first time marked diﬀerences be-
tween properties of friend and enemy networks (most likely related to aforementioned
diﬀerences in the dynamics of positive and negative actions), and subjected a series
of long-standing social-dynamics hypotheses to empirical tests with extraordinary
precision for social science standards. We proposed two social laws in communica-
tion networks, the first expressing betweenness centrality as the inverse square of
the overlap, the second relating communication strength to the cube of the overlap.
These laws not only provide strong quantitative evidence for the validity of the clas-
sical Weak ties hypothesis of Granovetter, they are moreover fully falsifiable. Our
study of the “microscopic building blocks”, the triad significance profiles, empiri-
cally confirmed several well-established assertions from social balance theory. We
found over-representation (under-representation) of complete (incomplete) triads in
networks of positive ties, and vice versa for networks of negative ties. We measured
empirical transition probabilities between triad classes and found explicit evidence
for the hypothesis of triadic closure, again with unprecedented precision.
Extending the number of considered network types to six, including three posi-
tive and three negative interactions, we defined and studied the multiplex network
underlying the society. In this multi-relational view, we quantified microscopic in-
teractions (couplings) of the constituents on diﬀerent interaction networks and we
assessed the interactions between the diﬀerent network layers, uncovering their non-
trivial organizational structures. This work represents first attempts to quantita-
tively measure the multi-dimensionality of human relationships. Its results pro-
vide information on macroscopic implications of interaction types: Relations driven
by aggression lead to quite diﬀerent systemic characteristics than relations of non-
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multi-dimensionality, and how humans play diﬀerent roles in diﬀerent relational net-
works. The richness of the data set allows to explore the eﬀect of multiple relations
on the structure and stability of a large-scale social network, thereby providing a
first empirical basis for the modeling of multiplex complex networks.
First steps to “connect the pieces” were provided in the last part dealing with
multiplex networks [203]. Clearly much more work is needed, to explore several as-
pects in combination. For example, how does social performance of individuals relate
to their economic performance? Which qualities distinguish players who make many
friends (or a lot of money) from other players? How are other features (mobility,
negative behavior, etc.) related to social and economic factors? Can one quantify the
extent of long-range correlations and the tendency to self-organization in this com-
plex system? Since we have the full data of a closed socio-economic unit available
and since we “raised” this society and have all contextual information, we believe it
may now for the first time become possible to answer such questions with a precision
usually only known from the natural sciences.
A large number of other questions may be approached. As a few examples, the
data could be useful for network-theoretical questions such as multiplex community
detection [161], time-varying graphs [33], or the dynamics of non-cooperative orga-
nizations. Future research perspectives may also include diﬀerent generalizations
of structural balance theory, e.g. to a larger set of social relations, to the case of
weighted or directed networks or to larger motifs. Further possible issues include an
evolutionary game theory approach (tragedy of the commons happening in the game
in the form of e.g. resource exploitation), studying systems dynamics questions (e.g.
reaction of the society to shocks), or urban planning (distribution of buildings) in the
game, etc. It is also straightforward to test epidemics spreading [55, 120] of mobile
individuals who are connected in evolving social and economic networks. Of course
Pardus also provides the means for comprehensive economic studies, including the
study of price formation and cartelization, distribution of wealth and emergence of
inequality, game-theoretic considerations from a behavioral economics perspective,
a detailed quantification of systematic “irrationality” in human (economic) behavior
[128, 129], the emergence of conflict or crime in social systems [35, 52, 146] and of
trust in commercial networks [62], clustering of industries, development of cities, or
group dynamics and community formation.
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